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Thesis Summary 
 
This thesis interrogates various accounts of the relationship between the biological and social. Often 
the biological is conceptualised as built upon, or originating from, the foundation of the social (or 
vice versa). I suggest an alternative approach, using various resources and approaches from the 
sciences and from social theories, to reconceptualise the biological and social as always already 
entangled. 
 I develop an account of the entanglement of the biological and social that also entangles the 
ontological and epistemological, matter and meaning. I begin by exploring feminism and 
sociobiology in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly feminist standpoint and postmodernist 
epistemologies. Building on this, and developing my approach (particularly in terms of 
conceptualising material and more-than-human agency), I explore queer and deconstructive 
approaches to sexuality alongside the Human Genome Project and genetic determinism in the 
1990s, and more recent theories of kinship from gender and sexuality studies alongside insights from 
animal studies and critical posthumanisms. Finally, I interrupt this trajectory, suggesting that the so 
far uninterrogated opposition of living/non-living that structures biological science is threatened by 
the liminal status of viruses. More importantly, people living with viruses can become liminal in 
relation to this and other binary oppositions, with consequences for their health and ability to live 
well. 
I propose an approach to living well that is both ecological and queer; connections, 
symbioses and entanglements are crucial throughout. I argue that attention to the entanglement of 
the biological and social offers a way of interrogating narratives of biological determinism and for 
countering the effects of patriarchy and heteronormativity in the theory and practice of science. 
Furthermore, this approach can offer ways of rethinking the production of scientific knowledge and 
the effects this has on the possibility of living well as biopolitical citizens in the more-than-human 
world. 
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‘There are two aspects to emphasize when discussing biology. 
The first is: We live intimately “as” and “in” a biological world. 
This may seem obvious but I emphasize it to reiterate the 
ordinariness or quotidian nature of what we are talking about 
when we talk about biology. And the second aspect, which 
represents a major gestalt switch from the previous point, is: 
Biology is a discourse and not the world itself.’ 
 
 
Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Thyrza Goodeve 
(New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 25 
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Introduction 
Strange Bodies, Strange Pleasures  
 
‘Biology need not be a purveyor of essentialism, of rigid universals. 
Biology need not limit our potential.’ 
Joan Roughgarden, Evolution’s Rainbow1 
 
On the 18th January 2010, The Times published an article by Patrick Muirhead entitled ‘The Day I 
Decided to Stop Being Gay’. In the article, the former BBC newsreader describes how, twenty years 
after coming out, he witnesses a father and son in a barber’s shop and this leads to his decision to 
‘stop being gay’. Specifically, in this moment, he decides that he not only wants a child, but also a 
wife and to reject what he describes as the ‘lifestyle’ of homosexuality.2 The article is problematic 
for many reasons, including Muirhead’s reduction of all homosexuality to his twenty years of 
personal experience of ‘cavorting’ with men, as he describes it: from ‘pubescent fumbling’ to 
‘numerous hours of internet dating; a dizzying number of casual couplings and a few trips to 
genitourinary medicine clinics’.3 Muirhead associates homosexuality with promiscuity and disease, 
while associating heterosexuality with procreation, family and love (although interestingly not 
                                                          
1 Joan Roughgarden, Evolution’s Rainbow: Diversity, Gender, and Sexuality in Nature and People (California: 
University of California Press, 2004), p. 180. 
2 Patrick Muirhead, ‘The Day I Decided to Stop Being Gay’, The Times Online, 18 January 2010 
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_style/men/article6990013.ece> [accessed 10 July 2010] (para. 12 
of 38). The article was simultaneously published in the T2 supplement of The Times print edition under the 
title: ‘I want a wife to love and a child to protect: Twenty years after he came out, Patrick Muirhead, 41, 
explains why he is suddenly feeling the appeal of the opposite sex’, 18 January 2010, p. 2–3. I am primarily 
referring to the online version, as the online comments are particularly interesting and illuminating in relation 
to my thesis. 
3 Muirhead, ‘The Day I Decided to Stop Being Gay’ (para. 19 of 38). 
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monogamy – he states ‘Would I keep faithful? Well, I would try. The same siren voices to stray call to 
all men, all the time. I would be no different’).4  
While the article itself is interesting and problematic, a comment that was made on the 
online version of the article is particularly arresting and is illustrative of a number of the issues that I 
raise in this thesis. After congratulating Muirhead on his decision, the commentator states, ‘I think 
[...] you will enjoy yourself a whole lot more putting it where it was designed to go.’5 There are two 
key assumptions at work in this statement. First, that it – the penis – was designed to go in the 
vagina for the purposes of procreation. This assumption has echoes of the Judeo-Christian creation 
myth where the creation of complementary male and female bodies was followed immediately by 
the imperative: ‘Be fruitful and multiply’.6 This is not necessarily solely a religious imperative, 
however, and the idea of self-evidently complementary male and female bodies and seemingly 
inevitable heterosexuality is not confined to religious rhetoric. Compulsory heterosexuality and the 
supposed complementarity of male and female bodies, for example, are also central to many 
evolutionary origin stories.7 As Roger N. Lancaster states: 
Heterosexuality, like nature, is ‘there from the first day’. Or rather, heterosexuality is the 
first day – the very principle of origin, creation, and generation. By extension, heterosex – 
that is, reproductive sex: penis-in-vagina-to-the-point-of-ejaculation-sex – is ‘real’ sex, 
manifestly revealed in the design of the genitalia. (That’s what sex is for, isn’t it?)8 
                                                          
4 Muirhead, ‘The Day I Decided to Stop Being Gay’ (para. 32 of 38). See also the following response to 
Muirhead’s article: David L. Rattigan, ‘“Ex-gays” side with prejudice’, The Guardian, 20 January 2010 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jan/20/ex-gay-prejudice-attack> [accessed 20 November 
2012]. 
5 Muirhead, ‘The Day I Decided to Stop Being Gay’. Online comments accessed 10 July 2010, but no longer 
available online.  
6 Genesis 1. 28. 
7 I take the term ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ from Adrienne Rich, ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian 
Existence’, Signs, 5:4 (1980) 631-660, in which she employs the term to think about heterosexuality as an all-
pervading western political institution in which homosexuality and other non-normative acts and identities will 
always be marginal or deviant.  
8 Roger N. Lancaster, The Trouble with Nature: Sex and Science in Popular Culture (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 2003), p.38. 
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Second, the statement assumes that by putting it where it was designed to go, Muirhead should 
enjoy himself a lot more; that is, ‘correct’ sexual use of the body should produce more and better 
pleasure than the non-normative or incorrect uses alluded to in Muirhead’s article. The link between 
the body, sexual acts and pleasure is seemingly natural and unproblematic; bodies are self-evidently 
designed for procreation, and the complementarity and congruence of correct orientation between 
the male and female body (should) lead to greater enjoyment than any other wrong, or queer, 
alignment. 
 This example demonstrates a particular normative attitude to the body. It also begins to 
demonstrate the complex interdependent relationship between social attitudes towards the body 
and biological ‘facts’ about the body. In this thesis I will explore this relationship, arguing that the 
biological and the social are not independent but are, in fact, inseparable. I will argue that attention 
to the inseparability of the biological and the social is important for a number of reasons. Chief 
among these is the fact that living well depends on both biological and social factors. In terms of 
health, the biological body is always already part of a multispecies world and health is often 
dependent upon the negotiation of the human’s relationship to nonhuman others such as bacteria 
and viruses. Illnesses and health practices (as well as the conceptualisation of multispecies 
relationships) are, although always embodied and biological, always emphatically social issues. I will 
argue this in detail in the final chapter in relation to social attitudes towards bodies infected with 
HIV/AIDS. Living well is a negotiation of the entangled relationship of the biological and the social. 
My focus in this thesis is on how gendered and sexual bodies are understood in terms of this 
biological-social entanglement, and what the consequences are for living well in a world of 
multispecies relationships. I will ask a number of questions in the thesis, but there are two questions 
that underlie the thesis as a whole. First, are there ways in which the theories and practices of the 
biological sciences can offer opportunities rather than constraints for gender and sexuality studies, 
for living well, and for bringing about more equitable futures? Instead of supporting conservative 
and normative narratives (such as those implicit in the statement that you should enjoy yourself 
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more when you put it where it was meant to go), could biology offer radical, alternative and more 
equitable narratives, bodies of knowledge, and ways of living? Second (and conversely), can theories 
and practices from gender and sexuality studies, as well as closely related work from animal studies 
and ecological thinking, offer opportunities to those working in science and biomedicine?  
 This is a feminist project, and as such Chapter One outlines the development of feminist 
approaches to the sciences, as well as exploring a particular example of a feminist attempt to rewrite 
a narrative from the biological sciences. Chapter One seeks to demonstrate that while patriarchy can 
be seen to structure the theory and practice of evolutionary science, this is not inevitable and there 
are other ways of producing evolutionary narratives for different political and social purposes. My 
project is also a queer project, and as such Chapter Two explores the development of queer theory 
and its relation to the feminist approaches outlined in the first chapter. The focus of the chapter is a 
clear example of the entanglement of the biological and social: the search for gay genes. This is also 
a particularly pertinent example of why the entanglement of the biological and social matters, as a 
genetic basis for homosexuality (or a lack of one) is important for queer politics. As in Chapter One, I 
suggest in this chapter that biological determinism is not the only option, and that the biological 
sciences offer opportunities for alternatives. I offer an alternative account of ‘gay genes’ that I argue 
is more attentive to the biological complexity of genes and to the social complexities of sexuality. 
The main question of my project is how to live well, and as I have stated, this is always a worldly 
multispecies negotiation.  
Chapters Three and Four build upon the theoretical foundations of the first two chapters to 
suggest a novel approach to the biological-social entanglement of the human with bacteria, viruses 
and other infectious microorganisms. Once again, my questions of how the biological and the social 
can offer opportunities for each other through their interrelationship are important here. And once 
again, my argument is that biological determinism is not the only option when considering this 
relationship. Chapter Three develops my approach to the relationship with the microbiological, and 
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begins to think through some of the biosocial consequences of this relationship. Focusing more 
specifically on viruses, and the biosocial and biopolitical consequences of being entangled with the 
microbiological, Chapter Four explores living with HIV/AIDS. Drawing together the insights of the 
previous chapters I offer an account of living with the virus that can provide resources for gender 
and sexuality studies, as well as biological and biomedical sciences. The work done in the earlier 
chapters is essential to develop an approach that is faithful to the real and material nature of the 
virus and of infected bodies, while recognising the ways in which infected viruses and bodies are 
configured, constructed and then treated with scientific and biomedical knowledge. My project is 
feminist, queer and ecological, and asks what opportunities can be produced when these areas are 
put into conversation with the biological sciences. The thesis argues that through this conversation, 
resources can be developed for both the sciences and for gender and sexuality studies, resources 
that are directed towards bringing about more equitable futures where people (healthy or 
otherwise) can live well in this entangled multispecies world.  
Bodies and Pleasures 
In her article ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of 
Partial Perspective’, Donna Haraway states: 
I think my problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects [...] and a no-nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world.9 
This ‘problem’ – the need to account for the material specificity and ‘realness’ of bodies, and of the 
world, while simultaneously emphasising the historically and socially contingent nature of all 
knowledge claims about this real world – is one that informs my entire project. As I have stated, I 
                                                          
9 Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective’, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association Books, 
1991), pp. 183–201 (p. 187). 
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approach the biological and social as not independent, but as always already interrelated and 
inseparable. This has a number of consequences, a number of which I have just outlined. In the 
thesis I will argue that attention to the inseparability of the realness of the world and the 
contingency of accounts of the world, in terms of the entanglement of the biological and social, can 
offer alternatives to biological determinist and normative accounts of bodies, pleasures, health and 
communities. 
A lot of work has been done in gender and sexuality studies to resist normative accounts of 
bodies and pleasures – what Michel Foucault calls, in the final section of the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality, ‘that austere monarchy of sex’.10 For Foucault, bodies and their associated 
pleasures can be resistant, and can counter the normative narrative of complementary male and 
female bodies, and compulsory reproductive heterosexuality. Elsewhere Foucault focuses on non-
normative practices such as S&M to elaborate on this point, insisting that ‘we can produce pleasure 
with very odd things, very strange parts of our bodies, in very unusual situations’.11 Heteronormative 
logic and rhetoric – often informed by and informing evolutionary narratives – specifies and depends 
upon a right and wrong use of the body. Odd things, strange body parts and unusual situations, in 
this narrative, can be interpreted as wrong things, body parts and situations. Yet these ‘wrong’ 
configurations of objects, bodies and situations can in fact produce pleasure, and this pleasure, for 
Foucault, can be resistant. Speaking of the same passage in Foucault, David Halperin argues that the 
emergence of sexual and subcultural phenomena such as S&M and fist-fucking ‘has the potential to 
contribute to redefining both the meaning and the practice of sex’.12 In this Foucauldian approach, 
bodies and pleasures seem to offer productive sites of resistance to compulsory heterosexuality and 
normative reproductive sex.  
                                                          
10 Michel Foucault, The Will to Knowledge, trans. by Robert Hurley, The History of Sexuality, Vol I, 3 Vols 
(Hammondsworth: Penguin, 1990), p. 159. 
11 Foucault, ‘Sex, Power and the Politics of Identity’, in Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. by Paul Rabinow, 
trans. by Robert Hurley and others (London: Allen Lane, 1997) pp. 163–174 (p.165). 
12 David M. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 
91. 
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 Popular evolutionary narratives are often based upon the assumption that evolution has 
developed or designed male and female bodies so that they complement each other. This 
assumption often surfaces in terms of an over-emphasis on adaptationism, which I will discuss in 
detail in Chapter One. In this account, all physiology and behaviour must have an evolutionary 
function, and must be adaptations that somehow improve the likelihood of passing on genes. Bodies 
and pleasures, then, from an adaptationist perspective, must have evolved as an adaptation, and 
exist only to promote procreation and the continuation of the species. In these terms, 
homosexuality is difficult to explain, as are all non-normative and non-procreative sexual uses of the 
body, and this is true for both humans and nonhumans.13 In this approach, homosexuality and other 
non-normative configurations of bodies become either deviations or throwbacks; alternatively, they 
must be explained by some circuitous logic wherein homosexuality actually promotes or supports 
heterosexuality (importantly heterosexual reproduction, not necessarily heterosexual pleasure). In 
these terms, putting it where it was designed to go really should lead to more and better pleasure. 
Sexual pleasure, after all, must be for the continuation of the species, and male and female bodies 
must have evolved to complement each other, just as sexual pleasure must have evolved to promote 
procreation. In contrast, non-normative uses of the body (and the strange pleasures that can result) 
question and challenge the logic of adaptationism, and can disrupt and threaten the 
heteronormativity in this approach.  
 The use of the body in non-normative ways and the non-normative pleasures that arise can 
offer new ways to think of the body, the individual and the community. A Foucauldian analysis of a 
practice such as S&M undermines the self-evidence of bodily design, sex and sexuality illustrated in 
the online comment on Muirhead’s article. The obviousness of the reference – ‘it’ clearly refers to 
the penis, while ‘where it was designed to go’ clearly refers to the vagina – illustrates this supposed 
self-evidence of the complementarity of male and female bodies in heterosexual reproduction. 
                                                          
13 For accounts of non-normative sexual behaviour in nonhumans, see Bruce Bagemihl, Biological Exuberance: 
Animal Homosexuality and Natural Diversity (London: Profile, 1999); and Roughgarden, Evolution’s Rainbow. 
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Foucauldian readings of non-normative bodies and pleasures undermine this, and the related 
assumption that more and better pleasure is produced by normative configurations of bodies than 
any other. Foucault’s insistence on the resistance of bodies and pleasures, however, is not without 
its problems. Judith Butler argues that celebrating bodies and pleasures over sex-desire is 
problematic for a number of reasons. She argues that to replace sex-desire with bodies and 
pleasures simply inverts the binary opposition and in turn actually reifies the distinction: ‘Not sex-
desire, but bodies and pleasures; a strange binarism at the end of a book that puts into question 
binary opposition at every turn.’14 Butler argues that an insistence on bodies and pleasures at the 
expense of sexuality can be seen in contemporary queer studies, and suggests that the exuberance 
with which queer theory attempts to abandon sexuality for bodies and pleasures is related to the 
attempt to abandon the past, and with it the categories of gender and sex-desire.15 The inverting of 
a binary opposition which, in fact, leaves the structure of opposition intact is problematic for queer 
theory. In Chapter Two I argue for a queer theory that is formulated as a deconstructive approach to 
sexuality. Following the work of Jacques Derrida and feminists engaging with deconstructive 
approaches to gender, I argue that ‘queering’ must not just invert hierarchical binary oppositions, 
but deconstruct these oppositions and the structures in and with which they are articulated.  
 A subtlety of this deconstructive queer approach to sexuality and to the body is that the 
body is necessarily active and agential, and always already deconstructing and queering itself. 
Derrida argues that deconstruction is not a process performed by a knowing subject, but rather is 
always already happening, and to itself. As he states, ‘Deconstruction takes place, it is an event that 
does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, or even of modernity. It 
                                                          
14 Judith Butler, ‘Revisiting Bodies and Pleasures’, Theory Culture Society, 16:2 (1999), 11–20 (p. 16–17). 
15 For further discussion of the relationship between gender and sexuality in the context of queer theory, 
feminism, and lesbian and gay studies, see Butler, ‘Against Proper Objects’, in Feminism Meets Queer Theory, 
ed. by Elizabeth Weed and Naomi Schor (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1997), pp. 1–30; and Biddy 
Martin, ‘Extraordinary Homosexuals and the Fear of Being Ordinary’, in Feminism Meets Queer Theory, pp. 
109–135; and Martin, ‘Sexualities without Genders and other Queer Utopias’, Diacritics, 24:2/3 (1994), 104–
121. The birth of queer theory and its relation both to feminism and to gender and sexuality studies is 
discussed at length in Chapter Two. 
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deconstructs itself. It can be deconstructed [Ça se deconstruit].’16 A deconstructive queer approach 
to the body and to sexuality suggests that the body is queer and is always already queering itself 
without the need for a subject who is ‘doing’ the queering. This queerness of the body itself is often 
not recognised or interrogated in accounts of queer uses of the body, and of non-normative acts and 
pleasures. In Foucauldian terms, we may be able to produce pleasure with ‘strange parts of our 
bodies’, but I argue that the body is always itself strange, and this strangeness of our bodies can be 
read as resistant. It is, in fact, a central argument of my thesis that the body is itself queer, both 
biologically and socially.  
The strangeness of bodies 
 Work has been done in feminist and queer theories to recognise the complex and active 
character of the body, while attending to the ways in which bodies are constructed in particular 
historical and cultural moments. Judith Butler’s work in particular has drawn attention to the ways 
that bodies come to matter (in all senses of the word). Through the critical lens of performativity, 
Butler suggests that bodies are active sites of negotiation between matter and meaning. Although 
her work emphasises the ways in which bodies are constructed in, and understood through, 
discourse, her work does not make a purely constructivist claim. Rather, Butler’s work seeks to 
explore the fact that bodies are real and constructed, material and semiotic. Indeed, in an interview, 
she states of her approach as outlined in her 1990 and 1993 works Gender Trouble and Bodies that 
Matter, that: 
It would be equally right – or possible – to say that it seeks to understand why the 
essentialism/constructivism debate founders on a paradox that is not easily or, indeed, not 
ever overcome. Just as no prior materiality is accessible without the means of discourse, so 
no discourse can ever capture that prior materiality; to claim that the body is an elusive 
                                                          
16 Jacques Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, ed. by Peggy Kamuf 
and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 16–19. 
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referent is not the same as claiming that it is only and always constructed. In some ways, it is 
precisely to claim that there is a limit to constructedness, a place, as it were, where 
construction necessarily meets its limit.17  
Butler’s denaturalisation of the body and of biological matter is foundational for queer theory and 
important in my approach to the biology of bodies. Not only this, but Butler’s insistence on not 
resolving the tension and paradox between essentialist and constructivist accounts of matter and 
meaning is important, and is explored in more depth in Chapter Two.  
 There is an important way in which the body can be read as strange or queer that is often 
not accounted for in gender and sexuality studies, and which this thesis attempts to articulate in a 
number of different ways. Crucially, for my project, the human body is always already queer to itself 
because of its nonhuman origin and composition (evolved from prehominid apes, and full of 
microbiological agencies), and also because of the problems involved in isolating the human body or 
defining its limits. This is both an ontological and epistemological claim, as it concerns the body as a 
‘real’ material entity and the discourses and bodies of knowledge that produce this entity. In fact, 
the entanglement of ontology and epistemology (as a corollary to the entanglements of matter and 
meaning and of the biological and social) is central to my thesis. My approach builds on a number of 
theoretical engagements with this entanglement, especially Haraway’s work on the inseparability of 
the material and the semiotic and the natural and cultural, and Karen Barad’s insistence on the 
entanglement of matter and meaning, as well as the ontological, epistemological and ethical.18 
Entanglement is an important phenomenon, concept and figure for my project. Barad explores 
entanglement and diffraction as quantum physical phenomena that can also be employed in critical 
theories of bodies and knowledge, matter and meaning. Entanglement, specifically, refers to the 
                                                          
17 Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins, ‘How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith Butler’, Signs, 
23:2 (1998), 275–286 (p. 278). See Butler’s Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New  
York: Routledge, 1990) and Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge, 1993). 
18 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning 
(London: Duke University Press, 2007).  
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necessary and performatively co-constitutive relationships that precede the facts and objects of 
matter and meaning. Bodies and discourse, matter and meaning, and the biological and the social 
are, for Barad, performatively co-constituted: neither one precedes the other, nor pre-exists their 
entangled and entangling relationship. I explore this in more depth in Chapter Two, in reference to 
discourses of genetic determinism surrounding the Human Genome Project, and the material 
specificity of genes. I argue that the biological specificity of genes and the social meanings that are 
associated with genes and genetic discourse produce (or performatively co-constitute) one another; 
the biological and the social are always already entangled. This perspective leads to an account of 
the biological-social body that is (right down to its genes) complex, active, agential and queer. 
This queerness of the biological-social body is, I argue, dormant in all evolutionary 
narratives, even when these support or are supported by conservative heteronormativity. The 
nonhuman ancestry of human bodies problematises attempts at attributing fixity and stability to the 
category of human. This challenging and problematic character of Darwinian evolutionary theory can 
be threatening to normative and conservative notions and narratives that rely on human 
exceptionalism, and reveal a non-normative potential in Darwinism. Charles Darwin’s theory of 
evolution by natural selection was originally considered so challenging to accepted notions of human 
sovereignty at the time that in 1860, Bishop Samuel Wilberforce described Darwin’s theory as 
‘utterly irreconcilable’ with man’s self-evident ‘supremacy over the earth’.19 This threatening 
element of Darwinism is often effaced or ignored, and Darwinism and neo-Darwinism have served a 
variety of conservative agendas or purposes since the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of 
Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life 
in 1859.20 Sociobiology, for example, which I discuss in Chapter One, was interpreted by many critics 
as not only following faulty scientific logic, but serving conservative ideological ends, and upholding 
                                                          
19 Samuel Wilberforce quoted in Robert Young, Darwin’s Metaphor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), p. 8.  
20 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859). 
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the patriarchal status quo. However, it is my argument that the threatening and subversive elements 
of Darwinian evolutionary theory are dormant even in these conservative accounts, and in all 
evolutionary accounts of the biological and social human body. This is demonstrated by Elaine 
Morgan’s feminist retelling of the narrative of descent from the perspective of the female 
prehominid ape, discussed in Chapter One. Biology and evolutionary theory are not necessarily 
conservative and can offer the opportunity for the production of subversive narratives and 
(re)interpretations. 
More-than-human Entanglement 
 Not only has the human body evolved from pre-human others, but the current composition 
of the body demonstrates nonhuman (or ‘more-than-human’) reliance or entanglement. Bacterial 
cells outnumber human cells in the body ten to one, and the human body is, in a very real way, a 
bacterial community.21 The bacteria that live in the human gut for example, the human gut 
microbiota, are essential for digestion. Gut microbiota and humans have co-evolved over thousands 
of years and are involved in a long-term relationship of mutual dependence and co-constitution. 
Digestion (which I will discuss along with the concept of indigestion in Chapter Three) is always, 
then, a multispecies process. Similarly, all plant and animal cells, including those of humans, contain 
organelles that have evolved from free-living bacteria. These organelles – chloroplasts in plants and 
mitochondria in animals – produce energy for the cell which is essential for life. This 
interdependence and entanglement of the human and the bacterial demonstrates both the more-
than-human origin and composition of the human body as well as the complications and problems 
involved with defining the human. Human-bacterial entanglement, then, raises biological-social 
questions to humanism and to the doctrine of human exceptionalism. Human exceptionalism – the 
view that humans are the pinnacle of evolution and that this grants them mastery over all 
                                                          
21 Jennifer Ackerman, ‘How Bacteria in Our Bodies Protect Our Health’, Scientific American, 15 May 2007 
<http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=ultimate-social-network-bacteria-protects-health> 
[accessed 17 February 2013].  
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nonhuman species – is threatened by human-bacterial entanglement, as it questions the human’s 
position at the highest point of evolution as well as suggesting the impossibility of isolating and 
defining the human. This project focuses on more-than-human interdependence and entanglement 
and attempts in a number of different ways to account for more-than-human agency. More-than-
human agency is, in fact, essential to the project’s challenge to humanism and the doctrine of 
human exceptionalism.22 
 The question of how to account for more-than-human agency is important to my thesis and 
in my approach I use resources from a number of different areas. I explore scientific accounts of 
bodies, organisms, behaviours and practices, and while always remaining aware that scientific 
theory and practice is produced and maintained within socially and historically specific paradigms, 
the attempt to account for the material specificity of bodies and organisms in scientific publications 
is essential to my approach. I explore feminist and queer approaches that emphasise the active and 
agential character of the body. These include approaches from new materialism as well as 
approaches from feminist technoscience studies.23 These approaches are useful, as they call 
attention to the ways in which bodies are constructed, produced and controlled in specific historical 
and social circumstances, and the ways in which bodies and technologies are always already 
entangled. I also use approaches and resources from animal studies that attempt to break down the 
hierarchical divide between the human and the animal. Work has been done in animal studies to 
challenge this divide, as it strengthens and supports human exceptionalism by disallowing agency (as 
                                                          
22 Posthumanism, and the kinds of critical posthumanisms that inform this project, will be discussed in more 
detail in Chapter Three. For more general introductions to the field, see Posthumanism, ed. by Neil 
Badmington (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2000); Neil Badmington, ‘Theorizing Posthumanism’ Cultural Critique, 53 
(2003), 10–27; and N. Katherine Hayles, How we became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,Literature, 
and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
23 New materialism is most often associated with writers such as Karen Barad, Rosi Braidotti, and Elizabeth 
Grosz. For an introduction to the field of new materialism, see New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and 
Politics, ed. by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010). Feminist 
technoscience studies is a varied and interdisciplinary field. For useful genealogies of feminist technoscience 
studies see Maureen McNeil, Feminist Cultural Studies of Science and Technology (London: Routledge, 2007); 
and Nina Lykke, ‘Feminist Cultural Studies of Technoscience: Portrait of an Implosion’, in Bits of Life: Feminism 
at the Intersections of Media, Bioscience and Technology, ed. by Anneke Smelik and Nina Lykke (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 2008), pp. 3–15. 
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well as, among other things, language and culture) to animals, and this is useful to the attempt to 
account for all more-than-human agency, not just that of animals.24 My project is also indebted to 
work done in and around Actor Network Theory, specifically that of Bruno Latour.25 My insistence on 
the entanglement of the biological and the social (as well as the ontological and epistemological and 
of matter and meaning) is indebted to Actor Network Theory’s insistence on the links between the 
material and the semiotic. This project maps some networks of more-than-human agency, thinking 
of these more-than-human connections and networks as ecological entanglements. 
Ecological thought and criticism is important to this thesis, and I explore some specific 
connections and entanglements between the human and the more-than-human world. These 
connections and entanglements include those with pre-hominid apes, genes, bacteria and viruses. In 
the third and fourth chapters I develop a queer ecological approach. In particular I develop claims by 
Timothy Morton that ecological thinking is always already queer, while exploring work done at the 
intersection of ecofeminism, ecological theory and gender and sexuality studies, tentatively titled 
‘queer ecologies’.26 Morton explicitly sets his queer ecological thinking apart from much ecofeminist 
work; however, the work of feminists in ecological and environmental studies is foundational to the 
development of an approach that is both ecological and queer.27 As well as being indebted to these 
ecological and environmental projects, I also align my queer ecological approach developed in the 
later chapters with the feminist postmodernist and deconstructive epistemologies discussed in 
                                                          
24 See, for example: Erica Fudge, Animal (London: Reaktion, 2002). 
25 See Bruno Latour’s Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers through Society (Milton Keynes: 
Open University Press, 1987); ‘On Actor Network Theory. A Few Clarifications plus more than a Few 
Complications’, Soziale Welt, 47 (1996), 369–381; and Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-
Network-Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
26 Timothy Morton, ‘Queer Ecology’, PMLA, 125:2 (2010), 273–282. For further elaboration of Morton’s 
approach to ecology, see his Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (Boston, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007); and The Ecological Thought (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). 
See also Queer Ecologies: Sex, Nature, Politics, Desire, ed. by Catriona Mortimer-Sandilands and Bruce Erickson 
(Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2010). 
27 Although feminist ecocriticism and environmental studies are wide-ranging fields, the following can be 
considered key texts or introductions: Val Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature (New York: 
Routledge, 1993); Environmental Culture: the Ecological Crisis of Reason (New York: Routledge, 2002); 
Ecofeminism: Women, Animals, Nature, ed. by Greta Gaard (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993); and 
Maria Mies and Vandana Shiva, Ecofeminism (Halifax, NS: Fernwood Publications, 1993). 
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Chapters One and Two. These feminist postmodernist and deconstructive epistemologies emphasise 
the political nature of networks and connections, and this is important for thinking through the 
importance of responsibility in the entangled web of ecological relationships with the more-than-
human world.  
 As I stated earlier, the work of Haraway is important throughout my project. Her article, 
‘Situated Knowledges’ is an important resource for my first chapter, as it provides a way to think 
through some of the tensions in feminist epistemologies and feminist engagements with science and 
objectivity. Haraway’s 1997 work, 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM: Feminism and 
Technoscience, is a key resource for my second chapter, as I focus on the Human Genome Project 
and the phenomenon and critical practice of diffraction. Once again, in this work, Haraway is 
dedicated to maintaining the tension of needing faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world and recognising 
the always historically and culturally situated nature of all knowledge claims about the world. 
Chapters Three and Four explore and elaborate Haraway’s companion species framework and 
approach that she outlines in The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant 
Otherness and When Species Meet.28 Haraway’s companion species framework is important as it 
suggests that more-than-human entanglement is always performative and co-constitutive. She 
emphasises that the human and the more-than-human become with each other through these 
performative relationships, and this notion of multispecies becoming-with is central to my 
                                                          
28 Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Chicago: Prickly 
Paradigm Press, 2003); and When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008). 
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conceptualisation of entanglement as both performative and constitutive, for the human and the 
more-than-human.29 
Apes, Genes, Bacteria, Viruses 
 In Chapter One, ‘Connections: Sociobiology, Feminist Apes, and Cyborgs’, I discuss feminist 
engagements with the natural sciences in the late 1970s and 1980s. In particular I consider different 
feminist approaches to patriarchy in the theory and practice of evolutionary biology. Taking the 
publication of Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975 as an important moment 
in post-Darwinian evolutionary theory, I analyse certain claims put forward by Wilson as well as 
looking at feminist criticisms of Sociobiology that were published in the late 1970s and 1980s. As 
well as discussing Wilson’s text, I also focus on a particular example of a feminist attempt to write an 
evolutionary (and sociobiological) narrative from the perspective of the female ape. Elaine Morgan’s 
work on the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis is just such a project, and illustrates certain tensions in feminist 
engagements with evolutionary science at this time. Morgan’s work employs a sociobiological 
approach to create a narrative of female descent, from pre-hominid apes to contemporary female 
bodies and experience. I contextualise Morgan’s work with the feminist criticism of Wilson’s 
Sociobiology published in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and from this perspective Morgan’s work 
can appear problematic; it appears to replicate the sorts of biological determinism that are at work 
in Wilson’s text, which often do nothing more than confirm a rather conservative social status quo. 
However, by further exploring work done by feminists engaging with science in the 1980s – 
specifically feminist standpoint epistemologies and feminist postmodernism – I argue that Morgan’s 
                                                          
29 It is worth stating that this notion of multispecies becoming-with is taken from Haraway, and not associated 
with the Deleuzian notion of becoming-animal. Haraway explicitly disassociates her multispecies becoming-
with from the becoming-animal that is outlined in Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987) in 
When Species Meet, pp. 27–30. As she states elsewhere: ‘I think part of my own allergy to (too much of) 
Deleuze comes from years of being named as a Deleuzian, when my conversations are overwhelmingly with 
other folks (many of whom are or were graduate students), especially biologists, feminist theorists, 
geographers, anthropologists, and ordinary animal people (many of whom crowd the pages and endnotes of 
WSM).’ (Donna Haraway, ‘When Species Meet: Staying with the Trouble’, Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 28 [2010], 53–55 [p. 53, n. 2]). 
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work can be read in a more productive way. Crucially, this approach suggests that Morgan’s 
narrative can be read as usefully interrogating and challenging certain hierarchical binary 
oppositions at work in Wilson’s and other sociobiological narratives. Central among these are the 
oppositions of male/female, subject/object, active/passive, and agent/resource, as well as 
human/nonhuman, in terms of the relationship of contemporary human embodiment and society to 
those of prehominid apes. This chapter explores the historical development of feminist 
engagements with the science as well as demonstrating, through Morgan’s work, the possibility of 
alternative narratives and knowledges within science. The idea of connection is important in this first 
chapter; connections across binary divides and between the contemporary human and the 
prehominid ape make possible certain situated engagements with, and responses to, the patriarchal 
and the conservative in the theory and practice of evolutionary science. 
 In Chapter Two, ‘Entanglements: Diffraction, The Human Genome Project and Queer(ing) 
Genes’, I will follow the trajectory of my thesis into the 1990s to discuss the meeting of feminism 
with queer theory and deconstruction. I discuss this alongside the proliferation of narratives of 
genetic determinism that surrounded the Human Genome Project. A central concern of this chapter 
is the debate about the origins of sexuality that is often crudely expressed in the terms ‘born’ or 
‘made’. To contextualise, in the early 1990s feminists were engaging with deconstruction and the 
work of Jacques Derrida, and developing insights from earlier feminist epistemologies. 
Contemporary with these developments in feminist theory in the 1990s, the word ‘queer’ was 
increasingly being reclaimed from its derogatory definition, and paired with the word ‘theory’ in 
sexuality studies. Feminist engagements with deconstruction and queer theory in the 1990s focused 
on indeterminacy and the lack of singular stable identities upon which to ground politics. Linking 
developments in queer theory with these insights, I suggest that ‘queer’ can be conceptualised as a 
deconstructive approach to identity, sexuality and normativity. It is interesting to note that at the 
same time that this deconstructive approach to sexuality was gaining prominence, narratives of 
genetic determinism proliferated, and key pieces of scientific research were published that claimed a 
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biological or genetic basis for homosexuality. To explore this apparent incongruity, I will discuss the 
genesis of the Human Genome Project. A certain amount of hubris surrounded the Human Genome 
Project in the early years, and it was in this climate that this research was published. I interrogate 
these pieces of research in the light of feminist and queer approaches to sexuality, agency and the 
theory and practice of science. My approach attempts to go beyond overturning or interrogating 
binary oppositions such as born/made and biological/social, and provides a starting point for 
thinking about the possibility of queering genes, and for queering conservative narratives of genetic 
determinism. In this chapter, I argue that the search for ‘gay genes’ not only misrepresents sexuality 
but also the material specificity of genes. I take this argument further, suggesting a diffractive 
approach (building on work by Barad and Haraway) which recognises and promotes the active and 
agential character of genes. 
 In Chapter Three, ‘Symbiosociality: Bacteria, Humans and More-than-Human Kinship’, I 
expand this diffractive approach beyond the boundaries of the human to develop a symbiosocial 
approach to human kinship with the more-than-human world. Specifically, I suggest symbiosociality 
as a merger of symbiosis and biosociality. My discussion of symbiosis in this chapter is indebted to 
Lynn Margulis’s work on bacteria, speciation and symbiogenesis. Margulis claims in her work that 
symbiosis is the driving force of evolutionary novelty, and that this can be observed in bacterial 
symbioses. With this in mind, I discuss the bacterial ancestry of organelles in human cells, as well as 
the role of human gut microbiota in digestion. Biosociality is itself a merger, suggested by Paul 
Rabinow as a way of thinking through the interrelatedness of biological sciences and community 
formation, particularly in relation to communities arranged around rare genetic disorders. Integral to 
the merger of symbiosis and biosociality into symbiosociality is the question of kinship. In this 
chapter I place insights from gender and sexuality studies on human kinship into dialogue with 
Donna Haraway’s companion species framework for conceptualising human/more-than-human 
kinship as well as insights from previous chapters on connections, entanglements, performativity 
and more-than-human agency. This continues the focus on the relationship between the biological 
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and social and begins to conceptualise human/more-than-human kinship and the consequences for 
human and more-than-human health and flourishing. In particular I discuss human-bacterial kinship 
as a symbiosocial kinship – an entangled and entangling biological-social relationship of endless 
multispecies becoming-with. This is important for my thesis, as I try to offer resources for alternative 
narratives, bodies of knowledge and ways of living as biopolitical citizens in a multispecies world. 
 In the fourth and final chapter, ‘Interruptions: Viral Biopolitics, Queer Ecologies and 
Monstrous Futures’, I interrupt the trajectory of the thesis so far and interrogate an important 
binary opposition at work (yet so far uninterrogated) in the discussion of the entanglement of the 
biological and social: the distinction between the living and the non-living. In this final chapter I 
discuss how this distinction and opposition structures the theory and practice of the biological 
sciences. I explore the material agency of viruses in order to problematise the opposition between 
living and non-living. I suggest that viruses are liminal agents that interrupt in a number of ways, and 
this includes interrupting understandings of life and death as well as linear and progressive 
narratives of evolution. Interruption is an important central theme in the final chapter, and I will 
suggest that interruption is a necessary critical practice that is essential to the approach I have 
developed in the earlier chapters. The fourth chapter emphasises what is at stake in my project: that 
living and becoming in more-than-human worlds is not a matter of peaceful coexistence and 
harmony; rather, this is always a mortal becoming, and must be thought alongside the threat of 
failure and unbecoming. To illustrate this point I discuss people living with HIV/AIDS and the ways in 
which the virus entangles individuals in knots that connect to issues of – and this is far from an 
exhaustive list – nation, economics, sexuality, health practices, biomedicine, conservation and 
ecologies. Viruses are liminal but more importantly, people living with the virus can also become 
liminal themselves, losing full biopolitical citizenship: relegated to the status of not quite fully living 
but not yet dead. This liminal status, although bringing with it a loss of biopolitical citizenship does, 
however, allow for coalitions and patient advocacy. These coalitions and the insistence on infected 
bodies being reconceptualised as active participants in, rather than the passive resources for 
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biomedical science, has changed the way that biomedical knowledge about living with HIV/AIDS gets 
produced and how health practices are implemented. I suggest that this approach can be 
productively linked with critical theories of temporality in the necessary attempt to imagine and 
bring about more equitable possible futures.  
Living and dying in the more-than-human world 
 This thesis attempts to take the active and agential character of the body (both human and 
more-than-human bodies) seriously. In doing so, it demands an interrogation of material agency, 
and of how to conceptualise agency outside of the realm of the human, where it is traditionally 
conceived. In doing so, it also demands a questioning of what is meant by ‘human’ in the first place. 
As I have stated, this is aligned with posthumanism, even while Chapter Three recognises and 
explores some of the difficulties and the problems associated with this term. Throughout the 
project, I try to emphasise agency outside of the human and draw attention to the constitutive 
performative relationships that exist between the human and the more-than-human. One way in 
which this is done is through the choice of terms, such as ‘becoming-with’, ‘more-than-human’ and 
‘entanglement’. These terms all seek to avoid human exceptionalism, and demonstrate that the 
human is embedded in a more-than-human ecology as well as being a more-than-human ecology 
itself: an ecosystem for trillions of bacteria and other microorganisms. These terms have been 
chosen specifically to attempt to go beyond ecological embeddedness and to emphasise the 
entanglement of the human and the biological-social body in co-constitutive, performative, 
biological-social relationships. Throughout the project I insist not only upon the active and agential 
‘nature’ of the body, but of ‘nature’ itself and the queer and performative ways that more-than-
human networks of relationships pre-exist the biological-social bodies and meanings that emerge 
through their relating.  
 This project is important for a number of different reasons. The thesis analyses how the 
body is conceptualised, both in terms of its biological make-up and in social terms, which includes 
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issues of sex, gender and sexuality. This has relevance for normative and non-normative bodies, 
practices and communities. In reference to the biological body, I explore how the matter and 
materiality of the body are thought of in scientific theory and practice, and follow some of the 
consequences of this. For example, I investigate the links between bodies in neo-Darwinian 
sociobiology and feminist epistemology and between the findings of the Human Genome Project 
and the ways that genes get appropriated and used in narratives of genetic determinism about 
sexuality. This is not just of social and political relevance, but also has consequences for the theory 
and practice of science. I illustrate in this thesis that there are different ways of ‘doing’ science – 
different ways of producing scientific knowledge and of putting science and biomedicine into 
practice. Another issue that this project raises is how to define the human, again in biological and 
social terms. To explore this I interrogate the notion of the human from a number of different 
angles: as a descendent of pre-hominid apes; as a carrier of vertically inherited genes; as an 
ecosystem and habitat for trillions of bacteria; and as a porous and penetrable entity that is open to 
infection and the mortal dangers of failure and unbecoming. The problems associated with the 
definition of the body and of the human also raise questions about the relation of the human to 
more-than-human others (both animal and non-animal, right down to the scale of bacteria and 
viruses) and the more-than-human world (in terms of environment and ecology). Living well as a 
human is always a question of multispecies becoming-with (and the constant threat and danger of 
unbecoming) and living well in a more-than-human world. 
 One of the most important issues raised by this project is the relationship between life forms 
and forms of life. That is to say, there is an entangled relationship between biology (in terms of 
biological matter and the way that it is conceptualised through the theory and practice of biology as 
a science) and the social possibilities and opportunities that are open and available to individuals 
and communities. This is particularly well illustrated by the unbecoming of the body when infected 
by viruses. This can be read as an unbecoming in a number of ways: the biological unbecoming of 
the body into illness and disease, and the social unbecoming of individuals in terms of citizenship. In 
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Chapter Four I discuss the US immigration ban on people living with HIV/AIDS, in place from 1988 to 
2010. This example clearly illustrates that not only did individuals suffer the mortal unbecoming of 
living and dying with the virus, but also a biopolitical unbecoming in which they were denied full 
citizenship. Individuals in this example are reconfigured as unhealthy and dangerous to the majority. 
Furthermore, non-normative communities and practices necessarily suffered: they too were 
reconceptualised as dangerous and unhealthy, necessitating eradication for the sake of the health of 
the nation. The entanglement of human and virus involves a threatening liminality – threatening to 
both life forms and to forms of life. It is clear that at stake here are both ways of living and practices 
of dying in the more-than-human world. 
Putting it where it was Supposed to Go 
The project begins roughly chronologically, covering feminist epistemologies and 
sociobiological narratives developed in the 1970s and 1980s; feminist engagements with 
deconstruction, queer theory and the genetic determinism of the 1990s; and symbiogenesis and 
kinship studies and companion species approaches from the late 1990s and early 2000s. The final 
chapter then interrupts this trajectory and, in fact, suggests the importance or necessity of 
interruptions. The thesis itself is an interruption of sorts, hoping to interrupt conservative narratives 
and ideologies that are formative of and formed by biological determinism. This interruption of the 
thesis is important, as it works to challenge narratives of progression or development as well as 
teleology in both scientific and social theories. I also want to associate interruption as a critical 
practice with what Haraway calls ‘staying with the trouble’. She states: ‘I am committed to the 
finicky disruptive details of good stories that don’t know how to finish’.30 Haraway describes staying 
with the trouble as an interruption and a disruption. Staying with the trouble is a practice of 
                                                          
30 Donna Haraway, ‘Cosmopolitical Critters: Companion Species, SF and Staying with the Trouble’, unpublished 
paper presented at Cosmopolitan Animals, John Coffin Memorial Lecture, Institute of English Studies, 26 
October 2012. A recording is available online at Youtube, 19 November 2012 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMIm0SeRRY4> [accessed 17 February 2013]. See also Haraway, ‘When 
Species Meet: Staying with the Trouble’. 
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interrupting storytelling to draw attention to the historically and socially situated practices that 
make storytelling possible; staying with the trouble also makes it possible to expand upon details, 
complexities, problems and questions, without letting the story end or come to any resolution. The 
thesis itself, and the final chapter within the thesis, attempts to stay with the troubles I have 
outlined in this introduction: troubles of biology, evolution, science as theory and practice, gender, 
sexuality, slippery and unstable definitions of humans, of animals, of bacteria and viruses – troubles, 
in short, of living and dying together in multispecies entanglements.  
 To return to the quotation at the start of this introduction: ‘I think [...] you will enjoy yourself 
a whole lot more putting it where it was designed to go’. This statement can be interrogated to 
illustrate some of the ways relevant to my project that the queer, multispecies and more-than-
human relationship commonly thought of as the human body is conceptualised in biological and 
social terms. What is it? How can it be defined? It is part of the body, but the concept of the 
biological-social body is problematised, interrupted, and put into question throughout this thesis. It, 
then, can be thought of in a number of different ways: as the penis of an evolved primate body 
descended from pre-hominid apes; as a means to the end of a genetic legacy through vertical 
inheritance and heterosexual biological reproduction; part of a larger ecosystem that trillions of 
bacteria call home; a means of producing pleasure and opening oneself up to relationships of 
hospitality and becoming; as well as a demonstration of the dangers of infection, failure and 
unbecoming. This thesis proposes an approach to the strange, queer, multispecies becoming-with of 
the body and of living (and dying) well. This approach depends upon the entanglement of the 
biological and social, attention to which I argue offers a way of interrogating narratives of biological 
determinism and for countering the effects of patriarchy and heteronormativity in the theory and 
practice of science. Also, and perhaps more importantly, this approach attempts to make a 
contribution to the ways that the production of scientific knowledge and biomedical practices are 
conceptualised, and the effects that these have on the possibility of living well as biopolitical citizens 
in the more-than-human world. 
25 
 
Chapter One 
Connections: Sociobiology, Feminist Apes, and Cyborgs 
 
‘Addressed to each other, western and feminist scientific discourses warp 
each other's story fields and redraw possible positions for claiming to know 
something about the world, including gendered social space and sexed bodies’ 
Donna Haraway, Primate Visions1 
 
In this chapter I will analyse feminist engagements with evolutionary science in the 1970s and 1980s. 
I will focus on two examples of engagements with evolutionary narratives of descent and their social 
and political implications: the feminist response to Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology and Elaine 
Morgan’s attempt to create a feminist narrative of evolution in The Descent of Woman. I will use 
these examples to discuss the feminist use and interrogation of empiricism and biological 
determinism, and the development of feminist standpoint epistemologies in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. I will suggest that the emergence of postmodernist feminism in the late 1980s illustrated 
tensions in these and other feminist engagements with the natural sciences. Feminist engagements 
with patriarchy in the theory and practice of science are foundational to my project. For this reason 
it is important to explore in detail the development of the particular approaches that I will be 
employing throughout the later chapters of my thesis.  
                                                          
1 Donna Haraway, Primate Visions: Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern Science (London: 
Routledge, 1989), p. 324. 
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Early feminist engagements with science are important for emphasising the ways that 
patriarchy uses (or abuses) scientific knowledge, while later work began to question the more 
fundamental theories and practices of science itself, not just the use of scientific findings. Both 
approaches are important to my thesis, and are explored here in depth to emphasise both that 
science is not produced in a socially innocent vacuum and that it is necessary to be vigilant for the 
uses and abuses of this socially-produced scientific knowledge. As well as establishing this historical 
context to feminist engagements with science which will form part of my approach in later chapters, 
this chapter explores an example of an attempt to rewrite a particular evolutionary narrative from a 
feminist perspective. While I analyse some of the difficulties associated with this, the important 
point is that biological determinism, conservativism and patriarchy are not inevitable. My reading of 
Morgan’s evolutionary narrative, through Donna Haraway’s concept of situated knowledges (an 
approach to science and knowledge-production that I place in its historical context), offers a novel 
interpretation of Morgan’s narrative, and more importantly the role of alternative narratives in 
science. I propose that this example illustrates the opportunities provided by science for these 
alternative narratives. Crucial to my reading of Morgan is the agency of prehominid apes. This 
interpretation of Morgan’s work forms an essential foundation to later work in the project on 
nonhuman agency, as well as later discussion of other opportunities for radical or alternative 
interpretations and narratives within science. This chapter works to lay the foundation for my later 
queer approach to scientific theory and practice, as well as demonstrating that science and social 
theories such as feminism as not necessarily oppositional. The biological and the social can, when 
put into conversation, offer possibilities for new and radical positions, narratives and knowledges. 
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Feminist Engagements with Patriarchy in Science 
Feminists in the late 1970s began to recognise and interrogate patriarchal assumptions that 
structured the content and methodology of the natural sciences.2 Three key feminist texts were 
published in the late 1970s that engaged with scientific theory and practice. These three texts 
approach areas of science in similar ways and an analysis of convergences between these texts 
reveals certain important feminist concerns with scientific theory and practice in the late 1970s, 
which have relevance for my project. First, a special issue of Signs: Journal of Women and Society 
focusing on feminism and science was published in 1978, entitled Women, Science, and Society. This 
issue set out to contribute to discussions between feminism and science, recognising the imperative 
to do so to counter patriarchal uses of biological determinism. Catharine Stimpson and Joan Burstyn, 
the editors of the issue, argue that an investment in supposedly biologically determined division of 
labour, especially in child-rearing, has far-reaching political implications and consequences: 
The advocacy of such beliefs has, as its equivalent, the current political and social struggle 
about women, the women’s movement, and modern motherhood, bitterly formalized in the 
issues of abortion, gay rights, and the Equal Rights Amendment.3 
The essays included in the special issue range from those focusing on patriarchy surrounding science 
(such as the barriers that stop women entering into the sciences in the same numbers as men) to 
articles concerned with patriarchal assumptions that structure the practice of science itself, with 
                                                          
2 I am using patriarchy throughout this research project to refer to an understanding of society as structured 
and defined around a binary of male-female wherein the male dominates the female. I take this definition 
from Kate Millett’s classic feminist text, Sexual Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1970). In particular I am 
employing her expansive use of the term from what she describes as her ‘notes towards a theory of patriarchy’ 
that sketches the support for patriarchy through the ideological; the biological; the sociological; class 
arrangements; the educational and economic; force and violence; the anthropological such as myth and 
religion; and the psychological (pp. 24–58). 
3 Catharine R. Stimpson and Joan N. Burstyn, ‘Editorial’, in Women, Science, and Society, ed. by Catharine R. 
Stimpson and Joan N. Burstyn (= Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society, 4:1 [1978]), 1–3 (p. 2). 
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reference to evolution, primate studies, sociobiology and sex difference research.4 The editors 
suggest that feminist work in these areas can imagine, and presumably bring about, ‘a change in the 
composition of scientific laborers and in the work and idioms of their enterprise’.5 According to the 
editors of the special issue, feminist engagements with science have two aims: a change in the 
number of women in scientific professions, and a change in the type of scientific theory and practice 
that is carried out. 
Second, in 1979, Ruth Hubbard, Mary Sue Henifin and Barbara Fried published Women Look 
at Biology Looking at Women: A Collection of Feminist Critiques.6 The book is arranged in two 
sections, entitled ‘What is a Woman?’ and ‘Gaining Control’. As the title of the book suggests, the 
focus of the collection is the fact that women have been figured as the object of scientific inquiry, 
distanced from male scientists. The book attempts to remedy this by suggesting that an 
interrogation of science – whereby women look at biology – can question the ways in which women 
are defined by science and the patriarchal power this bestows on androcentric scientific practice. 
The essays in the first section, ‘What is a Woman?’, investigate the ways in which women are 
defined by science: in evolutionary theory, accepted scientific language, and in research on brain 
asymmetry. This is followed by the second section, ‘Gaining Control’, which investigates how 
definitions of women can lead to an imbalance in power and control in scientific practice, 
particularly in medicine and reproductive science. Women Look at Biology Looking at Women states 
its political aim as one of combating patriarchal assumptions in the questions asked, the language 
used in questioning, and the answers discovered in science, encouraging more women to enter into 
                                                          
4 Adrienne L. Zihlman considers feminism and evolution in ‘Women in Evolution, Part II: Subsistence and Social 
Organization among Early Hominids’, Women, Science, and Society (pp. 4–20); Donna Haraway’s ‘Animal 
Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part I: A Political Physiology of Dominance’ (pp. 21–36) 
and ‘Animal Sociology and a Natural Economy of the Body Politic, Part II: The Past Is the Contested Zone: 
Human Nature and Theories of Production and Reproduction in Primate Behavior Studies’ (pp. 37–60) engage 
with evolutionary theory, primate studies and sociobiology; Marion Lowe also considers sociobiology and sex 
difference research in ‘Sociobiology and Sex Differences’ (pp. 118–125). 
5 Stimpson and Burstyn, ‘Editorial’, Women, Science, and Society, p. 3. 
6 Women Look at Biology Looking at Women: A Collection of Feminist Critiques, ed. by Ruth Hubbard, Mary Sue 
Henifin and Barbara Fried (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1979). 
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scientific professions and overcoming the imbalance of power in science that has negative medical 
consequences for women. 
Third, in 1980, The Brighton Women and Society Group published Alice through the 
Microscope: The Power of Science over Women’s Lives.7 The group had formed in 1976 and included 
biologists, community workers, sociologists, zoologists, social anthropologists and policy workers. 
Alice through the Microscope was a response to what the editors describe as a ‘serious gap in the 
literature on science’.8 The title of the book suggests that, like Women Look at Biology Looking at 
Women, the concern is with the patriarchal convention that women are restricted to the role of 
objects in scientific investigations, and are underrepresented as scientists. The articles included look 
at the patriarchal structure of science that discourages participation by women; areas of scientific 
research such as sociobiology, anatomy and medicine; and the growth of technology and its effects 
on the ways in which science considers women’s bodies.9 The editors state that across these areas of 
engagement they are primarily concerned with the ways in which theories are produced about 
women, in the name of scientific knowledge: 
We believe them to be, more often than not, based on sexist prejudices and ideology; we 
also believe such theories to have a specific role in providing scientific legitimation of the 
existing hierarchical organisation of society.10 
                                                          
7 Alice through the Microscope: The Power of Science over Women’s Lives, ed. by The Brighton Women and 
Society Group (London: Virago, 1980). 
8 Alice through the Microscope, Front Insert. 
9 Libby Curan considers the role of education in the imbalance of women in scientific professions in ‘Science 
Education: Did She Drop out or Was She Pushed?’, Alice through the Microscope (pp. 22–41). Sociobiology, 
anatomy and medicine are discussed in Deirdre Janson-Smith, ‘Sociobiology: So What’ (pp. 62–86); Lynda 
Burke and Sandy Best, ‘The Tyrannical Womb: Menstruation and Menopause’ (pp. 89–107); and Hilary 
Standing, ‘”Sickness is a Woman’s Business?”: Reflections on the Attribution of Illness’ (pp. 124–138). 
Technological control over women’s bodies is considered in the following articles: The Brighton Women and 
Science Group, ‘Technology in the Lying-in Room’ (pp. 165–181); Vivien Walsh, ‘Contraception: The Growth of 
a Technology’ (pp. 182–207); and Jalna Hanmer and Pat Allen, ‘Reproductive Engineering: The Final Solution?’ 
(pp. 208–227).  
10 Alice through the Microscope, p. 3. 
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The contributions to Alice through the Microscope recognise an intimate relationship between 
patriarchy and scientific practice. They acknowledge that patriarchy structures the practice of 
science, producing scientific knowledge that is based on sexist prejudices and ideology. Following 
this acknowledgement they argue that this scientific knowledge is employed to justify the existence 
of patriarchy in society. 
 To interrogate this argument I will focus on an area of feminist engagement with science 
that is common to the three publications, and which I therefore understand as a key feminist 
concern of the time. This example demonstrates one of the ways that social structures affect the 
production of scientific knowledge, which is a theme throughout my thesis. All three early feminist 
collections of engagements with science include an analysis of sociobiology, in particular the work of 
Edward O. Wilson. Wilson published Sociobiology: The New Synthesis in 1975, a book in which he 
attempted to instantiate the new science of sociobiology – evolutionary biology and theory applied 
to social organisation.11 Marion Lowe approaches Wilson’s claims from a scientific and political 
perspective in ‘Sociobiology and Sex Differences’ published in the special issue of Signs. She analyses 
the scientific basis of many of Wilson’s claims, and concludes that: ‘We do not need to treat 
sociobiology seriously as a scientific theory of human behavior. Unfortunately, we do have to take it 
seriously as a political theory.’12 Ruth Hubbard expands upon this in her article, ‘Have Only Men 
Evolved?’ published in Women Look at Biology Looking at Women. She illustrates the ways in which 
Victorian stereotypes influenced Charles Darwin’s theory of sexual selection, and the ways in which 
these stereotypes of female passivity and male agency and activity are replicated in sociobiological 
theory and practical research.13 Hubbard questions the political and social conventions that 
structure the particular type of evolutionary science that is practised, and the methods by which it 
proceeds. She also traces the ways that this science is employed to justify a conservative social 
                                                          
11 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975). 
12 Marion Lowe, ‘Sociobiology and Sex Differences’, Women, Science, and Society, 118–125 (p. 123). 
13 Ruth Hubbard, ‘Have Only Men Evolved?’, Women Look at Biology Looking at Women, pp. 7–36. 
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status quo, and suggests avenues for future feminist engagements with evolutionary science. 
Meanwhile, Deirdre Janson-Smith considers On Human Nature, Wilson’s work that followed 
Sociobiology, in her article ‘Sociobiology: So What?’, published in Alice through the Microscope.14 
Janson-Smith interrogates Wilson’s response to the reception of Sociobiology, as well as his 
development of certain themes in this later publication including the sexual division of labour. 
Janson-Smith, like Lowe and Hubbard, recognises the ways in which political commitments influence 
the way science is practised, and the political implications of sociobiological claims.  
Edward O. Wilson’s Metaphor of Extension 
Wilson described the science of sociobiology as ‘the extension of population biology and 
evolutionary theory to social organisation’.15 Wilson had previously published texts on population 
biology and invertebrate zoology and Sociobiology was an attempt to expand his work into new 
areas of research.16 The ‘synthesis’ that Sociobiology attempted to create was a combination of 
Wilson’s earlier work on population biology, observations of animal (especially invertebrate) 
sociality, and neo-Darwinism. The idea of a ‘new synthesis’ as stated in the book’s subtitle suggests a 
new method of using or interpreting Darwinism following from what scientists refer to as the 
Modern Evolutionary Synthesis. The latter takes its name from Julian Huxley’s Evolution: The Modern 
Synthesis published in 1942, in which Mendelian genetics was shown to be compatible with natural 
selection.17 The Modern Evolutionary Synthesis combined seemingly contradictory observations 
from palaeontology, botany, microbiology, and population genetics into a synthesis that could still 
be legitimately called Darwinian, because the common factor was the work of natural selection in 
                                                          
14 Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1978); 
Deirdre Janson-Smith, ‘Sociobiology: So What?’, Alice through the Microscope, pp. 62–86. 
15 Edward O. Wilson, On Human Nature, p. x. 
16 Edward O. Wilson and William H. Bossert, A Primer of Population Biology (Sunderland, Mass: Sinauer, 1971); 
Edward O. Wilson, The Insect Societies (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971). 
17 Julian Huxley, Evolution: The Modern Synthesis (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1942). 
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gradual evolution.18 Wilson’s subtitle, ‘The New Synthesis’, attempts to position sociobiology as the 
next step in the Darwinian synthesis based on natural selection. Wilson states, ‘It may not be too 
much to say that sociology and the other social sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last 
branches of biology waiting to be included in the Modern Synthesis.’19 This is a particularly pertinent 
comment for my thesis; although I am arguing for the inseparability of the biological-social and for 
the blurring of disciplinary boundaries throughout, Wilson’s approach is very much the antithesis of 
my approach. Wilson’s approach is to reduce all disciplines to biology, rather than open up the 
possibility for new positions, narratives and knowledges through interdisciplinary conversation. 
Sociobiology endeavours to reformulate the social sciences and humanities as functions of natural 
selection, and thus as elements of a new evolutionary synthesis. 
Wilson’s claim that sociobiology is an ‘extension’ of evolutionary science to theories of 
society and social organisation is illuminating, because his use of the metaphor of extension is 
illustrative of certain assumptions and tensions in the study of science. I will analyse three 
perspectives on scientific practice that involve or interrogate the metaphor of extension. First, the 
metaphor of extension suggests continuity with a traditional scientific method that values objectivity 
gained through distance between the scientist and the object of scientific inquiry. Second, it can 
suggest that there is a value-neutral science that can be extended to comment on society. This leads 
to the conclusion that debates and disputes about science should be directed to the use or abuse of 
science, not the structure of science itself. Finally and closely related to the second perspective, the 
metaphor of extension creates an artificial distinction between the practice of science and politics. 
This distinction can protect scientific practice as well as the structure of science itself, as the practice 
of science is constructed as inhabiting a different domain from culture or politics. Analysing this one 
claim of Wilson’s illustrates how traditional models of scientific practice and objectivity function. 
                                                          
18 For a history of the concept of evolution and the context of the Modern Evolutionary Synthesis see Peter J. 
Bowler, Evolution: The History of an Idea (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2003), especially pp. 
333–339. 
19 Wilson, Sociobiology, p. 4. 
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This is foundational for my project, as the question of different ways of producing knowledges of 
scientific objects is one that recurs throughout. Furthermore it illustrates how Wilson’s 
sociobiological claims are positioned, and some of the ways in which these claims can be countered 
by feminists. 
The metaphor of extension implies a particular method of practising science. The activity of 
extending suggests expansion, invasion, dominance and even penetration. For the scientist to be 
able to extend knowledge into a certain field, a pre-existing distance must be assumed between the 
scientist and the objects or domain of scientific inquiry. Evelyn Fox Keller suggests that this distance 
is a patriarchal construct, relying on a Baconian notion of nature as female, and knowledge or 
rationality as male.20 Genevieve Lloyd argues that Francis Bacon’s gendered metaphors structure his 
philosophical and logical system and have the effect of building the masculine scientific 
manipulation of feminine nature ‘into the very articulation of the nature of science’.21 Lloyd traces 
the gendering of rational knowledge through Bacon to Greek theories of rationality and logic, to 
argue that:  
Rational knowledge has been construed as a transcending, transformation or control of 
natural forces; and the feminine has been associated with what rational knowledge 
transcends, dominates or simply leaves behind.22 
The metaphor of rationality as masculine and nature as feminine resource to be used, controlled, 
dominated by and for rational knowledge is powerful and insidious. As Lloyd argues, ‘The metaphors 
do not merely express conceptual points about the relations between knowledge and its objects. 
They give a male content to what it is to be a good knower.’23 So, the metaphor of extension relies 
                                                          
20 Evelyn Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), especially pp. 
33–42. 
21 Genevieve Lloyd, The Man of Reason: ‘Male’ and ‘Female’ in Western Philosophy (London: Methuen, 1984), 
p. 16. 
22 Lloyd, The Man of Reason, p. 2. 
23 Lloyd, The Man of Reason, p. 17. 
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upon a tradition and history of patriarchal metaphors that structure the theory and practice of 
science. To be able to extend one area of knowledge into another domain suggests a distance 
between rational male subject and feminine object or resource, and the reliance on the metaphor 
suggests a ‘good knower’, namely a rational male theorist or scientist, proceeding along traditional 
models of scientific inquiry. 
The metaphor of extension can suggest that there is a value-neutral and empiricist science 
that is extended, either successfully or unsuccessfully to comment on society. This perspective 
implies that there is a proper domain of science, and that debates and disputes only arise when it is 
exported to other, cultural, domains; that is, biases and contradictions arise from unsuccessful or 
improper extension of the value-neutral facts of science. This is a form of scientific realism or 
empiricism, and is reflected in some feminist claims that patriarchy surrounding science affects the 
ways in which scientific facts are used or abused, interpreted and implemented. In this chapter I will 
discuss empiricism and some of its problems, returning to a more in-depth discussion of realism in 
the following chapter. The use-abuse model is often invoked by scientists (and others) as a defence 
against charges of negative personal or political bias in scientific practice, and some feminist scholars 
have argued that the use-abuse model has a patriarchal function. For example, the editors of Alice 
through the Microscope suggest that it serves two purposes: 
First, it absolves scientists themselves from responsibility, and from the need to question the 
ethics of what they are doing. More important, it bolsters the image of ‘pure’ science, 
somehow divorced from the social world in which it takes place, and thus diverts attention 
from more fundamental questions of the politics of science.24 
To suggest that the practice of sociobiology is the extension of population biology and evolutionary 
theory to comment on social organisation thus absolves Wilson and other sociobiologists from the 
                                                          
24 Alice through the Microscope, p. 17. 
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need to question the ethics of such an ‘extension’, as well as bolstering the image of science as pure, 
in this case suggesting that population biology and evolutionary theory are themselves value-neutral 
and separate from the social world in which they have been formulated.  
The metaphor of extension therefore creates a fictitious distinction between science and 
society. This distinction is paradoxical as the proclaimed aim of sociobiology is to reduce the distance 
between the domains of science and society, through a common grounding in neo-Darwinist 
principles. Yet, as I have shown, the metaphor of extension also protects sociobiological theories 
from cultural analysis. A pertinent example is when sociobiologist David Barash states, in reference 
to sociobiological claims about sex differences, that ‘ironically, mother nature appears to be a 
sexist’.25 This claim is typical of sociobiology as it suggests that seemingly political and cultural biases 
are not a product of the scientific method or theory, but rather a feature of the nature that 
sociobiology supposedly reflects. Sociobiology attempts to explain all social behaviour as a 
consequence of evolution by natural selection, thus breaking down the distinction between biology 
and social organisation. Fundamentally, however, this distinction is preserved; as a response to the 
charge of patriarchal and conservative political biases, sociobiology can rely upon the distinction 
between an empirical science and cultural politics to make the claim that it is nature which is sexist, 
not the science that simply interprets empirical facts. This deserves further attention as it 
emphasises particularly clearly the effects of the use-abuse model of scientific knowledge. 
Sociobiologists’ claim that they are attempting to reduce the distance between culture and science 
is, in fact, supported by a distinction between ‘pure’ science and the uses made of scientific facts. 
The reduction of fictional distance between subject and object, as between science and societal 
organisation, is figured in only one direction. Sociobiologists can extend evolutionary science to 
comment on the biological basis of culture, yet charges of cultural bias in the theory and practice of 
science are claimed to be based on a lack of scientific knowledge. Sociobiologists do not consider the 
                                                          
25 David Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior (New York: Elsevier, 1977), p. 283. 
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humanities eligible to comment on science, and any charge of sexism in the theory and practice of 
sociobiology can be interpreted by sociobiologists as misrecognition of a biologically universal 
sexism they consider themselves better qualified to interpret. The distinction between subject and 
object – and between science and culture – is reinforced through the claim that the scientific theory 
and practice is pure and not influenced by politics, history or culture. 
Wilson’s Sociobiology 
Wilson’s text itself is organised into twenty-seven chapters, of which only the first and last 
are entirely devoted to human social relations. The other twenty-five chapters of illustrated double-
column biological and zoological observation are intended to bridge the gap between the attempt at 
instantiating a new science in the first chapter and the suggestions about human behaviour made in 
the final chapter. In effect, the middle twenty-five chapters that cover more than five hundred pages 
must function as scientific proof, in the form of observation, of Wilson’s claim in the first chapter 
that all social behaviour has a biological basis.26 Furthermore, they are intended to provide a 
scientific basis for hypotheses made in the final chapter about – among other things – altruism, sex, 
the division of labour, aesthetics, ethics and territoriality in human social relations. For example, 
Wilson states in the final chapter that ‘nearly all human societies’ are organised by the sexual 
division of labour: ‘During the day the women and children remain in the residential area while the 
men forage for game or its symbolic equivalent in the form of barter and money.’27 This statement 
and its implications are given more significance and plausibility due to its position in the structure of 
the overall work. It appears as a scientific hypothesis rather than a political or socially biased 
statement, because it supposedly follows from Wilson’s claim that all behaviour has a biological 
basis and the wealth of biological and zoological observations that structurally support the first and 
final chapters.  
                                                          
26 Wilson, Sociobiology, p. 4. 
27 Wilson, Sociobiology, p. 553. 
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In the chapter on aggression, Wilson suggests that aggression has a genetic basis and is 
adaptive. He defines the following eight forms of aggression: territorial, dominance, sexual, parental 
disciplinary, weaning, moralistic, predatory, and antipredatory.28 A wide range of behaviour can be 
considered aggressive under this system, from territorial displays to maternal termination of 
unwanted suckling, and defensive manoeuvres directed towards predators by potential prey. The 
expansive and relatively imprecise definition of aggression does not concern Wilson; in fact he states 
‘we should not worry too much about terminology’.29 Despite its expansive and imprecise definition, 
Wilson proceeds to make claims about aggression and competition, and about the adaptive and 
genetic basis of aggression in all animals, including humans. Wilson defines aggressive competition 
as any sexual or resource competition, commenting that sexual competition between males is 
‘competition for a very special kind of resource’.30 In this example, Wilson starts with the assumption 
of competitive aggression – defining it vaguely and expansively – and consequently observes it in a 
variety of animal behaviour. Competitive aggression is then defined as a behavioural universal and 
suggested as an evolved biological adaptation. Importantly, the biological suggestion is replete with 
assumptions including that of a hierarchical relation between male and female in which the male is 
active and an agent of evolutionary change and the female is figured as passive and as a resource for 
the male.  
 Wilson uses the terms ‘competition’ and ‘aggression’ expansively to bolster his argument, 
without interrogating the cultural and political assumptions that structure these concepts. Michael 
Gross and Mary Beth Averill argue that sociobiology and other areas of evolutionary science are 
fundamentally structured by such uninterrogated concepts. In particular, they suggest that the 
concepts of scarcity and competition in evolution are patriarchal constructs, rather than empirical 
givens. Gross and Averill argue that Darwin developed the theory of natural selection in the light of 
                                                          
28 Wilson, Sociobiology, pp. 242–243. 
29 Wilson, Sociobiology, p. 242. 
30 Wilson, Sociobiology, p. 243. 
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Thomas Malthus’s An Essay of the Principle of Population.31 Darwin himself stated that this text had 
a direct influence on his evolutionary theory: 
In October 1838, that is, fifteen months after I had begun my systematic enquiry, I happened 
to read for amusement 'Malthus on Population’, and being well prepared to appreciate the 
struggle for existence which everywhere goes on from long-continued observation of the 
habits of animals and plants, it at once struck me that under these circumstances favourable 
variations would tend to be preserved, and unfavourable ones to be destroyed. The result of 
this would be the formation of new species. Here then I had at last got a theory by which to 
work.32 
Malthus argued that population would increase geometrically, doubling each generation, while food 
supply could only increase incrementally due to natural limitations. These two principles provided 
Darwin with a mechanism by which species would be transformed over time. As Gross and Averill 
state, ‘Malthus showed Darwin that if one assumed scarcity of resources, especially food, a 
competition would ensue which affected the composition of successive generations.’33 In other 
words, in an environment of scarce resources organisms would have to compete for food; organisms 
best suited to their environment would out-compete those less well suited, and they would produce 
relatively more offspring.  
 Gross and Averill argue that Malthus’s principles are contradictory when applied to the 
natural world. They maintain that it is overly simplistic to suggest that populations increase 
geometrically while resources increase incrementally as ‘one kind of organism’s “overproduction” 
                                                          
31 Thomas Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population (London: Dent, 1973 [1798]) 
32 The Life and Letters of Charles Darwin, Including an Autobiographical Chapter, ed. by Francis Darwin, 3 vols 
(London: John Murray, 1887) I, p. 83.  
33 Michael Gross and Mary Beth Averill, ‘Evolution and Patriarchal Myths of Scarcity and Competition’, in 
Discovering Reality: Feminist Perspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodology, and Philosophy of 
Science (London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 71–95 (p. 74). Other useful studies of the links 
between Malthusian principles of population and Darwinian evolution are: Peter Vorzimmer, ‘Darwin, 
Malthus, and the Theory of Natural Selection’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 30:4 (1969), 527–542; and Peter 
J. Bowler, ‘Malthus, Darwin, and the Concept of Struggle’, Journal of the History of Ideas, 37:4 (1976), 631–650. 
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may be another kind of organism’s food supply’.34 This is a more ecological approach than 
sociobiology and neo-Darwinism traditionally allows. I will explore this further in Chapters Three and 
Four. Furthermore, the concepts of scarcity and competition are not value-neutral but developed as 
a consequence of Malthus’s social and political concerns. They argue that Malthus employed his 
population principles so as to oppose nineteenth-century poor laws in England, believing that aid 
would encourage the poor to reproduce, thus having a detrimental effect on society as a whole. 
Gross and Averill identify in Malthusianism a number of patriarchal themes: ‘male control of 
reproductive choices for the sake of abstract political-economic goals’; ‘capitalistic defense of middle 
class accumulation, expansion, and domination’; and ‘objectification of rather than identification 
with the “other”’.35 Gross and Averill illustrate very clearly the ways in which patriarchal political 
concerns are inscribed into metaphors that structure scientific theory and practice. In particular, 
they draw attention to the fact that social and political values structure the theory and practice of 
evolutionary science by way of the metaphor of struggle. Although Darwin stated he used struggle in 
a ‘large and metaphorical sense’, it becomes the underlying and unquestioned essential principle of 
nature.36 Gross and Averill call attention to the fact that the patriarchal metaphor not only structures 
theoretical concepts such as natural selection but also the practical content and methodology of 
scientific research, because research proceeds without questioning certain key concepts such as 
scarcity and competition.37 Gross and Averill’s analysis is important to my analysis in this chapter 
(and to the development of my approach to science in the thesis as a whole) as it illustrates the 
                                                          
34 Gross and Averill, p. 74. For other issues related to the Malthusian basis of natural selection, see Elliott 
Sober, The Nature of Selection: Evolution Theory in Philosophical Focus (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1984), 
especially pp. 15–17 and pp. 194–195. Sober suggests that considering Malthusianism as a central axiom of 
natural selection is a distortion of current understandings of evolution. I agree that natural selection as it is 
understood in contemporary evolutionary science cannot simply be reduced to Malthusianism; yet it is 
important to recognise the historical context of scientific concepts, so as to be in a better position to 
interrogate their political uses. 
35 Gross and Averill, p. 75. 
36 Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life (London: John Murray, 1859), p. 62. 
37 Gross and Averill, p. 76.  
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extent to which social values and assumptions can function as unquestioned principles structuring 
both scientific theory and practice.  
The Feminist Response to Sociobiology 
In the year that Sociobiology was published, a group of scientists, feminists and social 
theorists wrote a letter to the New York Review of Books in which they questioned the objective 
nature of sociobiology.38 I will briefly outline their argument, before examining a specific feminist 
analysis of a sociobiological claim to illustrate my position that not only can patriarchal assumptions 
and values structure scientific theory and practice but also, when biological or evolutionary science 
is called upon (or ‘extended’ to use Wilson’s metaphor) to comment on social organisation, these 
patriarchal assumptions can resurface in the form of unquestioned biological fact. Such biological 
facts are then used as justification for the social status quo. The authors of the letter, entitled 
‘Against “Sociobiology”’, emphasise the cyclical nature of Wilson’s sociobiological arguments, and 
question the scientific evidence that supposedly proves that all behaviour and social structures are 
genetically determined, stating that for Wilson, ‘what exists is adaptive, what is adaptive is good, 
therefore what exists is good’.39 It is Wilson’s preference for genetic explanations that the authors 
claim is responsible for his ‘leap of faith from what might be to “what is”’.40 The authors claim that 
this leap is one that could be made with the use of cultural or other explanations yet, for no 
                                                          
38 Elizabeth Allen et al., ‘Against “Sociobiology”’, New York Review of Books, 13 November 1975, pp. 182, 184–
186. This letter to the Editors was signed by Elizabeth Allen, Barbra Beckwith, Jon Beckwith, Steven Chorover, 
David Culver, Margaret Duncan, Steven [sic] [Jay] Gould, Ruth Hubbard, Hiroshi Inouye, Anthony Leeds, 
Richard Lewontin, Chuck Madansky, Larry Miller, Reed Pyeritz, Peter Bent, Miriam Rosenthal, and Herb 
Schreier. The letter is reprinted in The Sociobiology Debate: Readings on Ethical and Scientific Issues, ed. by 
Arthur L. Caplan (New York: Harper and Row, 1978), pp. 259–264, and further references will be to this 
reprinted version. Caplan’s collection of critical responses to Sociobiology also contains Wilson’s response to 
the letter written by Allen et al. ‘For Sociobiology’, New York Review of Books, 11 December, 1975 (repr. in The 
Sociobiology Debate, pp. 265–268.) 
39 ‘Against “Sociobiology”’, p. 261. The disadvantages of the type of adaptationist argument employed by 
Wilson are outlined by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin in an article in which they state: ‘Often, 
evolutionists use consistency with natural selection as the sole criterion and consider their work done when 
they concoct a plausible story.’ (‘The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the 
Adaptationist Programme’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, Series B, 205:1161 [1979], pp. 581–
598).  
40 ‘Against “Sociobiology”’, p. 262. 
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scientific reason, Wilson prefers genetic explanations. They also state that Wilson uses ad hoc 
arguments from economics and speculative anthropology and that he uses ‘metaphor and presumed 
analogy [...] to mask the absence of evidence’.41 For Wilson’s critics, the biological determinism 
found in Sociobiology rests upon assumptions, social conservatism and cyclical logic, rather than 
upon the discovery of biological or social facts. 
 One sociobiological claim that received attention from contemporary feminists was the 
argument that certain gendered social structures and roles were, in part, a consequence of the 
difference between the supposed energy investment demanded of males and females for successful 
sexual reproduction. Ruth Hubbard, in her essay ‘Have Only Men Evolved?’, analyses the 
sociobiological claim that it is the relative size of gametes, sperm and egg cells, which structures 
gendered social structures.42 Wilson states that: 
One gamete, the egg, is relatively very large and sessile; the other, the sperm, is small and 
motile [...] Because it represents a considerable energetic investment on the part of the 
mother the embryo is often sequestered and protected, and sometimes its care is extended 
into the postnatal period. This is the reason why parental care is normally provided by the 
female.43 
                                                          
41 ‘Against “Sociobiology”’, p. 263. 
42 Hubbard traces the history of feminist engagements with the egg and sperm differences to Ruth 
Hershberger, Adam’s Rib: A Defense of Modern Woman (New York: Harper and Row, 1970 [1948]). Key later 
engagements include Emily Martin, ‘The Egg and the Sperm: How Science Has Constructed a Romance Based 
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For sociobiologists, the difference in the size of gametes and the interpretation of this corresponds 
to a hypothetical difference in levels of energetic investment.44 The female’s large eggs are 
interpreted by sociobiologists as passive, receptive and immobile, whereas the male’s smaller sperm 
are interpreted as active and agile. Furthermore, the female gametes supposedly demand a higher 
level of energy investment. Hubbard asks, ‘Does it really take more “energy” to generate the one or 
relatively few eggs than the large excess of sperms required to achieve fertilization?’45 She argues 
that not only is the supposed energetic investment unknown, it is of little or no significance other 
than to justify existing social structures. Patriarchal assumptions about the passivity of women and 
activity of men structure the methodology and content of sociobiological theory about the relative 
size of gametes, and function only to provide political justifications for patriarchy.  
 The justification of the patriarchal status quo is supported in sociobiological theory by a 
rhetorical move that Anne Fausto-Sterling describes as a ‘linguistic hat trick’. Discussing 
sociobiological theories of forced copulation in animals and their relation to the human 
phenomenon of rape, she states: 
In using the word rape, [sociobiologists] have transformed its meaning. First, to describe 
certain animal behaviors they use a word originally applied to a human interaction, one that 
includes within its definition the notion of conscious will. Then they employ the animal 
behavior (named after the human behavior) in theories about rape in human society. In the 
process they confuse the meaning of two different behaviors and offer a natural justification 
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for a human behavior that Webster’s calls criminal. This linguistic hat trick characterizes 
virtually all of human sociobiology.46 
This logical move is evident not just at the level of comparative animal behaviour. The example of 
the relative size of gametes clearly demonstrates that sociobiologists also employ this logic at the 
level of the microbiological. Wilson describes the difference in sex cells in terms of level of activity, 
care and investment. Then these descriptions, based on fundamental assumptions about the 
difference between male and female nature, are employed in theories of male and female behaviour 
and social roles. Importantly, this confuses two very different phenomena and offers a justification 
for the original assumptions about male and female nature. The claims of sociobiology are so 
expansive and ill-defined that they can apply to the level of the microorganism, organism or even 
social group. This is important as it demonstrates one of the ways that social structures and the 
biological sciences are related, as well as emphasising that this brand of conservative logic can 
function at the level of social groups, individuals and the microbiological. This has relevance to 
Chapters Three and Four, where I will discuss microorganisms such as bacteria and viruses. Wilson’s 
text makes claims based on a similar logic that naturalises male aggression, female passivity and the 
sexual division of labour, alongside other political claims that touch on human social phenomena 
such as slavery, war and genocide.47 These claims confuse biological and social meanings and are 
inherently conservative, concerned with providing natural justifications for the social status quo.  
As I have argued, sociobiology and biological determinism were a concern for feminism in 
the 1970s. Feminist engagements with sociobiology illustrate a number of questions that feminists 
were raising regarding the theory and practice of science in the 1970s. Feminists in the 1970s began 
to recognise that patriarchy was not simply external to science, affecting the ways scientific 
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communities excluded women and used scientific research to support patriarchy, but that 
patriarchal constructs could structure the theory and practice of science itself. One of the ways in 
which this was interrogated was to analyse concepts such as scarcity and competition to reveal the 
political and social history of the terms that patriarchal science ignores. Similarly, feminists 
interrogated the traditional methodology of science and its political history. There was growing 
recognition in the 1970s that getting more women into scientific professions was important, but was 
inadequate to counter patriarchy in scientific practice; feminist scholarship was increasingly 
recognising the subtle and insidious ways that patriarchy structured science. 
Feminist Standpoints  
 Feminist engagements with science in the late 1970s and 1980s were indebted to a history 
of cultural studies of science, in particular the work of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn’s book, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions, was originally published in 1962 and questioned the notion of scientific 
objectivity and introduced the term ‘paradigms’ into the history and philosophy of science. Kuhn 
criticised the conventional view of science as proceeding in a linear fashion, gradually adding more 
facts and refining hypotheses. For Kuhn, scientists work within paradigms. These paradigms are 
‘coherent traditions of scientific research’, that incorporate ‘law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation together’.48 Paradigms are inherently conservative and concerned with the status 
quo; as Kuhn states, ‘Normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when 
successful, finds none.’49 Scientists working within a paradigm approach scientific research with 
theories, laws, methodologies and instruments that have been constructed within the paradigm. 
Kuhn describes the Copernican revolution as an important example of paradigms and paradigm shift. 
Kuhn states that Ptolemaic astronomy – the astronomical paradigm that Copernican astronomy 
succeeded – was ‘admirably successful in predicting the changing positions of both stars and 
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planets’.50 Not only this, but ‘for the planets, Ptolemy’s predictions were as good as Copernicus’’.51 
Kuhn suggests, however, that as the science of astronomy increased in complexity, discrepancies 
with the Ptolemaic paradigm became impossible to ignore. This accumulation of discrepancies or 
anomalies led to Copernicus’ rejection of the Ptolemaic system and his search for a new paradigm.52 
Normal science, for Kuhn, always reflects the contemporary paradigm and does not work to 
question or dispute elements of this. However, anomalies are always discovered, and it is the 
increase of anomalies which cannot be assimilated into the current paradigm which ultimately leads 
to scientific revolution, or paradigm shift. Kuhn’s theory of scientific paradigms disrupts a more 
conventional view, wherein science proceeds in a linear fashion, gradually uncovering more truths. 
Science, for Kuhn, is a social enterprise; social structures, conventions and assumptions are all part 
of paradigms and are thus integral to the theory and practice of science. Kuhn and the feminist 
expansion of his insights are important to my approach to scientific knowledge production. Science 
does reflect truths about the ‘real’ world, but science is always done within specific historical and 
cultural paradigms. 
 For feminists working in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Thomas Kuhn’s paradigm approach 
to science offered a set of useful analytic tools to the growing recognition that science both 
supported and was structured by patriarchal social structures. Kuhn’s argument undermined the 
conventional linear structure of the history of science, as a progression of great men that added 
gradually and cumulatively to scientific knowledge. Although he does not mention the masculinist 
bias within this paradigmatic history of science, the possibility for alternative histories of science 
with more prominent historical females is dormant in his project. The concept of the paradigm also 
offered feminists a productive language with which to speak about the metaphors that scientists 
used in the pursuit of normal science. Donna Haraway, for example, discusses the metaphors used in 
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embryology in Crystals, Fabrics, and Fields: Metaphors of Organicism in Twentieth-Century 
Developmental Biology. Although not an explicitly feminist text, it illustrates the use of metaphor in 
science and the importance of this process for the formation of scientific communities.53 Hubbard 
too follows a Kuhnian concept of paradigm communities when she states, ‘Science is made by 
people who live at a specific time in a specific place and whose thought patterns reflect the truths 
that are accepted by the wider society.’54 I argue that Kuhn offered feminist engagements with 
science the framework within which to subvert the masculinist linear history of science, to draw 
attention to patriarchal metaphors in science, and to question the supposed objective and gender-
neutral claims made by predominantly male scientific communities.  
The Kuhnian approach to the production of scientific knowledge was integral to the 
development of a significant feminist response to science in the 1970s and 1980s known as the 
feminist standpoint. Many early feminists responding to science had approached the question of 
patriarchy and science with a research programme that did not question the objectivity of science, 
but rather questioned the barriers and inequalities that meant more men than women entered the 
sciences. A concurrent and related programme studied the use and abuse of biology, arguing that 
the issue for feminism is the patriarchal use of science, rather than questioning the science itself. 
Sandra Harding has described a series of feminist epistemologies developing from these research 
programmes that foreground the question of objectivity in different ways. For Harding, these 
feminist epistemologies attempted to respond to an apparent paradox in feminist engagements with 
science: 
Feminism is a political movement for social change. But many claims, clearly motivated by 
feminist concerns, made by researchers and theorists in the social sciences, in biology, and 
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in the social studies of the natural sciences appear more plausible – more likely to be 
confirmed by evidence – than the beliefs they would replace. How can such politicized 
research be increasing the objectivity of inquiry? On what grounds should these feminist 
claims be grounded?55 
Harding explores the relation of politics and objectivity in the sciences, defining three major feminist 
responses to this paradoxical relation: ‘feminist empiricism, the feminist standpoint, and feminist 
postmodernism’.56 I will briefly outline the objectives and problems associated with feminist 
empiricism, before analysing in detail an early attempt to formulate a feminist standpoint within 
evolutionary theory. I will follow this by looking at the emergence of a feminist postmodernist 
approach to science studies in the late 1980s. 
 Feminist empiricist epistemologies suggest that social biases leading to the misuse or abuse 
of science could, and should, be corrected through stricter adherence to existing scientific 
methodologies. For feminist empiricists, it is biases such as patriarchy and androcentrism that distort 
the objective nature of science. Feminism, working to encourage more women to enter into 
scientific careers and to remove the social barriers obstructing this, encourages gender equity in the 
sciences and thus reduces male bias in the interpretation of scientific results. Harding quotes Marcia 
Millman and Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s description of this empiricist logic. They claim that social 
liberation movements ‘make it possible for people to see the world in an enlarged perspective 
because they remove the covers and blinders that obscure knowledge and observation’.57 
Unquestioned is the objectivity of knowledge and observation; scientific facts are gender neutral and 
available for objective observation. Alison Wylie associates this with a distinction she makes 
between feminist engagements with science that attempt to correct ‘bad science’, and engagements 
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that question ‘science as usual’.58 Feminist empiricism works to correct a bias in the interpretation of 
observed facts. Harding identifies a paradox within this logic that suggests that even within the 
project of feminist empiricism, the claims of an empiricist science do not hold. 
The social identity of the inquirer is supposed to be irrelevant to the ‘goodness’ of the 
results of research. Scientific method is supposed to be capable of eliminating any biases [...] 
But feminist empiricism argues that women (or feminists, whether men or women) as a 
group are more likely to produce unbiased and objective results than are men (or 
nonfeminists) as a group.59 
The logic of feminist empiricism actually subverts the empiricist assumption that science is value-
neutral; if a community of female or feminist scientists produced a different set of scientific values, 
then this questions the empirical nature of the science itself. Feminist empiricism claims a distinction 
between bad science and science as usual yet, in effect, makes this distinction untenable. 
 The idea that the gender of the scientist would have an effect on the science was taken 
further by advocates of a feminist standpoint epistemology. The feminist standpoint combined 
Kuhn’s insight that scientists work within socially constructed paradigms with the feminist insight 
that science had historically been performed by men and suggested that scientific knowledge, when 
grounded in women’s experience, would produce ‘a morally and scientifically preferable grounding 
for our interpretations and explanations of nature and social life’.60 Nancy Hartsock develops the 
project of feminist standpoint epistemology, defining a standpoint as ‘not simply an interested 
position (interpreted as bias) but [...] interested in the sense of being engaged’.61 A feminist 
standpoint would counter the male bias in the sciences, and a resultant female bias should be 
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interpreted not as a negative consequence but a positive political engagement on the part of 
women. Furthermore, Hartsock’s feminist standpoint is developed from the Marxist proposal that 
knowledge produced by those in a dominant social position can only ever be partial knowledge 
systems, whereas the subjugated position of women would necessarily produce more complete 
knowledge. This leads Hartsock to the argument that feminist epistemology should begin with 
women’s ‘life activity’, how women experience the world and their relations to others.62 A science 
grounded in women’s experience would engage with patriarchal bias, while producing a more 
complete system of knowledge. The feminist standpoint attempts to answer the paradox of feminist 
epistemology by suggesting that a bias should be interpreted as political interest, and arguing that 
an interested engagement with the sciences actually produces more complete systems of 
knowledge. 
Elaine Morgan and the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis 
 To explore this argument more fully, I will introduce a particular example of an early feminist 
standpoint epistemology in evolutionary science. This example illustrates the social nature of 
scientific knowledge-production, the possibility of producing alternative narratives within science, as 
well as some of the constraints on this. It also begins to demonstrate the importance of nonhuman 
agency, which I will discuss in more detail in later chapters. In 1972, Elaine Morgan published The 
Descent of Woman, in which she argued that contemporary Darwinian anthropology was 
androcentric and that a reinterpretation of the Darwinian ‘descent’ of the human from the 
perspective of the female would provide an alternative narrative. Morgan argues from a Kuhnian 
perspective that androcentrism in evolutionary theorising is a paradigm, and that a female 
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reinterpretation or revision represents a call for a paradigm shift.63 Morgan’s argument is that from 
the androcentric paradigm, all characteristics of human beings are interpreted within a particular 
framework, that of the ‘Mighty Hunter’: 
Almost everything about us is held to have derived from this. If we walk erect, it was 
because the Mighty Hunter had to stand tall to scan the distance for his prey. If we lived in 
caves it was because hunters need a base to come home to. If we learned to speak it was 
because hunters need to plan the next safari and boast about the last. Desmond Morris, 
pondering on the shape of a woman’s breasts, instantly deduced that they evolved because 
her mate became a mighty hunter.64 
Morgan considers the narrative of human evolution from the perspective of the female of the 
species and, through a development of a new female-centred narrative of evolutionary descent, 
argues for the acceptance of the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis. 
 The Aquatic Ape Hypothesis was first suggested by Alister Hardy in 1960, in an article in the 
New Scientist.65 He argues that certain physiological characteristics of Homo sapiens, such as 
hairlessness, can be best explained by positing that prehominid apes spent a significant length of 
time towards the end of the Miocene period (23 million to five million years ago) living in a semi-
aquatic environment. Hardy had wondered about an aquatic period in the evolution of humans since 
reading about the layer of subcutaneous fat present in humans but no other primates, in 1930. Being 
a marine biologist, Hardy was reminded of a similar layer of fat existent, and often coexistent with 
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hairlessness, in aquatic animals such as dolphins and seals.66 Hardy did not present his ideas on the 
aquatic history of humans until 1960 when he mentioned his thoughts to a lay audience at a sub-
aqua club in Brighton. At this point in his career he was a professor and a Fellow of the Royal Society 
and, although working within a scientific paradigm, his standing was such that he could attempt to 
ignore Kuhn’s paradigm imperative discussed earlier: ‘Normal science does not aim at novelties of 
fact or theory and, when successful, finds none.’ In the face of a negative academic reaction to his 
comments, however, Hardy only published the single article in the New Scientist. This context is 
illustrative as it provides support for the Kuhnian analysis of the paradigm nature of science, and for 
Morgan’s view that evolutionary theory works within a particular paradigm, that of Man the Mighty 
Hunter, and that an alternative narrative or standpoint could – or perhaps rather should – provoke a 
paradigm shift. 
The Aquatic Ape Hypothesis has received some support, with Morgan being its most 
prominent proponent, publishing The Descent of Woman in 1972 and a further five books on the 
subject: The Aquatic Ape: A Theory of Evolution; The Scars of Evolution; The Descent of the Child: 
Human Evolution from a New Perspective; The Aquatic Ape Hypothesis; and The Naked Darwinist: 
Questions about Human Evolution.67 Morgan comments in The Naked Darwinist that she expected, 
after publishing The Descent of Woman, for the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis set out in that book to be 
discussed, interrogated, and possibly refuted. However, she states, ‘The response I had not foreseen 
was total silence.’68 Morgan claims that the scientific community generally found it more effective to 
protect the prevailing paradigm by ignoring the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis, rather than attacking or 
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questioning it.69 Daniel Dennett, in his book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, commented on the refusal of 
scientists to engage with the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis: 
During the last few years, when I have found myself in the company of distinguished 
biologists, evolutionary theorists, paleoanthropologists and other experts, I have often asked 
them just to tell me, please, exactly why Elaine Morgan must be wrong about the aquatic 
theory. I haven’t yet had a reply worth mentioning, aside from those who admit, with a 
twinkle in their eyes, that they have also wondered the same thing.70 
The reaction of the scientific community to The Descent of Woman is illustrative of the way 
paradigm communities within science operate, and the ways that paradigms define who can ask 
questions, about what, and the answers that can be expected to those questions.  
A lucid example of Morgan’s reformulation of the evolutionary narrative can be seen in her 
description of the development of the human vagina and penis. Morgan claims that living in an 
aquatic environment could have encouraged the retraction of the vagina in the female of the 
species: ‘[The vagina] not only moved forward – it also withdrew farther within the body cavity, 
possibly for additional protection against salt water and abrasive sand. This is normal marine 
modification.’71 (In The Descent of Woman Morgan also claims that the hymen developed for 
reasons of protection, but states in later work that this claim is untenable due to the discovery of the 
existence of a hymen in other non-aquatic animals, including horses.72) It is Morgan’s claim that the 
vagina retracted as a response to environmental change, and that the development of a larger penis 
in humans compared to other apes such as chimpanzees was a response to this. Importantly, in 
Morgan’s narrative, male development follows initial developments in the female. The length of the 
human penis and the development of ventro-ventral (face to face) sexual intercourse are interpreted 
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as a consequence of female development.73 This subverts the androcentric view that female 
physiology and sexual behaviour developed as a consequence of the developments of Man the 
Mighty Hunter, and undercuts the assumption seen in sociobiological narratives, that man is the 
agent of evolutionary change. I believe Morgan’s work to be important, whatever the factual status 
of the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis, especially in conjunction with my analysis of sociobiology, because it 
clearly illustrates the ways in which gendered assumptions can produce an androcentric narrative of 
evolutionary change, with man as the active evolutionary agent and the female as a passive sexual 
resource. It also emphasises the possibility for alternative narratives and knowledges, which will be 
important in the following chapter where I propose a queer alternative to narratives of genetic 
determinism. This is also important for my project as a whole, which seeks to put science and social 
theory into conversation to produce alternative and more equitable narratives, knowledges, and 
ways of living. 
Morgan, through the adoption of a feminist standpoint, effects a shift in the traditionally 
gendered evolutionary narrative; the female of the species may have developed in a certain way in 
an aquatic environment with contemporary female and male physiology and behaviour following as 
an evolutionary consequence. I think that this narrative is very important for feminist engagements 
with evolutionary science, although it is also problematic for reasons I will outline below. Morgan’s 
narrative and its history and reception illustrates the extent to which androcentric paradigms define 
the ways in which scientific facts are interpreted, and the kinds of science that are encouraged or 
discouraged within paradigms. Morgan’s epistemology is avowedly feminist, and I believe The 
Descent of Woman to be typical of early feminist standpoint science, as the focus is the use and 
abuse of biologically deterministic narratives of evolutionary descent, rather than questioning the 
fundamental problems with such an approach. The Descent of Woman is an early example of an 
attempt to formulate a scientific narrative from a female perspective so as to counter gendered 
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assumptions and biases in narratives of biological determinism, such as sociobiological narratives of 
descent. Morgan’s narrative is important as it shows one method of opposing patriarchy in science. 
Also, it illustrates a number of problems with this approach; in particular it prompts the question of 
whether relying on biological determinism and a linear narrative of descent is a successful method of 
producing a feminist epistemology.  
Problems with Feminist Standpoints  
Based on this interpretation of her work, Morgan’s argument depends upon biological 
determinism, albeit from a subversive feminist standpoint. Among the drawbacks of this approach is 
the lack of analysis of patriarchal values that structure theory and method, as well as interpretation. 
As a consequence, her approach does not adequately confront the paradox of feminist empiricism, 
that a politically motivated empiricism can question the very truth claims of empirical science. For 
Morgan, the politically motivated narrative of The Descent of Woman reveals anomalies in the 
content of work produced within the androcentric evolutionary paradigm. Unfortunately, her work 
does not proceed to further question the validity of the adaptationist method, or the patriarchal 
assumptions that function in biological determinism and linear narratives of descent. Morgan’s 
narrative relies upon biological determinism, suggesting that contemporary behavioural and 
physiological characteristics of humans and human societies can be best explained through the 
construction of plausible narratives of descent. As a consequence, Morgan’s work draws attention to 
patriarchy in the traditional narratives of descent, yet replicates patriarchal methods and theoretical 
techniques such as the assumption of scarcity and competition without questioning the historical 
and political contexts within which these concepts were developed. 
Hubbard addresses the feminist standpoint in evolutionary science in her article, ‘Have Only 
Men Evolved?’ Hubbard’s perspective is interesting, as it illustrates a tension between empiricism 
and standpoint epistemology while pointing to some issues that led, in the 1980s, to the emergence 
of postmodernism in the feminist engagement with science. Hubbard argues that feminist 
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standpoint theories like Morgan’s are inadequate, because they overestimate biological 
determinism, and underestimate the role of social and cultural change: 
Except as a way of parodying the male myths, I find it unsatisfactory because it locks the 
authors into many of the same unwarranted suppositions that underlie those very myths. 
For example, both accept the view that our behavior is biologically determined, that what 
we do is a result of what we were or did millions of years ago. This assumption is 
unwarranted given the enormous range of human adaptability and the rapid rate of human 
social and cultural evolution.74 
As an alternative to feminist myth-making, Hubbard suggests ‘exposing and analyzing the male 
myths that hide our overwhelming ignorance’, arguing that ‘women who recognize an androcentric 
myth when they see one and who are able to think beyond it, must do the necessary work [...] and 
come up with ways of seeing the facts and of interpreting them’.75 She also draws attention to a 
difficulty with this project: 
None of this is easy, because women scientists tend to hail from the same socially privileged 
families and be educated in the same elite universities as our male colleagues. But since we 
are marginal to the mainstream, we may find it easier than they to watch ourselves push the 
bus in which we are riding.76 
Hubbard recognises the problems of a feminist standpoint or the creation of female myths: that 
unquestioned assumptions in male-centred theories can be replicated in female-centred theories. 
Her suggestion for an alternative is that feminist scientists ‘think beyond’ androcentric myths, rather 
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than creating feminist myths. This suggestion, however, depends upon empiricism. For Hubbard, the 
facts exist to be interpreted and ‘women who recognize an androcentric myth when they see one’ 
could, and should, ‘do the necessary work’ to uncover the empirical facts and interpret them 
without bias. As I argued earlier, the notion that science can become more empirical when practised 
by a particular group of people is problematic and actually subverts the notion of empiricism itself.  
Hubbard emphasises the problem with biological determinism in standpoint epistemologies 
such as Morgan’s, yet her suggested empirical response is problematic. The feminist empiricist 
paradox is not resolved by the suggestion that women can produce a more value-neutral science. 
Furthermore, it is not apparent that all female or feminist scientists would respond to androcentric 
myths in the same ways. This problem is recognised by Hubbard, and she makes reference to the 
fact that female scientists tend to be from similar class and educational backgrounds as male 
scientists. For Hubbard, female scientists may, in fact, be committed to the same androcentric myths 
as male scientists, due to a collective similar background or educational bias. Implicit in this 
recognition is the question of what constitutes a collective solidarity or commitment to scientific 
myths. Her argument points to a tension in feminist science studies in the late 1970s and 1980s 
which questioned whether a female or feminist identity could be collectively assumed to produce 
standpoints or politically useful scientific knowledge. If class or educational background could 
produce a bias that would destabilise a standpoint, then this would suggest that other identities or 
loyalties could also threaten such solidarity grounded in female identity; and, indeed, Hubbard’s 
comments foreshadow the question of whether there could even be a single female identity upon 
which to ground a single stable feminist standpoint.  
As I have shown, the feminist standpoint was an attempt to counter patriarchy in scientific 
narratives such as sociobiology. Feminist standpoint epistemology attempted to create systems of 
knowledge that originated in women’s experience, and accounted for women’s lives. This developed 
as a consequence of early feminist recognition of the imbalance of women and men in scientific 
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careers, and the ways in which science was often used as a patriarchal tool of control over women’s 
bodies and lives. Elaine Morgan’s The Descent of Woman represents an early attempt to formulate a 
feminist standpoint, and also draws attention to some of the problems of this approach – in 
particular the use of patriarchal concepts and theoretical approaches to fashion a narrative that 
appears valid as scientific theory. Not only does Morgan’s Aquatic Ape Hypothesis reproduce the 
biological determinism of sociobiological narratives, but the suggestion of a feminist standpoint that 
grounds epistemology in women’s experience also raises the question of whether a singular stable 
feminist identity exists from which to take a standpoint and, in fact, what counts as women’s 
experience. I will build on this argument in the following section, looking at some theoretical 
developments in the 1980s, before rereading the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis and suggesting a novel and 
alternative interpretation in the light of some of the findings of feminist postmodernism. 
Feminist Postmodernism 
The growing recognition of the difficulty in taking up a single standpoint from which to 
practise science illustrates a tension in feminist engagements with science in the 1970s and early 
1980s that led to the development of postmodernist perspectives within science studies. Harding 
outlines this development, echoing Hubbard’s recognition of social privileges and bias and expanding 
upon the implications. Harding asks, ‘what are the intellectual and political relationships between 
feminist scientific and epistemological projects and the similar projects of the other groups?’: 
Furthermore, are women, or even feminists, a ‘group’ in the sense required by the 
standpoint epistemologies? Do not other self-conscious political projects create in many 
women and feminists self-identities and political loyalties that are in tension with the 
metaphysics and politics of the standpoint epistemologies?77 
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Harding argues that the standpoint assumption that common female experiences produce a stable 
identity from which to produce a feminist epistemology and politics is undercut by ‘fracturing 
identities’ related to race, class and sexuality.78 In 1979, Hubbard had drawn attention in ‘Have Only 
Men Evolved’ to the fact that class and education problematise the project of taking a stable 
standpoint based on singular female identity. Feminists in the 1980s began to recognise that there 
are multiple ways in which an identity can be fractured and that there are many and varied complex 
political commitments and projects related to identity that could undermine the attempt to create a 
stable feminist standpoint. 
Feminist postmodernism also interrogates the process of producing knowledges, and 
questions the possibility of value-neutral empiricism.79 A singular stable position or standpoint is 
illusory, as is a singular stable realm of scientific facts that can be observed, described or 
interpreted. As Harding says, 
Contrary to the assumption of ‘a’ world out there composed of essential dichotomies, which 
it is science’s job to reconnect through explanation, there are as many interrelated and 
smoothly connected realities as there are kinds of oppositional consciousness. By giving up 
                                                          
78 Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 163. 
79 One of the key texts for the development of postmodernist epistemologies is Jean-François Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. by Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1984 [1979]). In this text, Lyotard makes a number of claims about science and 
the validation of knowledge. Chief among these is the claim that postmodernism should be understood as 
‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, p. xxiv. Lyotard also argues that science should be understood in terms of 
language games and speech acts and that scientific knowledge must, in fact, be legitimated by narrative 
knowledge (Lyotard acknowledged that this particular claim emphasised narrative knowledge to too great an 
extent in later texts – see in particular The Postmodern Explained to Children: Correspondence 1982–1985, ed. 
by Julian Pefanis and Morgan Thomas, trans. by Don Barry and others [London: Turnaround, 1992], especially 
pp. 29–32). The Postmodern Condition illustrates the questioning of science and the legitimation of knowledge 
that was occurring in the late 1970s and early 1980s. I am employing the term postmodern to signal a 
suspicion towards the political uses of metanarratives (in particular patriarchal narratives of evolutionary 
descent) but not engaging directly with Lyotard’s text as I believe Donna Haraway’s formulation of a 
postmodernist epistemology, which I will discuss later, to be a more successful negotiation between relativism 
and realism, and thus to be more useful for political engagements with scientific narratives and knowledge 
claims.  
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the goal of telling ‘one true story’, we embrace instead the permanent partiality of feminist 
inquiry.80  
Feminist postmodernism is concerned with the fracturing of identities, as well as the problems of 
objectivity and empiricism. It recognises the partiality of all inquiries, scientific and feminist, and 
suggests ways in which this partiality can be embraced for transformative political projects. 
Postmodernist epistemologies directly interrogate the traditional model of scientific practice, that a 
stable singular individual scientist can approach an object of scientific inquiry, itself singular and 
knowable, and produce empirical bodies of knowledge. Postmodernist epistemologies thus offered 
feminists a method of interrogating the Baconian gendered model of patriarchal scientific practice 
and the split between object and subject in scientific inquiry.  
 Donna Haraway sees political potential in the fracturing of identities and it is her 
perspective, as outlined in ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in 
the 1980s’, that I will be employing as a particular form of 1980s feminist postmodernism, although 
it is worth noting that she has since distanced herself from the term.81 Haraway argues for ‘pleasure 
in the confusion of boundaries and for responsibility in their construction’.82 Haraway’s work is 
important throughout my thesis, as she sees possibility and radical potential in science. Haraway 
regards the development of science and technology as bringing about confusion in the three 
fundamental distinctions that are the basis of humanism: 
Biology and evolutionary theory over the last two centuries have simultaneously produced 
modern organisms as objects and reduced the line between humans and animals to a faint 
trace re-etched in ideological struggle or professional disputes between life and social 
                                                          
80 Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 194. 
81 See Donna Haraway, ‘The Promises of Monsters: A Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others’, in 
Cultural Studies, ed. by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, Paula A. Treichler (New York; Routledge, 1992), pp. 
295–337, especially pp. 297–298. 
82 Donna Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s’, Signs, 
4 (1987), 1–42 (p. 3). 
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sciences [...] The second leaky distinction is between animal-human (organism) and machine 
[...] The third distinction is a subset of the second: the boundary between physical and non-
physical is very imprecise for us.83 
I will focus on the first ‘leaky distinction’ and its effects in narratives of evolutionary descent and in 
the operations of biological determinism.84 Wilson and other sociobiologists misinterpret cultural 
phenomena as biological fact and this is in part achieved through a negotiation of the boundary 
between human and animal. As I argued earlier, with reference to Fausto-Sterling’s ‘linguistic hat 
trick’, constructs from human culture are attributed to animal populations; they then function as 
supposed natural phenomena; these phenomena are then applied to human culture. This confuses 
different sets of phenomena and supports the status quo. It is important to note here that this 
sociobiological logic depends both upon the ‘leakiness’ of the animal-human distinction, and the 
ability of the sociobiologist to define the distinction as is necessary for the theory.  
In this approach, the boundaries between human and animal are questioned, as are the 
ways in which this boundary is defined and negotiated. Feminist standpoint epistemologies suggest 
that feminist science should start from women’s experience, and Morgan’s narrative of evolutionary 
descent of the female of the species does exactly that, anachronistically considering evolutionary 
adaptation from the point of view of contemporary women’s experience of, among other things, 
                                                          
83 Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’, pp. 4–6. 
84 The second and third distinctions and their permeability can also be observed in evolutionary theory, for 
example in the debates over human development and tool use. The distinction between the animate and non-
animate is brought into question in discussions of the importance of inanimate objects in human evolution. 
Many anthropologists suggest that tool use was a watershed moment in human evolution, taking hunting tools 
as the first or most important tool; feminist anthropologists have responded to this with the suggestion that 
the proto-tool might have been the female gatherer’s basket, not the male hunter’s spear (For example Sally 
Slocum, ‘Woman the Hunter: Male Bias in Anthropology’, in Towards an Anthropology of Women, ed. by Rayna 
R. Reiter [New York: Monthly Review Press, 1975], pp. 36–50.). Adrienne Zihlman traces the historical 
representation of the gendered division of labour in anthropological and evolutionary narratives. She argues 
that both Man the Hunter and Woman the Gatherer narratives reproduce a gendered division of labour that 
reflects contemporary society rather than the prehistoric past (‘The Paleolithic Glass Ceiling: Women in Human 
Evolution’, Women in Human Evolution, pp. 91–114). Morgan argues that the female would have developed 
tool use so as to break into crustaceans at the shore, a development unnecessary for the male with generally 
larger sharper teeth, again subverting the conventional idea of man as the agent of evolutionary change and 
offering a narrative that does not depend upon the gendered division of hunting and gathering (Morgan, The 
Descent of Woman, p. 27).  
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their bodies, reproduction, and childbearing. The question, however, of what comes to constitute 
women’s experience in the face of the fractured identities and loyalties recognised in different 
women becomes an important question for postmodernist feminist science studies in the 1980s. 
Feminists began to recognise that there is not one set of experiences that fully represents women’s 
experience. Furthermore, Haraway emphasises the impossibility of a stable cultural or biological 
identity base from which to formulate a feminist standpoint: ‘There is nothing about being “female” 
that naturally binds women. There is not even such a state as “being” female, itself a highly complex 
category constructed in contested sexual scientific discourses and other social practices’.85 Haraway 
does, however, recognise the need to produce bodies of knowledge that speak for a feminist 
political purpose and does not suggest that feminist science is impossible. Rather, I think it is useful 
to restate her call for pleasure in the confusion of boundaries, and for responsibility in their 
reconstruction. Feminist postmodernist science studies – as well as the queer approach that I will 
build upon these epistemologies in the next chapter – faces a paradoxical imperative: it must 
support the pleasure in the confusion of traditional boundaries that support the patriarchal status 
quo, while also recognising the necessity of the reconstruction of boundaries for knowledge-making 
and political purposes.  
Haraway’s Postmodernism and Objectivity 
Haraway’s argument suggests an epistemology based on pleasure in the confusion of the 
central boundaries of Western humanism, such as fusions between human, animal and machine. 
The cyborg is an ironic symbol of hybridity in the face of the leaky boundary distinctions. She argues 
that, ‘From the point of view of pleasure in these potent and taboo fusions, made inevitable by the 
social relations of science and technology, there might indeed be a feminist science.’86 Harding 
concludes from Haraway’s cyborg myth that, 
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From this perspective, if there can be ‘a’ feminist standpoint, it can only be whatever 
emerges from the political struggles of ‘oppositional consciousnesses’ – oppositional 
precisely to the longing for ‘one true story’ that has been the psychic motor for Western 
science.87 
Harding suggests that feminist postmodern epistemology must always be figured in opposition to 
the dominant scientific drive for universal narratives. It is, however, important to read Haraway’s 
epistemology as not simply suggesting a politics based on an oppositional identity, as this would 
replicate the very problems that feminist postmodernism identified in standpoint epistemologies. 
Haraway’s postmodernist epistemology attempts to create political solidarity without recourse to 
universal narratives or identity. This epistemology seems to contrast to Morgan’s attempt to 
produce a narrative of female evolutionary descent. As useful and potentially subversive as her 
narrative is, it is an attempt to produce a singular factual universal narrative from a singular female 
perspective, and it fails to recognise the structural problems with this attempt, either from the 
patriarchal or feminist perspective. 
 Haraway sets her outlined feminist postmodernism apart from relativism, or radical social 
constructionism. Her project is one of mediation between a position of Kuhnian social 
constructionism in science and the political need for a feminist standpoint. As she states in ‘Situated 
Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’: 
I think my problem and ‘our’ problem is how to have simultaneously an account of radical 
historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects [...] and a no-nonsense 
commitment to faithful accounts of a ‘real’ world.88 
                                                          
87 Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 193. 
88 Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective’, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association Books, 
1991), pp. 183–201 (p. 187). 
63 
 
Haraway’s postmodernist feminist epistemological approach must therefore account for both the 
contingent constructed nature of scientific claims, and the necessity of a certain type of scientific 
realism for political projects. This mediation between two seemingly opposite approaches to 
scientific knowledge is accomplished, in part, through a reinterpretation of the concept of objectivity 
and the consequences of the development and insistence upon this new mode of feminist 
postmodernist objectivity. Crucially, this illustrates that there are different ways of producing 
knowledge about objects of scientific enquiry; in short, there are always alternative ways of ‘doing’ 
science. 
 Haraway suggests that feminist standpoint epistemologies point the way to a politically 
useful reinterpretation of objectivity. Feminist standpoints lay claim to greater objectivity as they 
originate in a position of subjugation, and are thus less biased by dominant norms and conventions. 
Haraway states that these subjugated standpoints seem to promise ‘more adequate, sustained, 
objective, transforming accounts of the world’.89 For Haraway, however, it is not a matter of simply 
replacing male scientists with female scientists, or recognising and challenging androcentrism when 
it is apparent. Haraway’s feminist postmodernist objectivity demands taking up a partial position, so 
as to ‘see from below’, while problematising the very possibility of taking up ‘a’ position in the first 
place.90 This positioning must negotiate the impossibility of a stable ground or standpoint without 
becoming a form of relativism, since as Haraway states, ‘Relativism is a way of being nowhere while 
claiming to be everywhere equally.’91 This statement is important as the alternative to taking up a 
singular stable standpoint is not necessarily positionless relativism. Haraway argues, in fact, for an 
alternative to relativism, not in the development of universal truths or singular stable narratives and 
identities, but in partiality, contingency and critical reflection: ‘The alternative to relativism is partial, 
locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connection called solidarity in 
                                                          
89 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 191. 
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91 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 191. 
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politics and shared conversations in epistemology.’92 It is important to note here that Haraway 
usefully rejects the fictional necessity to choose one of two dichotomous positions in epistemologies 
of science: Baconian objectivity based on a split between object and (male) scientific subject, or 
relativism and the rejection of any sense of realism. Haraway redefines the Baconian position as 
identity, as it protects the subject from connection with the object, and suggests that the alternative 
is in fact a reformulation of objectivity, achieved through partial perspectives, connections and 
conversations. 
It is solidarity without the ground of identity that is fundamental to Haraway’s reformulation 
of objectivity. Complete and discrete identity reinforces the fictional distance between subject and 
object, between scientist and the object of scientific inquiry. Haraway argues that a complete and 
discrete self is incapable of objectivity, because true objectivity demands a collapse of distance 
between subject and object: 
The knowing self is partial in all its guises, never finished, whole, simply there and original; it 
is always constructed and stitched together imperfectly, and therefore able to join with 
another, to see together without claiming to be another. Here is the promise of objectivity: a 
scientific knower seeks the subject position not of identity, but of objectivity; that is, partial 
connection.93 
Traditional models of scientific practice have valorised the distance between scientist as subject and 
the object of scientific inquiry as the most efficient way of producing rational knowledge. Haraway’s 
postmodernist feminist reformulation of objectivity suggests that contingency, positioning, location 
and partiality are the conditions of producing rational knowledge claims.94 Haraway thus encourages 
the reduction of distance between subject and object. This reformulation of objectivity is useful to 
feminist epistemologies, as it problematises the traditional gendered models of rationality that 
                                                          
92 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 191. 
93 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 193. 
94 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 195. 
65 
 
structure the practice of science. It does, however, threaten the possibility of a singular female 
identity or standpoint, as much as it does male identity or patriarchal perspectives. It is also crucial 
to my project, and foundational for the deconstructive approach to gender and sexuality I will 
discuss in Chapter Two. Again, Haraway’s call for responsibility in the reconstruction of boundaries is 
useful, as it illustrates the need for certain contingent responsive and responsible standpoints for 
feminist politics. 
Haraway and the Agency of the Object 
 One of the ways that Haraway suggests the object-subject distinction can be broken down to 
encourage more contingent partial connections, and thus more objectivity, is by emphasising the 
agency of the object. Haraway’s conception of objects as actors offers a more complex way of 
interpreting Morgan’s feminist narrative of evolutionary descent, rather than simply as an 
alternative narrative of biological determinism. Haraway argues that the objects of scientific inquiry 
have traditionally been seen as passive and inert, and that: 
Accounts of such objects can seem to be either appropriations of a fixed and determined 
world reduced to resource for the instrumentalist projects of destructive Western societies, 
or they can be seen as masks for interests, usually dominating interests.95 
Haraway uses the example of biological sex to elucidate this point; when sex becomes an object of 
biological knowledge, this encourages biological determinism, and threatens the work of social 
constructionism and the critical theory of political projects such as feminism. A more pertinent 
example for my own argument is that of the female in evolutionary theory. Androcentric accounts of 
females in evolution reduce the female to a resource for the male in sexual competition, and 
Morgan’s narrative of female evolutionary descent emphasises the extent to which the traditional 
agents of evolutionary change are male. The apparent plausibility of the adaptationist narratives 
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regarding gendered development in evolution masks the dominant interest in maintaining the status 
quo in relation to gendered social structures.  
 Haraway names this traditional way of conceiving of the subject’s relation to the object as an 
appropriationist or productionist logic.96 Haraway argues that there is a logic of domination built into 
traditional Western binaries such as object-subject, whereby one component side of the binary is 
always figured as passive and as a resource for the production or appropriation by the corresponding 
active component. Nature is considered as the raw material or resource for cultural production; sex 
is the resource for the acts of gender; the female is the resource for the male. The object of inquiry, 
or resource, must be denied the status of an agent in the production of knowledge. Haraway 
suggests that feminist postmodernist epistemologies emphasise the agency of the object: 
Situated knowledges require that the object of knowledge be pictured as an actor and agent, 
not a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally as slave to the master that closes off the 
dialectic in his unique agency and authorship of ‘objective’ knowledge.97 
Haraway argues that conceiving of objects as actors is not a naive form of scientific realism, which 
depends upon a logic of discovery, but an engagement that depends upon a ‘power-charged social 
relation of “conversation”’.98 The material and productive nature of active objects reduces the 
distinction between subject and object, threatening productionist or appropriationist narratives, and 
providing space for the work of social constructionism without slipping into mere relativism. 
 This theory of objects as actors is reminiscent of Bruno Latour’s use of the term ‘actant’. 
Latour uses the concept of actants to emphasise material agency within scientific practice and, like 
Haraway, to negotiate a middle-ground between radical social constructionism and naive scientific 
realism. An actant in Latour’s conception is an object, considered as material and active, and 
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contributing to the scientific process. Objects of scientific inquiry are actants with multiple effects, 
not all of which can be known by the scientist. The scientific process turns ‘actants’ into ‘actors’, 
defining the ways in which the object relates to other objects, including how it is affected by these 
relations.99 The concepts of nature and culture are by-products of this process, rather than simple 
dichotomous opposites. As Haraway states, ‘The world neither speaks itself nor disappears in favour 
of a master decoder [...] The world is not raw material for humanization’.100 The ‘activation’ of the 
categories previously held to be passive and inert, such as biological sex, nature, and the female, 
provides a way of challenging the productionist and appropriationist logic without resorting to 
radical social constructionism or naive scientific realism. As Haraway argues, ‘The activation 
permanently problematizes binary distinctions like sex and gender, without however eliminating 
their strategic utility.’101 Latour’s concept of the actant is useful when following Haraway’s system of 
critical objectivity achieved through a collapse of the distance between subject and object, and 
offers a way of considering Morgan’s narrative of female evolutionary descent that goes beyond a 
criticism of its reliance upon biological determinism.102 I will be using the term ‘actor’ or ‘agent’ 
throughout this thesis; as useful as the actor/actant distinction is, there is a danger of it giving 
overdue emphasis to scientific and laboratory work, rather than the agency of the actors in question, 
which is something I am trying to avoid throughout. 
Morgan’s Apes as Agents of Evolution 
 Morgan’s narrative in The Descent of Woman reformulates the subject-object division along 
the traditional lines of male-female within evolutionary theory. In sociobiological theory, for 
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example, the female is considered a ‘special kind of resource’, and the clear distinction is made 
between male and female along the hierarchical binary oppositions of active/passive and 
agent/resource.103 The male is the agent of evolutionary change, and the female is solely object or 
resource. Morgan’s narrative of descent of the female inverts this binary, suggesting that the body 
or actions of the female ape brought about evolutionary change. A pertinent example is that of the 
sexual relationship between male and female prehominid apes and its connection with social bonds, 
as discussed in the chapter entitled ‘Love’. Morgan draws attention to the ‘stultifying tendency to 
assume that the male has always been the initiator of sexual activity, and the female only a passive 
instrument or receptacle of his desire’.104 She proceeds to discuss estrous cycles in primates, a 
female sexual cycle that she argues actually stimulates and produces male sexuality as a 
developmental response.105 Morgan argues that the lack of estrus in Homo sapiens has not 
detracted from the female ape’s agency, but rather that this can be considered as one of the origins 
of more complex contemporary sexual and social relationships.106 In effect, in this example and 
throughout The Descent of Woman, Morgan performs an activation of the object, giving the female 
of the species evolutionary agency. Morgan considers the female of the species as an actor and 
agent, rather than just a passive resource. 
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Morgan’s narrative does, however, somewhat fail to mediate successfully between social 
constructionism and scientific realism, and ultimately falls back upon biological determinism without 
adequately recognising the problems with this approach. In the previous example, contemporary 
social and sexual relations are argued to be determined by the loss of estrous cycles in early Homo 
sapiens. Not only can this account therefore be read as performing the same logical trick that I 
identified earlier in sociobiological accounts of differences between egg and sperm, it also reduces 
contemporary female and male sexuality to solely a process of biological reproduction. It is my 
contention, nonetheless, that the way in which she ‘activates’ the category of woman in evolution 
can in fact be used as a powerful tool to counter conservative biological determinism. The female 
body for Morgan is a productive site, not a passive resource as considered by sociobiologists. 
Morgan’s female apes are active agents from whose body and actions follow evolutionary changes. 
It is for this reason that I believe that the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis can be re-evaluated as a useful 
epistemology for feminists engaging with evolutionary science. In representing the active and 
agential nature of the female body, rather than figuring it as a passive resource, I believe Morgan’s 
aquatic apes can be interpreted as representations of active female embodiment, and as resistant to 
the patriarchal conventions of active male domination of a passive female resource. 
 Haraway states in ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’ that, ‘Biological-determinist ideology is only one 
position opened up in scientific culture for arguing the meanings of human animality. There is much 
room for radical political people to contest for the meanings of the breached boundary.’107 
Sociobiology negotiates the boundary of the human and the animal in a way that reinforces the 
distinction and reinforces conventional social norms in the process. Haraway suggests that this leaky 
distinction, the transgression of the boundary of human and animal, can offer – and it is important 
to note her choice of words – other ‘positions’ to interrogate the production of meanings in scientific 
culture. Haraway thus recognises the necessity of political positions and the responsible negotiation 
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and construction of boundaries, however partial and contingent. Feminists engaging with 
sociobiological claims in the 1970s had to take a position from which to interrogate the political 
claims of sociobiologists such as Edward O. Wilson. This need for a position from which to 
interrogate patriarchy is elaborated further in Morgan’s alternative female narrative of descent and 
the development of feminist epistemologies in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Haraway, although 
opposed to a singular feminist standpoint, offers the cyborg as a myth of transgressed boundaries, 
where positions can be created in the impossibility of identity. Importantly, Haraway’s 
postmodernism and cyborg myth offer a way to reinterpret feminist engagements such as Morgan’s 
The Descent of Woman without simply reducing her work to biological determinism. Morgan’s 
Aquatic Ape Hypothesis, when seen through Haraway’s postmodern framework, is not about a single 
identity shared between contemporary women and prehominid apes, but rather a sense of solidarity 
without a ground of identity and a conversation and partial connection between feminist politics and 
the active evolving bodies of prehominid female apes. 
While Haraway develops her argument in opposition to feminist standpoint epistemologies, 
she incorporates elements of the standpoint strategy. Harding argues that the oppositional and 
political nature of Haraway’s postmodernism makes the cyborg myth not incompatible with 
standpoint epistemology. Feminist postmodernist epistemology begins from ‘nonessential, 
nonnaturalizable, fragmented identities and the refusal of the delusion of a return to an “original 
unity”’.108 This, for Harding, offers tools with which to explore the naturalisation of patriarchal 
assumptions and values in science. However, she maintains that feminist standpoint epistemologies 
of science cannot be abandoned; ‘they are central to transferring the power to change social 
relations from the “haves” to the “have-nots”’.109 Harding thus illustrates a tension in feminist 
engagements with science in the 1980s. The development of feminist postmodernism identified 
internal contradictions in the feminist standpoint project and suggested that the attempt to ground 
                                                          
108 Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 193. 
109 Harding, The Science Question in Feminism, p. 195. 
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a feminist epistemology in a particular standpoint or identity was a totalising gesture. 
Simultaneously, feminist postmodernism pointed to oppositional political action, which feminist 
standpoint epistemologies were committed to producing, in the form of a feminist standpoint which 
was oppositional to the masculinist, androcentric discourses of the sciences.  
Conclusion 
A rigid distinction between feminist standpoint epistemologies and feminist postmodernism 
is unhelpful, as it reduces feminist standpoint theories to naive scientific realism or universalising 
and totalising identity claims, while caricaturing feminist postmodernist theories as relativist or a 
radical form of social constructionism. Feminist standpoint epistemologies offer science studies an 
approach that recognises the social nature of science and the ways in which social conventions and 
political ideologies structure the theory and practice of science. Feminist postmodernism offers the 
recognition that no position is value-neutral and that powerful political responses can be made from 
opposition to dominant use of science; however, following from Haraway’s work on situated 
knowledges, these positions of opposition must always be partial and contingent, rather than 
grounded in universal and totalising notions of identity. It is the conversation between feminist 
standpoint epistemologies and feminist postmodernism that I take as my resource here, and which I 
will build on in the next chapter, when elaborating a queer approach to narratives of genetic 
determinism about gender and sexuality. 
Haraway’s situated knowledges approach to science questions the possibility of empirical 
truths and the traditional model of scientific practice, where the male scientist reveals empirical 
truths about the object of inquiry while maintaining a distance in this subject-object relation. 
Haraway suggests that objectivity should be reinterpreted as a solidarity achieved through partial 
connections and conversations with the object, rather than the maintenance of distance. In the light 
of this reinterpretation of the concept of objectivity, Wilson’s metaphor of extension of population 
biology and evolutionary theory to social organisation reveals sociobiology to be not about 
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objectivity and connection between subject and object, but about the identity of the scientist, and 
the science itself. Wilson’s discovery of sociobiological ‘facts’ through extension is in opposition to 
Haraway’s suggested model of conversation and partial connections. Thus, working from Haraway’s 
model, sociobiology cannot be defined as objective but rather as a system of knowledge that 
protects and reinforces traditional patriarchal theories, identities and practices.  
Feminist postmodernist epistemologies also question the possibility of constructing a 
singular standpoint from which to create alternative narratives and bodies of knowledge. 
Questioning what counts as women’s experience and the notion of a singular female position, 
feminist postmodernism is seemingly hostile to early attempts at female retellings of scientific 
narratives. Haraway’s approach is useful, however, because it recognises the need to constantly 
negotiate between the constructed nature of all knowledge and the political need for accounts of 
(and to account for) a ‘real’ world; and between the impossibility of stable positions and the political 
necessity of positions, however contingent, for feminist epistemologies. Feminist postmodernist 
approaches offer ways of rethinking the projects of early feminist engagements with evolutionary 
science. From this perspective, the biological determinism in Morgan’s Aquatic Ape Hypothesis can 
be re-evaluated as an activation of the female ape, a contingent connection across time and species. 
Morgan’s narrative of female evolutionary descent is thus reappraised as an activation of the female 
and of female embodiment in evolutionary science, and an attempt to break down the traditional 
subject-object divide, in turn creating a space for partial connection and solidarity. From this 
perspective, Morgan’s narrative offers the possibility of conversations between subject and object, 
and thus objectivity in Haraway’s sense. There is a temptation to read Morgan’s work as simply 
biological determinism, but as Haraway emphasises this is not the only position available when 
traditional patriarchal boundaries are breached. 
My analysis of Morgan’s narrative of evolutionary descent through Haraway’s situated 
knowledges reveals a number of salient issues for my project. First, my analysis demonstrates the 
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historical development of feminist engagements with science. This is important as the queer 
approach I will develop in subsequent chapters builds upon these insights. Second, my reading of 
Morgan’s narrative begins to gesture towards the importance of nonhuman agency, which is a major 
theme throughout this project. Finally, Morgan’s narrative, however problematic, illustrates the 
possibility and potential for alternative positions, narratives and bodies of knowledge in science. This 
point will be particularly important in the final chapters when I will discuss health and biomedical 
knowledge. In the next chapter I will build upon the possibility for alternatives to biological 
determinism and radical re-readings of scientific narratives in relation to genetic determinism and 
the search for gay genes. 
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Chapter Two 
Entanglements: Diffraction, The Human Genome Project and 
Queer(ing) Genes 
 
‘The “gene” is nothing but a very applicable little word’ 
Wilhelm Johannsen, ‘The Genotype Conception of Heredity’1 
 
In the previous chapter I discussed feminist engagements with evolutionary science in the 1970s and 
1980s. I argued that the meeting of feminism and postmodernism in the 1980s and the development 
of feminist postmodernism offered ways of interrogating patriarchy in the theory and practice of 
science. In the 1990s, feminist approaches to identity met deconstruction, and the developing field 
of lesbian and gay studies met the new field of queer theory. Meanwhile, narratives of genetic 
determinism proliferated, attempting to relate complex behavioural and social phenomena to 
hypothetical genes or genetic factors. The multi-national Human Genome Project seemed to 
promise a genetic basis for all physical and behavioural traits, and this provided the background for 
specific scientific research in the 1990s that attempted to define the biological or genetic basis for 
homosexuality.  
In this chapter I will analyse theoretical developments in the 1990s that increasingly focused 
on indeterminacy and non-essential theories of identity, including feminist and queer theories and 
their relation to deconstruction. I will situate these theoretical developments alongside deterministic 
                                                          
1 Wilhelm Johannsen, ‘The Genotype Conception of Heredity’, American Naturalist, 45 (1911), 129–159 (p. 
132). 
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narratives of the Human Genome Project, and of specific research into the genetic basis for 
homosexuality, in order to question the legitimacy of the research and claims. To interrogate these 
genetic narratives, I will argue that a theoretical approach that focuses on the deconstruction of 
binary oppositions and the assumptions that hold such oppositions in place is necessary but 
ultimately limited. I will instead propose a diffractive approach, promoting the performative and 
agential nature of genes. The metaphor and physical phenomenon of diffraction offers a productive 
starting point for queering genes, and attempts to produce narratives of genetic determinism 
related to sexual identity.  
This chapter builds on a number of insights developed in Chapter One. My queer approach 
to genetic science is indebted to a history of feminist engagements with science. More specifically, in 
this chapter I build upon the idea that a conversation between science and social theory can produce 
the possibility for alternative narratives, positions and bodies of knowledge. I also develop on the 
discussion of agency in the previous chapter. In this chapter I will argue that thinking about the 
agency of the objects of scientific study does not necessarily lead to biological determinism (in terms 
of genetic determinism and sexuality this would be expressed as an active gene causing sexual 
identity and behaviour). I will argue instead that thinking of the objects of scientific study as agential 
and queer can open up the possibility of an alternative queer genetic approach that is more 
attentive to both the biological and social complexities at work. This chapter also explains my 
particular deployment of the term queer, which is important as in later chapters I will argue for a 
queer ecological approach to living well in multispecies entanglements. The complex intersections of 
sexuality, politics and scientific knowledge will be particularly important in the final chapter where I 
discuss health, viruses and biomedical knowledge. 
What is Diffraction? 
 Throughout this chapter I will be referring to diffraction as a metaphor and as a theoretical 
approach, relating this to deconstructive and queer approaches. Initially, however, it is important to 
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have a sense of diffraction as a physical phenomenon. Diffraction demonstrates the complexity of 
the ‘real’ world and the role of situated knowledges in scientific theory and practice, which will be 
important in later chapters. In a classical physical interpretation, diffraction is a phenomenon that 
occurs when waves combine or overlap, and when waves encounter an obstacle. To fully understand 
this, it is important to emphasise that waves are different phenomena from particles (although the 
phenomenon of diffraction is intimately linked to the problematic distinction between waves and 
particles – something to which I will return shortly). In classical physics, a particle is a material entity 
that can only occupy a single position in time and space. Waves, in contrast, are not entities but 
rather disturbances in a medium that cannot be localised to a single point in time or space. All 
waves, whether propagating in air or water, can exhibit diffraction under the right conditions. 
Straight waves in water will curve when they pass through a small opening in a barrier, just as light 
waves appear to bend around the edge of objects or through slits. In the right conditions, diffraction 
patterns can be produced whereby waves overlap and combine – a physical process known as 
superposition. Superposition is the phenomenon whereby waves combine, either cancelling one 
another out when they are out of phase, or adding to one another’s strength when they are in 
phase. Superposition is essential to diffraction and is responsible for diffraction patterns, the 
sometimes unexpected dark and light areas that are produced when light waves are diffracted. 
Familiar examples of diffraction are found in the patterns that can be seen when light shines off a 
compact disc, or in the iridescence of some birds’ feathers. In both cases, light waves of different 
frequencies are being diffracted through slits – what is called a diffraction grating – and the 
interference and superposition of the different frequencies of light produce colourful diffraction  
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patterns.2  
 Importantly, diffraction is not explainable by geometric optics. Geometric optics 
approximates light as a ray so as to indicate its direction and does not take account of the physical 
wave-nature of light. Reflection of light can be adequately explained by geometric optics. The angle 
and direction of light, approximated to a ray, can successfully explain the reflection of light off an 
object such as a mirror. The Newtonian law of reflection, that the angle of incidence (approach to 
the mirror) equals the angle of reflection (reflected light from the mirror), is achieved through the 
approximation of light to a ray. Diffraction, on the other hand, demands a physical optics that takes 
account of the wave-nature of light. As diffraction is dependent upon the superposition of waves, 
approximation of light to a directional ray cannot account for diffraction patterns. It is for similar 
reasons that diffraction has been instrumental in the wave-particle debates about light in physics. 
Isaac Newton claimed that light was made up of particles which he called ‘corpuscles’. Newton’s 
corpuscular theory of light easily explained the phenomenon of reflection, much in the same way as 
the approximation of light to a ray.3 In the early nineteenth century, double-slit experiments that 
produced diffraction patterns through superposition seemed to suggest that light acted like a wave, 
and thus the wave theory of light became the predominant paradigm in physics.4 
                                                          
2 For a detailed description of the physical phenomenon of diffraction, see Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe 
Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2007), especially Chapter Two, ‘Diffractions: Difference, Contingencies and Entanglements that Matter’, pp. 
71–94. Interference and diffraction are, in fact, the same physical phenomenon. Both are produced by the 
combination of amplitudes in wave superposition. As physicist Richard Feynman states, ‘No one has ever been 
able to define the difference between interference and diffraction satisfactorily. It is just a question of usage, 
and there is no specific, important physical difference between them.’ (‘Diffraction’, Volume 1, The Feynman 
Lectures on Physics, 3 Vols [Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1965]), Chapter 30, p. 1. It is for this reason that I 
use the terms interchangeably throughout this chapter.  
3 Certain phenomena of reflection problematise this, such as partial reflection off a glass surface. If light is 
made up of particles, but is only partially reflected, how do the particles of light ‘decide’ whether they will be 
reflected or not? For a detailed discussion of this phenomenon and how the theory of quantum 
electrodynamics approaches it, see Richard Feynman, QED: The Strange Theory of Light and Matter (London: 
Penguin, 1990 [1985]). 
4 For a discussion of the paradigm shift from a particle theory to a wave theory of light see, Jed Z. Buchwald, 
The Rise of the Wave Theory of Light: Optical Theory and Experiment in the Early Nineteenth Century (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
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 This was not, however, the end of the story. In the early twentieth century, Albert Einstein’s 
Nobel Prize-winning research on the photoelectric effect (the emission of electrons from matter 
when light is absorbed) reintroduced the notion of particles of light into physics, now described as 
photons, or quanta of light. Double-slit experiments and the phenomenon of diffraction still 
suggested, however, that light behaved like a wave, even as scientific equipment was developed that 
could detect single photons of light. Quantum physics, in fact, suggests that light behaves as both a 
wave and a particle, and light is commonly referred to as having a wave-particle duality.5 
Interestingly, in 1924, Louis le Broglie proposed that material particles have a wave-like behaviour, 
and thus also have a wave-particle duality.6 Experimental confirmation followed, demonstrating that 
electrons exhibit diffraction, even when a single electron is fired at a time through an experimental 
set-up such as the double-slit experiment.7 Because diffraction patterns are caused by interference, 
this means that a single electron must interfere with itself to produce the diffraction pattern on a 
screen set up on the other side of the slits from the electron source.8 This counterintuitive theory of 
matter, its particle-wave duality – also known as the quantum theory of matter – can be utilised to 
produce scientific equipment of very high accuracy. In electron microscopy, a beam of electrons is 
first diffracted by the object and then re-focused into a diffraction pattern that can be viewed on a 
detector screen. This process allows for much greater magnification and resolution than traditional 
optical microscopes.9 This brief explanation of wave-particle duality and its role in diffraction is 
                                                          
5 For a clear introduction to these and many other concepts in physics, see Richard Feynman, The Feynman 
Lectures on Physics, especially Volume 3, Chapter 1, ‘Quantum Behavior’. 
6 Louis de Broglie, ‘Recherches sur la Théorie des Quanta’ (Thesis, Paris, 1924). 
7 C. Davisson and L. H. Germer, ‘Diffraction of Electrons by a Crystal of Nickel’, Physics Review, 30:6 (1927), 
705–740; and G. P. Thomson and A. Reid, ‘Diffraction of Cathode Rays by a Thin Film’, Nature, 119 (1927), 890.  
8 O. Donati, G. P. Missiroli, and G. Pozzi, ‘An Experiment on Electron Interference’, American Journal of Physics, 
41:5 (1973), 639–644. 
9 Arthur L. Robinson, ‘Electron Microscope Inventors Share Nobel Physics Prize’, Science, 14 November 1986, 
821–822. Ian Hacking discusses the role of microscopes as interventions in science, and the role of diffraction 
in optical microscopes (although he does not discuss electron microscopy) in Representing and Intervening: 
Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 
186–209. Barad builds upon Hacking’s argument in relation to electron microscopy and scanning tunnelling 
microscopy to question the relation of subject to object. Barad questions whether the practice of microscopy 
can be adequately described as ‘seeing’ the object, or whether a rather more complex description of the 
ongoing embodied practice of microscopy is needed (Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, pp. 50–59). 
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important to this chapter and to my thesis as a whole as it illustrates the complexity of the material 
world. Matter, in a quantum mechanical account (and in my queer diffractive approach that I will 
propose) is always complex, agential and producing biological-social interference in attempts to 
construct narratives and bodies of knowledge. 
 As a metaphor, Donna Haraway suggests that diffraction may be preferable to that of 
reflection, and the related practice of reflexivity: ‘Reflexivity is a bad trope for escaping the false 
choice between realism and relativism in thinking about strong objectivity and situated knowledges 
in technoscientific knowledges.’10 I will return to this ‘false choice’ later in the chapter. Haraway 
suggests that, ‘Diffraction, the production of difference patterns, might be a more useful metaphor 
for the needed work than reflexivity.’11 Haraway suggests that reflexivity is inseparable from the 
geometric optics of reflection, and is therefore caught up in the mirroring of the same elsewhere. 
Diffraction, however, is attuned to differences, and how these differences matter. As I have shown, 
diffraction also allows for the active (and often counterintuitive) nature of matter. It is therefore a 
useful metaphor for theories that want to promote the active and agential nature of matter and of 
the world. As Karen Barad notes, diffraction is not only a metaphor, and thinking about the physical 
phenomenon of diffraction can offer a productive theoretical approach to social and scientific 
theories. In particular she suggests diffraction as a theoretical approach to interdisciplinary studies 
of theory and science. She argues that diffraction, as an interdisciplinary methodology, places 
understandings from putatively separate fields into a conversation of dynamic relationality with 
each other, so as to question the boundaries between areas of knowledge. She states: 
The diffractive methodology that I propose enables a critical re-thinking of science and the 
social in their relationality. What often appears as separate entities (and separate sets of 
concerns) with sharp edges does not actually entail a relation of absolute exteriority at all. 
                                                          
10 Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM: Feminism and 
Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 16. 
11 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 34.  
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Like the diffraction patterns illuminating the indefinite nature of boundaries – displaying 
shadows in ‘light’ regions and bright spots in ‘dark’ regions – the relation of the social and 
the scientific is a relation of ‘exteriority within’.12 
This differs from Edward O. Wilson’s approach outlined in the previous chapter, where the 
humanities are to be subsumed within biology, as it puts disciplines into conversation rather than 
assuming that one discipline will ultimately be expanded to include all others. Diffraction offers a 
possible approach to the relationship between social theories (particularly for my project, feminist 
and queer theories) and scientific theories (such as narratives of genetic determinism that surround 
the Human Genome Project and the search for the gay gene).  
Feminism and Deconstruction 
 Feminists in the 1990s began to see productive convergences between their projects and 
approaches and the work of deconstruction. Feminists in the 1970s and 1980s had recognised the 
need to contest patriarchy at the level of social practices such as those preventing women entering 
the sciences, as well as at the level of language, conventions and paradigms. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, feminists in the 1980s recognised the problems associated with countering 
patriarchy from the position of a stable singular identity, and began to question the category of 
woman. For Diane Elam, this is the starting-point for a productive association of feminism and 
deconstruction. In her book, Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme, Elam suggests that 
feminism and deconstruction both bring about a ‘deferral of consensus but not at the cost of 
political solidarity or ethical judgement’.13 This is the abyss of Elam’s subtitle – ‘the infinite 
displacement brought about by feminism and deconstruction: the displacement of the subject, of 
                                                          
12 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 92–93. Barad is here drawing on Haraway’s notion of difference as 
not a matter of essence but as a ‘critical difference within’ that she elaborates in ‘The Promises of Monsters: A 
Regenerative Politics for Inappropriate/d Others’, in Cultural Studies, ed. by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, 
Paula A. Treichler (New York; Routledge, 1992), pp. 295–337 (p. 299). 
13 Diane Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction: Ms. en Abyme (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 25. 
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identity politics, of the subject of feminism and deconstruction’.14 It is important to emphasise 
Elam’s argument that this displacement and deferral is not brought about at the expense of political 
solidarity. She refers to Jacques Derrida’s statement that ‘there is a duty in deconstruction’ which he 
characterises as a call that ‘comes from nowhere’.15 Feminism represents a similar obligation – the 
duty to respond to the call of feminist politics, while being aware that this call does not come from a 
stable singular ground of identity. As Elam states: ‘I understand the subject as neither sovereign nor 
autonomous but as always caught up in a network of responsibilities to others.’16 ‘The obligation of 
feminism,’ she argues, ‘is an obligation that, in effect, comes from nowhere.’17 Feminist politics are 
not made impossible by the recognition that there is not one single stable identity of woman, or 
even of feminism. On the contrary, this recognition allows for potential connections, and the 
fulfilment of the obligation of political solidarity. 
 Feminism and deconstruction both work to problematise binary oppositions. For Derrida, 
oppositions are always arranged hierarchically, with one privileged term dominating the other. He 
states in an interview that, ‘in a classical philosophical opposition we are not dealing with the 
peaceful coexistence of a vis-á-vis, but rather with a violent hierarchy. One of the two terms governs 
the other [...] or has the upper hand’.18 For a feminist engagement with deconstruction, the 
domination built into the ‘violent hierarchy’ of binary oppositions is particularly relevant in relation 
to the oppositions (or paired terms) of male/female, sex/gender, and heterosexual/homosexual. 
Similarly, for feminist engagements with science, the domination built into binary oppositions that 
function in evolutionary science – such as active/passive, mind/body, and subject/object – are 
especially pertinent. Attendance to the deconstruction at work in hierarchical oppositions of 
                                                          
14 Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction, p. 25. 
15 Jacques Derrida, ‘”Eating Well,” or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida’, Who 
Comes After the Subject?, trans. by Peter Connor and Avital Ronnell, ed. by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and 
Jean-Luc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991), pp. 96–119 (p. 108). 
16 Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction, p. 105. 
17 Elam, Feminism and Deconstruction, p. 26. 
18 Jacques Derrida, ‘Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta’, in Positions, trans. by 
Alan Bass (London: Athlone, 1987), pp. 37–96 (p. 41). 
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domination is, for Derrida, the way to approach a relationship to sexual difference that is ‘sexual 
otherwise’, that is sexual difference ‘beyond opposition and beyond binary structure’.19 Crucially, 
then, deconstruction does not simply invert the binary oppositions, as this would reinscribe the 
binary system. Derrida argues that, ‘Deconstruction does not consist in passing from one concept to 
another, but in overturning and displacing a conceptual order, as well as the nonconceptual order 
with which the conceptual order is articulated.'20  
Derrida’s statement that deconstruction consists in the overturning and displacing of non-
conceptual as well as conceptual orders warrants further discussion, particularly in relation to 
feminist engagements with binary oppositions in evolutionary science. Derrida suggests that 
concepts are only meaningful when understood in hierarchical relation to other concepts. A 
deconstructive approach problematises this set of hierarchical relations – the conceptual order – by 
interrogating the hierarchical relations and oppositions involved in systems of meaning. A 
nonconceptual order is best thought of as that which makes the articulation and coherence of a 
conceptual system possible. A nonconceptual order provides the conditions for articulation of – and 
is only knowable by its effects within – a coherent and meaningful conceptual order. For example, 
the narratives of sociobiology discussed in the previous chapter rely upon a hierarchical binary 
arrangement of male and female, a binary that implicates other hierarchical oppositions, such as 
active/passive, agent/resource, and aggressive/coy. A feminist deconstructive approach might begin 
at the male/female opposition, and attempt to overturn it. 
In the previous chapter I discussed Elaine Morgan’s development of a narrative of descent 
from the perspective of the female ape, thus displacing the male from the position of active agent of 
                                                          
19 Jacques Derrida, ‘Choreographies’, trans. by Christie V. McDonald, in Points...: Interviews, 1974–1994, ed. by 
Elisabeth Weber (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 89–108 (p. 108); ‘On Colleges and 
Philosophy’, Postmodernism: ICA Documents, ed. by Lisa Appignanesi (London: Free Association, 1989), pp. 
209–228 (p. 227). For further articulation of Derrida’s approach to sexual difference, see ‘Voice II’, in Points..., 
pp. 156–170; and Derrida and others, ‘Women in the Beehive’, Differences, 16:3 (2005), 139–157. 
20 Jacques Derrida, ‘Signature, Event, Context’, in Margins of Philosophy, trans. by Alan Bass (Brighton: 
Harvester, 1982), pp. 307–330 (p. 329). 
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evolution with the passive female resource as the dominated other. Placing the female as the active 
agent of evolution could be interpreted as reinscribing rather than subverting the binary alignment 
of maleness and activity in opposition to femaleness and passivity, thus overturning a restricted 
conceptual order but not troubling the nonconceptual order with which it is articulated. With this in 
mind, a feminist approach might further draw attention to the fact that concepts such as 
active/passive, agent/resource, and aggressive/coy are made possible by a larger nonconceptual 
order – for instance emphasising that the structuring of scientific concepts around hierarchical 
binaries of sexual difference is made possible by the existence of patriarchy. Patriarchy, functioning 
as the possibility and condition of the articulation of certain conceptual orders, is (prior to its 
conceptualisation) a nonconceptual order with which the conceptual order is articulated. 
Accordingly, the female ape becomes both active agent of evolution and the resource, through 
Morgan’s commitment to begin her project from a feminist standpoint of contemporary female 
bodily experience. In this way, patriarchy, which was previously a nonconceptual order, making the 
conceptual order possible, is now conceptualised. This has its benefits, as patriarchy can now be 
interrogated itself, rather than known only through its effects in the conceptual order. Yet the 
conceptual order of patriarchy can be articulated only within a nonconceptual order. This is the 
abyss of deconstruction, as there is no solid ground, no final concept or end point that exists without 
a nonconceptual order that can itself be overturned and displaced.  
Diffraction can offer a way of developing a deconstructive approach, through its use as an 
alternative optical metaphor to reflection. As I have noted, the geometric optics of reflection 
suggests the displacement (or mirroring) of the same elsewhere. This is also the weakness in reading 
deconstruction as a reflexive practice. Reflexivity is too easily reduced to reflection, and the 
mirroring of the same, rather than the production of, and attention to, difference. The overturning 
and displacing that occurs within binary oppositions is not something that needs to be performed by 
a reflexive subject, someone ‘doing’ the deconstruction. As Derrida says, ‘Deconstruction takes 
place, it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organization of a subject, 
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or even of modernity. It deconstructs itself. It can be deconstructed [Ça se deconstruit].’21 A 
diffractive approach supports Derrida’s claim that deconstruction does not just overturn or displace 
conceptual orders, but also the nonconceptual order with which they are articulated. That is, 
deconstruction is more than the overturning of an opposition, which would simply lead to the 
displacement of meaning, and an endless mirroring of binary oppositions. This would produce the 
same elsewhere, while leaving the conceptual and nonconceptual orders intact. This is insufficient 
for deconstructive approaches that seek to overturn and displace conceptual and nonconceptual 
orders. Diffraction emphasises not the mirroring of the same, but the production of differences 
between or within. Diffraction interrogates binaries by suggesting that the relation between 
supposed separate entities is not one of absolute exteriority; boundaries are never fixed and 
determinate. Diffraction is therefore a more productive metaphor than reflexivity, producing 
‘interference patterns’ or patterns of difference (rather than the replication of the same) and also 
emphasising the effects of these differences. Diffraction, then, supports a deconstructive approach 
to the production of meaning, and is important to my project as it suggests possible ways to 
approach the differences between and within queer and feminist theories, and the production of 
scientific knowledge. 
The Emergence of Queer Theory 
 In the early 1990s, work was being done in gay and lesbian studies that intersected with 
feminist politics and deconstructive theories. David M. Halperin traces the beginnings of queer 
theory to a conference organised by Teresa de Lauretis, held in February 1990 at the University of 
California, Santa Cruz. Halperin states that: 
She had heard the word ‘queer’ being tossed about in a gay-affirmative sense by activists, 
street kids, and members of the art world in New York during the late 1980s. She had the 
                                                          
21 Jacques Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, Volume II, ed. by Peggy Kamuf 
and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 16–19. 
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courage, and the conviction, to pair that scurrilous term with the academic holy word, 
‘theory’. Her usage was scandalously offensive.22 
Following the conference, a number of essays generated in the context of this conference were 
collected in the journal, Differences. In the introduction to this special issue, entitled Queer Theory: 
Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, de Lauretis claims that the term ‘queer’ marks a certain critical distance 
from ‘lesbian and gay’, which she describes as an ‘established and often convenient formula’.23 De 
Lauretis suggests that the development of queer theory depends upon,  
the speculative premise that homosexuality is no longer to be seen simply as marginal with 
regard to a dominant, stable form of sexuality (heterosexuality) against which it would be 
defined either by opposition or by homology. In other words, it is no longer to be seen either 
as merely transgressive or deviant vis-á-vis a proper, natural sexuality [...] or as just another, 
optional ‘life-style’ [...] Instead, male and female homosexualities [...] may be 
reconceptualized as social and cultural forms in their own right.24 
De Lauretis sees queer as the promise of thinking about sexuality not in the terms of binary 
oppositions, wherein homosexuality is always oppositional to heterosexuality, and lesbian and gay 
sexualities are problematically both linked and opposed through the ‘and’ of lesbian and gay studies. 
In Derridean terms, queer is an attempt to think sexuality otherwise – sexuality beyond these and 
other oppositions and binary structures.  
 It is my argument that queer theory offers a deconstructive approach to identity. Queer 
suggests configurations other than those in which homosexuality is opposed to, or marginal to, 
                                                          
22 David M. Halperin, ‘The Normalization of Queer Theory’, co-published in Journal of Homosexuality, 45:2–4 
(2003), pp. 339–343; and in Queer Theory and Communication: From Disciplining Queers to Queering the 
Discipline(s), ed. by Gust A. Yep, Karen E. Lovaas, and John P. Elia (Binghamton, NY: Harrington Park, 2003), pp. 
339–343. 
23 Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, An Introduction’, in Queer Theory: Lesbian 
and Gay Sexualities, ed. by Teresa de Lauretis (also published in Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural 
Studies, 3:2[1991]), iii–xviii (p. iv). 
24 De Lauretis, ‘Queer Theory’, p. iii. 
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heterosexual identity, and offers a non-essential theory of identity. In Saint Foucault, published in 
1995, David M. Halperin proposes a formulation of queer that, although it relies upon a framework 
of opposition, employs a deconstructive approach to identity. He states that: 
queer identity need not be grounded in any positive truth or in any stable reality. As the very 
word implies, ‘queer’ does not name some natural kind or refer to some determinate object; 
it acquires its meaning from its oppositional relation to the norm. Queer is by definition 
whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant. There is nothing in 
particular to which it necessarily refers. It is an identity without an essence.25 
Queer is, for Halperin, an oppositional identity. It is important, however, to draw attention to his 
emphasis in the sentence: ‘Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the 
legitimate, the dominant.’26 Queer is not simply homosexuality, in an oppositional position to stable 
heterosexuality. Rather, queer is whatever is oppositional to the norm in any context at any given 
time. Queer, in Halperin’s formulation, is a contingent identity – one that is always shifting and 
aligning itself along different axes of opposition and non-normativity.27 Halperin’s description of a 
queer identity without an essence follows the logic of a deconstruction of stable, essential, 
oppositional sexual identities. As noted, Halperin does still employ ‘queer’ within a framework of 
opposition and identity – he does not use it to suggest a Derridean sexuality otherwise, a sexuality 
beyond opposition and binary structure. Rather, Halperin’s formulation of queer is an oppositional 
deployment of sexuality along contingent axes of social normativity. 
                                                          
25 David M. Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 
62. 
26 Halperin, Saint Foucault, p. 62. 
27 Many feminist critics have criticised this element of queer theory, suggesting that the reliance of queer upon 
shifting flexible alliances promotes gay male sexuality at the expense of lesbianism and feminism, as only gay 
male sexuality is seen as sufficiently flexible to negotiate the shifting axes of normativity. See Shelia Jeffreys, 
‘The Queer Disappearance of Lesbians: Sexuality in the Academy’, Women's Studies International Forum, 17:5 
(1994), 459-472. 
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 Halperin’s insistence that queer can be ‘whatever’ and need not be limited is useful. The 
emphasis on opposition, however, is potentially problematic. If queering is an oppositional process, 
then it follows that queer always comes after, or is instantiated by, whatever is the norm. This would 
be a reduction of the reach or agency of queer and queering. Queer is often strategically positioned 
as oppositional to oppressive and seemingly ubiquitous norms of heterosexuality. My reading of 
queer is that, rather than always oppositional, queer is about relationality; queering draws attention 
to discourses, narratives, bodies, communities and practices and how they intersect and relate, and 
how these relationalities can structure and be structured by norms of gender and sexuality. I 
develop this approach to the queer alongside diffraction as these relationalities are not ones of 
opposition and absolute exteriority, but of connections, conversations and the blurring of 
boundaries. My use of queer is also strategic and political. I am not attempting to replace 
sociobiology as a normative paradigm with symbiogenesis (to be discussed in the following chapter) 
as a queer alternative in opposition. This approach would risk replacing one normative paradigm 
with another. Instead, queering can draw attention to the political uses of scientific narratives and 
the fact that narratives and knowledges are formed in a dynamic relationality with each other and, 
among other things, issues of gender and sexuality, as well as social and political forces of 
normativity and resistance. Queer is thus, in my project, a collection of methodologies, negotiations, 
positions and resistances, which can challenge and threaten binaries and conventional categories – 
particularly those binaries and categories that structure and are structured by conservative 
patriarchy and heteronormativity. My use of queer is more specifically biopolitical, and in the next 
chapter I will discuss biopolitics in terms of queer and multispecies kinship. This will be important for 
my final chapter in which I argue that the theory and practice of science as well as the material 
realities of more-than-human kinship have real material effects on individuals and groups. My queer 
account is a strategic political attempt to imagine and bring about more equitable futures for non-
normative bodies, practices and communities. 
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 The idea of queer as a non-normative social process is emphasised by Michael Warner in the 
introduction to Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory, published in 1993. Warner 
suggests that queer identity is always performing a social reflection and resistance to normativity. 
The passage deserves quoting in full: 
Every person who comes to a queer self-understanding knows in one way or another that 
her stigmatization is connected with gender, the family, notions of individual freedom, the 
state, public speech, consumption and desire, nature and culture, maturation, reproductive 
politics, racial and national fantasy, class identity, truth and trust, censorship, intimate life 
and social display, terror and violence, health care, and deep cultural norms and the bearing 
of the body. Being queer means fighting about these issues all the time, locally and 
piecemeal but always with consequences. It means being able, more or less articulately, to 
challenge the common understanding of what gender difference means, or what the state is 
for, or what ‘health’ entails, or what would define fairness, or what a good relation to the 
planet’s environment would be. Queers do a kind of practical social reflection just in finding 
ways of being queer.28 
For Warner, being queer is a social process in itself.29 Furthermore, queer here may be understood 
to converge with the non-programmatic and self-enacting nature of deconstruction. Warner’s queer 
self-understanding is always already deployed against normativities, rather than awaiting the 
conscious actions of a queer subject. To rephrase Derrida’s statement about deconstruction: queer 
takes place; it is an event that does not await the deliberation, consciousness, or organisation of a 
subject. It queers itself. It can be queered. Following De Lauretis, Halperin, Warner, and the logic of 
                                                          
28 Michael Warner, ‘Introduction’, in Fear of a Queer Planet: Queer Politics and Social Theory (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1993), pp. vii–xxxi (p. xiii). 
29 Warner uses the term ‘queer self-understanding’ rather than ‘queer identity’, but queer is undoubtedly an 
identity for Warner. It is, however, a non-essential identity, based on the sharing of historically contingent 
queer publics. In an article co-written with Lauren Berlant, ‘What Can Queer Theory Tell Us About X?’, Warner 
argues that ‘Queer publics make available different understandings of membership at different times, and 
membership in them is more a matter of aspiration than it is the expression of an identity or a history’, PMLA, 
110 (1995), 343–349, p. 344. 
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deconstruction, queer is a contingent, non-essential identity that positions itself as whatever is 
oppositional to social normativity and, importantly, is self-forming in the act of positioning. 
Queer Problems, Queer Approaches 
 Queer is not an unproblematic term; many of the theorists who helped to develop queer 
theory in the early 1990s have since raised concerns over its use, or even abandoned the term 
altogether. Teresa de Lauretis, in an article published in 1994, emphasises that her choice of the 
term ‘lesbian’ rather than queer in her book, The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse 
Desire, constitutes a deliberate repudiation: 
As for ‘queer theory’, my insistent specification lesbian may well be taken as a taking of 
distance from what, since I proposed it as a working hypothesis for lesbian gay studies [...] 
has very quickly become a conceptually vacuous creature of the publishing industry.30 
De Lauretis distances herself from queer theory, suggesting that the political and critical potential it 
once had has been effaced or destroyed. David M. Halperin echoes this sentiment, suggesting that 
queer theory has been normalised by its acceptance in the academy. He describes this normalisation 
in three steps. First, ‘queer’ becomes a qualifier of ‘theory’:  
if it’s theory, progressive academics seem to have reasoned, then it’s merely an extension of 
what important people have already been doing all along. It can be folded back into the 
standard practice of literary and cultural studies, without impeding academic business as 
usual.31 
Second, queer theory despecifies the sexual identities that were integral to queer theory’s 
development. This, claims Halperin, has the effect of 
                                                          
30 Teresa de Lauretis, ‘Habit Changes’, Differences, 6:2–3 (1994), 296–313 (p. 297). See also Teresa de Lauretis, 
The Practice of Love: Lesbian Sexuality and Perverse Desire (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994). 
31 Halperin, ‘The Normalization of Queer Theory’, pp. 341. 
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abstracting ‘queer’ and turning it into a generic badge of subversiveness, a more trendy 
version of ‘liberal’: if it’s queer, it’s politically oppositional, so everyone who claims to be 
progressive has a vested interest in owning a share of it.32  
Finally, queer theory, through its status as a theory, can be incorporated into established disciplines 
and applied to topics in already established fields. Halperin’s criticisms clearly illustrate the concerns 
raised by some theorists about the possible neutralising of the radical potential of queer theory. 
 Another criticism of queer theory, and one closely related to the second step of Halperin’s 
normalisation of queer theory, is that it distances itself too readily from lesbian and gay studies. 
When de Lauretis stated in 1990 that queer marks a ‘certain critical distance’ from lesbian and gay 
studies, the choice of terms was unfortunate and somewhat misleading. The special issue of 
Differences was entitled Queer Theory: Lesbian and Gay Sexualities, and I think that this 
demonstrates the intimate links between queer, lesbian and gay, as well as those between theory 
and multiple sexualities. Queer theory was suggested as a way of taking a critical distance from gay 
and lesbian studies that would paradoxically produce closer and more representative meanings and 
knowledges about lesbian and gay sexualities. As de Lauretis states, ‘our “differences”, such as they 
may be, are less represented by the discursive coupling of those two terms in the politically correct 
phrase “lesbian and gay”, than they are elided by most of the contexts in which the phrase is used’.33 
De Lauretis sees queer as offering a critical distance from this elision, and as actually offering a more 
intimate recognition and representation of sexualities in the plural, including lesbian and gay 
sexualities, and the differences in and between these sexualities. De Lauretis’s formulation of a 
queer theory in intimate relation with lesbian and gay sexualities is vastly different from the queer 
theory that Halperin critiques in ‘The Normalization of Queer Theory’. This is a queer theory that 
distances itself from lesbian and gay studies by presenting itself as the new and radical successor. 
                                                          
32 Halperin, ‘The Normalization of Queer Theory’, pp. 341–2. 
33 De Lauretis, ‘Queer Theory’, p. v. 
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Lesbian and gay studies becomes queer theory’s other, and critics such as Halperin have noted that 
this legitimises queer theory at the expense of the historically, socially and theoretically important 
work of lesbian and gay studies.34 
 Some critics have claimed that queer theory is apolitical, and ahistorical – of little use to 
communities based around non-normative sexual identities or gender-identifications. Similar claims 
were levelled at the feminist postmodernism that was being developed in the 1980s. Feminist 
postmodernist epistemologies problematise the stable category of woman, and further question the 
efficacy of grounding politics in identity and stabilising identity categories by recourse to 
essentialism. Queer theory follows these findings of feminist postmodernism and questions the 
categories of lesbian and gay, and the efficacy of grounding sexual politics in identity, along with the 
stabilisation of identity through essentialism. This, however, is not an abandonment of politics. 
Judith Butler states: ‘The deconstruction of identity is not the deconstruction of politics; rather it 
establishes as political the very terms through which identity is articulated.’35 I maintain that queer is 
a politically useful term, not as a ‘new’ or ‘radical’ identity, but as a deconstructive approach to 
identity. I believe that in this form, it links productively to Haraway’s feminist postmodernism – as a 
negotiation rather than a stable position. Queer is useful for avoiding and negotiating between two 
supposed opposite poles of theorising sexuality, and therefore is not simply oppositional, but about 
negotiating relationalities often structured by patriarchy or heteronormativity. The first pole is an 
‘anything goes’ approach to sexuality, which, like Haraway’s description of relativism is ‘a way of 
being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere equally’.36 This is the approach to sexuality critiqued 
by Grosz in her article ‘Experimental Desire: Rethinking Queer Subjectivity’. In this article, published 
                                                          
34 See The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader, ed. by Henry Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale, and David M. Halperin 
(New York: Routledge, 1993), especially the introduction, pp. xv–xviii. 
35 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 148. 
Diane Elam disagrees slightly with Butler on this point, suggesting that ‘the deconstruction of identity is also 
the deconstruction of politics – which does not mean the end of politics’ (Feminism and Deconstruction, p. 
139, n. 18). 
36 Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges’, p. 191. 
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in 1994, Grosz warns of the dangers of allowing queer to accommodate any non-normative 
sexuality, which she claims will ‘provide a political rationale and coverage [for] many of the blatant 
and extreme forms of heterosexual and patriarchal power games’, including ‘[h]eterosexual sadists, 
pederasts, fetishists, pornographers, pimps [and] voyeurs’.37 The second pole is a realist approach to 
sexuality, whereby sexual politics is related to notions of the real that deny the shifting and 
contingent nature of meaning.38 This approach grounds politics in the ‘real’ of bodies and identities, 
and stabilises the contingencies through the essentialist notion that sexuality is a property of 
individuals and bodies, and a property that exists prior to intervention through definition or 
classification.  
 Queer, in its negotiation between the supposed poles of relativism and realism, also draws 
attention to the need to account for the reality of sexual difference, while simultaneously 
recognising the always historically contingent nature of such differences. This is a very important 
point to emphasise in my project. Overly simplistic realist approaches, such as biological determinist 
accounts of sexual difference, suggest that individuals have natural biological characteristics or 
properties that can be observed, measured and then used to classify those individuals. This 
approach suggests that, whether at the level of bodies, organs, genes, hormones, or chromosomes, 
differences between individuals are best accounted for as being determined by biology. In this 
account, representations of sexual difference are reflections of natural pre-social and pre-
intervention (such as measurement or classification) properties of individuals. Social constructivist 
                                                          
37 Elizabeth Grosz, ‘Experimental Desire: Rethinking Queer Subjectivity’, in Supposing the Subject, ed. by Joan 
Copjec (London: Verson, 1994), pp. 133–157. Reprinted in Grosz, Space Time and Perversion (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), pp. 207–228. Grosz’s argument is reminiscent of the anti-pornography stance taken by 
writers and activists such as Andrea Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon in what are commonly referred to as 
the ‘sex wars’ of the 1980s. The sex wars deeply divided feminism in the 1980s between anti-pornography and 
sex-positive feminists (such as Pat Califia), through debates over sexuality, gender, violence, pornography, and 
non-normative sexual practices such as S&M. For a detailed discussion of the sex wars and their ongoing 
significance, see Sex Wars: Sexual Dissent and Popular Culture, ed. by Lisa Duggan and Nan D. Hunter, 10th 
Anniversary Edition (New York: Routledge, 2006). 
38 Sharon Marcus criticises this approach in relation to feminist engagements with the difficulties surrounding 
poststructuralism and the ‘real’ of sexual violence against women (‘Fighting Bodies, Fighting Words: A Theory 
and Politics of Rape Prevention’, Feminists Theorize the Political, ed. by Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott [New 
York: Routledge, 1992], pp. 385–403). 
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accounts, on the other hand, suggest that representations of sexual difference are not reflections of 
any ‘true’ nature, but cultural constructions. In a weak constructivist account, there may well be pre-
social biological differences between individuals; yet these differences are only knowable through 
historically contingent cultural constructions and representations. In a strong constructivist account, 
not only are the representations cultural constructions, but there is no ‘real’ core of pre-social 
biological difference underneath the representations, only further cultural constructions. It is my 
argument that all these approaches are unsatisfactory, as they rely upon and reinforce the 
separation of the real and the culturally constructed. They also have more in common than is first 
apparent, as they rely upon representationalism: the underlying belief that representations mediate 
between knowers (subjects) and what can be known (objects). Both scientific realists and social 
constructivists rely upon the assumption that representations mediate access to the ‘truth’ of sexual 
difference. For realists, representations faithfully reflect the truth of the material and biological 
nature of sexual difference; for constructivists, although representations can never reflect the ‘real’ 
material and biological nature of sexual difference, they can seemingly unproblematically reflect 
certain social and historical ‘truths’. 
 In the following section I will further analyse the realist and constructivist strands of 
scientific representationalism with reference to the Human Genome Project, before elaborating an 
alternative, performative approach to scientific practice and the production of scientific knowledge. I 
will also use this example to expand upon the possibility of using diffractive and queer approaches to 
scientific practice, before analysing specific research carried out in the 1990s that claimed to 
discover a genetic basis for homosexuality. Although mindful of the problems associated with the 
term ‘queer’, I will be using it throughout my thesis as I believe it can be a useful and productive 
term when linking multiple and disparate areas of theory and social practice with ways of thinking 
about sexualities and normativities. I wish to preserve the strangeness at the heart of queerness, 
and to employ it to suggest a link to Elam’s ‘groundless solidarity’. Due to the strangeness of 
queerness and the importance of Elam’s groundless solidarity, I will not be using queer as a noun to 
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refer to a stable queer identity, but rather employing it more as an adjective and verb – as an 
adjective to preserve the links between disparate forms of strangeness through a description of a 
shared queerness; as a verb to preserve the deconstructive notion that queer is a process that takes 
place, and that queers itself. To queer, in my approach, is to make strange, to make apparent any 
strangeness that is already at work, and to question the positioning of strangeness in opposition to 
normativity. Again, I would liken this approach to a Derridean logic of deconstruction: queering 
brings out a queerness that is always already taking place before the intervention of a subject. 
Diffraction is once again a useful metaphor for queer approaches. Queering is not a process of 
projecting queerness onto an object, nor is it a process of revealing the essential queerness of the 
object. Instead, queering attends to the patterns of interference and difference (and the effects of 
these differences) created by the interaction of subject and object within a field or network usually 
defined or structured by heteronormativity. In this respect, this deconstructive and diffractive queer 
approach is also useful in the context of evolutionary science to preserve the queerness of the 
scientific object, and hence as a way of accounting for the active and agential nature of the ‘real’ 
world. Simultaneously, I am using queer to signal (deconstructively) the constructed nature of all 
knowledge, the ways that knowledge is developed and expressed within paradigms of hierarchy and 
domination. Throughout this thesis I am arguing that science is inseparable from the social and 
always produced in paradigms with all the biases that this entails. This does not mean, however, that 
relativism is inevitable. I am developing an account of scientific knowledge production that is 
committed to ideas of the ‘real’ (for example I am committed to the fact that ‘real’ science makes a 
‘real’ difference in ‘real’ lives – something that is more apparent in my discussion of biomedical 
knowledge and health practices in the final chapter) as well as being attentive to the historically and 
socially situated ways in which knowledge claims about the real are constructed. 
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Representing the Human Genome 
 The Human Genome Project began in the late 1980s, supported by the United States 
Department of Energy. Historian of Science Daniel J. Kevles suggests that much of the early impetus 
of the project originated from initiatives undertaken in the 1980s by molecular biologist Robert 
Sinsheimer and physicist and mathematical biologist, Charles DeLisi.39 They organised workshops on 
the prospects for such a project, most notably in Santa Cruz in 1985 and Los Alamos in 1986. It was 
during these workshops that the scale and some of the technical approaches to a human genome 
project were outlined. They also set the tone for the language used about the project. It was at the 
Los Alamos meeting in March 1986 that Walter Gilbert, molecular biologist and Nobel Laureate, 
described the human genome as the Holy Grail of biological research.40 Gilbert persuaded a number 
of key scientists of the merit of the venture, including Nobel laureate James D. Watson, co-
discoverer of the helical structure of DNA. In the late 1980s the US National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
endorsed the Department of Energy-backed Human Genome Project, and Watson agreed to head 
the NIH office of the Human Genome Project in 1988. The project was officially inaugurated as a 
federal programme in 1991 and became a multi-billion dollar, multi-national project, worked on in 
both private and public laboratories across Europe and North America. 
 There are a number of ways of interpreting the theory and practice of the Human Genome 
Project. I am focussing on realist and constructivist interpretations to argue that both are examples 
of representationalism and to propose an alternative, performative approach to the Human Genome 
Project. Performativity plays an important role in my thesis, as my articulation of it will attempt to 
bring together its usage in both science studies and gender and sexuality studies. This will be of 
                                                          
39 Daniel J. Kevles, ‘Out of Eugenics: The Historical Politics of the Human Genome’, The Code of Codes: Scientific 
and Social Issues in the Human Genome Project, ed. by Daniel J. Kevles and Leroy Hood (Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1992), pp. 3–36 (p. 18). 
40 See also Walter Gilbert, ‘A Vision of the Grail’, The Code of Codes, pp. 83–97. For a discussion of the 
metaphor of the Holy Grail in the Human Genome Project, see Richard Lewontin, ‘The Dream of the Human 
Genome’, in It Ain’t Necessarily So: The Dream of the Human Genome and Other Illusions (London: Granta, 
2000), pp. 133–196. 
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relevance when exploring kinship beyond the human in the third and fourth chapters. In the early 
stages of the Human Genome Project, the language used to describe the undertaking was one of 
optimism and exuberance, especially by figures such as Gilbert and Watson. The project was often 
described in terms of mapping the human genome, or reading the book of life.41 In ‘A Personal View 
of the Project’, Watson describes the aim as ‘a complete genetic blueprint of man’, as well as 
suggesting setting up a databank of overlapping genetic markers which he imagines as a ‘library for 
the entire human genome’ and ‘a map of overlapping fragments’.42 While in places Watson refers to 
the genome sequence as a ‘blueprint’, ‘description’, and ‘map’, elsewhere he refers to the project as 
able to explain ‘how life works’, and he predicts the possibility of not just describing the human 
genetic sequence but of ‘knowing the human genome’.43 Watson’s account is illustrative of naïve 
scientific realism, as he claims that the descriptions and maps produced by the human genetic 
sequence faithfully and unproblematically represent the biological real. For Watson, the draft of the 
human genome allows access to the truth of human biology and life. This realism, however, is a form 
of representationalism; the blueprint, description or map is necessary to mediate between the 
human knower – that is the subject or scientist – and the real that can be known – the object of 
scientific knowledge. This mediation maintains and reifies the distance and distinction between the 
real and its representations, as well as reinforcing the divide between subject and object. 
There are several problems with the realist claim that the Human Genome Project mediates 
access to the real of the human genome, or the more exuberant claim that it explains ‘how life 
works’. One practical problem with this claim is the composite nature of the human genome that is 
                                                          
41 Mary Rosner and T. R. Johnson, ‘Telling Stories: Metaphors of the Human Genome Project’, Hypatia, 10:4 
(1995), 104–129. Roser and Johnson explore the patriarchy involved in the metaphors of books and libraries; 
maps and explorers; and also machines and mechanics. The metaphor of mapping did not lose its appeal as the 
project continued. When the Human Genome Project published its ‘first draft’ in 2000, announced 
simultaneously by US President Bill Clinton and UK Prime Minister Tony Blair on June 26th, Clinton described 
the draft as ‘without a doubt [...] the most important, most wondrous map ever produced by humankind’ 
(Mark Kukis, ‘Clinton, Blair and Scientists Announce Full Genome Sequencing’, United Press International, 26 
June 2000). 
42 James Watson, ‘A Personal View of the Project’, The Code of Codes, pp. 164–173 (p. 164 and p. 169). 
43 Watson, ‘A Personal View of the Project’, p. 164–167, and p. 173, my emphasis. 
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sequenced. As all humans except identical twins have different DNA, the human genome sequenced 
by the HGP is necessarily a composite human. This raises the question of who selects which sections 
of DNA code are included and which excluded from the supposedly universal human genome. As 
Mary Rosner and T.R. Johnson point out, the metaphors of books and libraries in this context 
suggests that the Human Genome Project is ‘master librarian’: 
By the choices it makes – the choice of what books to include in the library and in what 
condition – the Project will determine what is ‘correct’, what is ‘real’. It will necessarily set 
standards, defining and cataloguing what it means to be human, limiting what range of 
diversity is acceptable.44 
For Rosner and Johnson, the metaphor of books and libraries is telling; it reveals the powerful ability 
of the scientists involved in the project to define standards and limit diversity. This example also 
problematises the realist claim that the Human Genome Project mediates knowledge of, and access 
to, the real of human life. The genome that is sequenced is a composite human, suggesting that the 
Human Genome Project does not offer access to the truth of any ‘real’ human genome. Instead, the 
object of knowledge in the project is a construction, whose composite parts have been chosen in a 
specific cultural and historical moment for a variety of cultural and historical reasons.45  
 This leads to a possible constructivist account of the Human Genome Project. From this 
perspective, the Human Genome Project is a cultural construction, representing the specific cultural 
and historical moment in which it takes place, as well as revealing particular socioeconomic and 
cultural truths. The metaphor of mapping is revealing in this context, invoking the power of the 
                                                          
44 Rosner and Johnson, ‘Telling Stories’, p. 107. 
45 The issues of race and nation are particularly relevant in this regard. To deal with some of the ethical 
implications surrounding this, and born out of an interest in global population genetics, the Human Genome 
Diversity Project was set up in the early 1990s to run alongside the Human Genome Project. For a history of 
the Human Genome Diversity Project and some of its controversies, see L. Luca Cavalli-Sforza, ‘The Human 
Genome Diversity Project: Past, Present and Future’, Nature Reviews: Genetics, 6 (2005), 333–340. See 
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scientist to delineate the territory of nature, which is linked to related disputes over ownership.46 
Disputes over ownership have plagued the Human Genome Project, in particular in debates over 
gene-patenting. As large-scale gene sequencing proceeded, patent applications were submitted by 
some scientists involved in the project. This ignited a debate about the status of genes, questioning 
whether they could be patented, and if so, who should own the patent rights. From a legal 
perspective, the difficulty derived from the fact that the genetic material was both natural and 
unnatural; genes are, as Rebecca S. Eisenberg states, ‘both material molecules and information 
systems’.47 Genes are problematic entities, both natural and unnatural, and this difficulty is 
emphasised by the continuing debates over what genetic material it is acceptable to patent.48 I will 
return to the mapping metaphor in greater detail as part of my elaboration of a performative 
account of the Human Genome Project. Importantly, in a constructivist account, the metaphors of 
the Human Genome Project are representations of cultural truths: revealing, for example, how 
science is being modelled on patriarchal exploration, ownership, limitation and domination of 
nature. 
 A constructivist account of the Human Genome Project, like the realist account, depends 
upon representationalism. In a constructivist account such as Rosner and Johnson’s, the narratives 
of the Human Genome Project are representations of a specific social and historical context, 
revealing truths about patriarchal culture. As in the realist account, the separation of subject and 
object, as well as between representations and that which they represent, is maintained by the 
mediation of representation between human knowers and what can be known. In the realist 
account the representation is the blueprint, and the object of representation is the biological truth 
of human genetics revealed through scientific practice. In the constructivist account, the 
representations are the narratives of the project, and the objects of representation are the various 
                                                          
46 Rosner and Johnson, ‘Telling Stories’, pp. 115–122.  
47 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, ‘How Can You Patent Genes?’, American Journal of Bioethics, 2:3 (2002), 3–11 (p. 3). 
48 See also Gary Stix, ‘Owning the Stuff of Life’, Scientific American, 294:2 (2006), 76–83. 
99 
 
truths about the specific social and historical context that are revealed through critical practice. I 
find both accounts to be insufficient. The previous chapter introduced the possibility of alternative 
narratives and knowledges that arise in the breakdown of the subject-object distinction. It is for this 
reason that I will articulate a performative account of the Human Genome Project. 
Performing the Human Genome 
An alternative to representationalist accounts of science is offered by Andrew Pickering in 
The Mangle of Practice. Pickering differentiates between what he calls ‘the representational and 
performative idioms for thinking about science’. Pickering argues that: ‘The representational idiom 
casts science as, above all, an activity that seeks to represent nature, to produce knowledge that 
maps, mirrors, or corresponds to how the world really is.’49 I would expand this definition of the 
representational idiom in relation to my argument that both realist and constructivist accounts of 
science are, in fact, representationalist. Whether scientific theory and practice represents nature, or 
certain truths about culture and society, the relationship between human knower and the object of 
knowledge is still one of distance, mediated by representations. This distance depends upon the 
assumption of agency being a property of human knowers, and denied to the objects of scientific 
knowledge. Pickering’s performative idiom, on the other hand, suggests an alternative approach to 
science:  
One can start from the idea that the world is filled not, in the first instance, with facts and 
observations, but with agency. The world [...] is continually doing things, things that bear 
upon us not as observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon 
material beings.50  
                                                          
49 Andrew Pickering, The Mangle of Practice: Time, Agency and Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1995), p. 5.  
50 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, p. 6.  
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This is very important, and foundational for my approach to agency, and I will return to it in later 
chapters. Pickering’s performative idiom suggests that science should be thought of as an ongoing 
process of ‘coping with material agency’.51 Significantly, the shift from a representationalist to a 
performative account of science is a shift from thinking about science-as-knowledge (wherein 
human agents produce representations of a non-contingent really real) to a performative account of 
science-as-doing (where knowledges are produced within complex ever-changing fields of human 
and nonhuman agency).  
 The term performativity is used in different ways in science studies and social theory. Social 
theories of performativity, most significantly in gender studies, suggest formulations of gender-as-
doing as an expansion of a linguistic theory based on citation and iterability.52 Gender performativity 
is most often associated with Judith Butler who, in Gender Trouble, suggested that gender is not a 
natural property of individuals. Rather, Butler argues that, ‘Gender is the repeated stylisation of the 
body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce 
the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being.’53 For Butler, gender is an ongoing process 
that operates through the repetition and recognition of norms. In short, ‘Gender is always a doing’.54 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick develops Butler’s theory of gender performativity into a queer formulation, 
                                                          
51 Pickering, The Mangle of Practice, p. 6. Ian Hacking also considers material agency as a challenge to 
representationalism. His formulation that ‘if you can spray them they are real’ – in reference to spraying a 
niobium ball with positrons or electrons so as to increase or increase electrical charge in quark-search 
experiments – is useful for understanding his move from representing to intervening. I prefer Pickering’s 
representational and performative idioms to Hacking’s representing and intervening, however, because of 
Hacking’s reliance upon human agency. Pickering’s account would suggest that positrons and electrons are 
material agents and therefore ‘real’ even before a human sprays them. Ian Hacking, Representing and 
Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of Natural Science, pp. 22–24. 
52 See J. L. Austin, How to do Things with Words: The William James Lectures delivered at Harvard University in 
1995 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
53 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 2008 [1990]), 
p. 45. 
54 Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 34. Butler develops her account of performativity throughout her work. See in 
particular Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993); Excitable Speech: A 
Politics of the Performative (New York: Routledge, 1997); Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004); Giving 
an Account of Oneself (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005). 
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arguing in fact that ‘“Performativity” is already quite a queer category’.55 Sedgwick takes advantage 
of the centrality of the performative utterance ‘I do’ used in marriage ceremonies, and draws on its 
repetition and failure throughout linguistic accounts of performativity to suggest a queer 
performativity based on the failure of heterosexuality, connected to the affect of shame. Sedgwick’s 
account is important as it emphasises the political – and possibly always queer – nature of 
performativity.  
 Pickering’s account of performativity is significantly different from that of Butler or 
Sedgwick. Although Pickering’s performativity attempts to account for nonhuman agency, which is 
something missing from Butler’s version, it does assume that this agency is a property of individuals 
or objects that precedes the performance. Butler’s performativity suggests that gender is a doing by 
a human individual although the individual does not precede the performance, stating that: ‘gender 
is always a doing, though not a doing by a subject who might be said to pre-exist the deed’.56 Barad 
suggests a posthumanist performativity that builds upon Pickering’s performativity of nonhuman 
agency and Butler’s insights, including the significant point that performativity is constitutive. 
Posthumanist performativity, for Barad, is an ‘approach to understanding technoscientific and other 
naturalcultural practices that specifically acknowledges and takes account of matter’s dynamism’.57 
Barad’s performativity, like Pickering’s, is an attempt to move away from representationalism to 
‘matters of practices, doings, and actions’.58 Barad suggests that representationalism is ‘caught up in 
the geometrical optics of reflection where, much like the infinite play of images between two facing 
mirrors, the epistemological gets bounced back and forth, but nothing more is seen’.59 As an 
alternative to the geometric optics of reflection and the question of whether a representation 
faithfully mirrors the real, Barad suggests a diffractive posthumanist performative account whereby 
                                                          
55 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ‘Queer Performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the Novel’, GLQ, 1:1 (1993), 1–16 (p. 
2).  
56 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, p. 34. 
57 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 135.  
58 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 135. 
59 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 135. 
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the real and its representations are performatively co-constituted through a network of human and 
nonhuman agency. Barad follows Pickering in emphasising the active nature of matter, yet considers 
agency not as a property of individual entities but as performatively constituted. I agree with Barad 
that it is useful to attempt to sharpen the theoretical tool of performativity.60 In particular I find 
Barad’s elaboration of a posthumanist performativity useful as it ‘allows matter its due as an active 
participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing intra-activity’.61 I will predominantly be referring 
to ‘performativity’ rather than ‘posthumanist performativity’ as I want to emphasise that this is a 
sharpening of an existent theoretical tool; I will return to the issue of posthumanism in Chapter 
Three. 
 Barad’s posthumanist performativity offers a productive way to think about the Human 
Genome Project. Eschewing a representationalist account, either from a realist or constructivist 
perspective, I want to propose a reading of the Human Genome Project that recognises the social 
and historically contingent nature of the project, while allowing biology – specifically human genetics 
– its due as an active participant in the Human Genome Project. Once again, the metaphor of the 
map is informative. In a performative account, the map of the genome is not a representation or 
reflection of the biologically real, but rather genomes and their maps are co-constituted through the 
performativity of the scientific practice of gene-sequencing. In my performative account of the 
Human Genome Project, I am building upon Haraway’s statement that ‘map-making is world-
making’.62 Haraway argues against what she calls the fetishism of the map – that is, a ‘reification that 
transmutes material, contingent, human and nonhuman liveliness into maps of life itself and then 
mistakes the map and its reified entities for the bumptious, nonliteral world’.63 Instead, she 
                                                          
60 This is a demand placed by Sedgwick, to sharpen the theoretical tool of performativity, and to avoid the 
‘sadly premature domestication of a conceptual tool whose powers we really have barely yet begun to 
explore’ (‘Queer Performativity’, p. 15). 
61 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 136. Barad uses the term ‘intra-activity’ rather than interactivity to 
suggest that instead of thinking of the world as full of separate and discrete entities inter-acting, it is more 
productive to think of the world as full of relations and agency, and intra-action within and between parts of 
the world. 
62 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 133. 
63 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 135. 
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proposes maps as ‘models of worlds crafted through and for specific practices of intervening and 
particular ways of life’.64 Haraway here echoes Hacking’s distinction between representing and 
intervening; I would elaborate on Haraway’s argument to suggest that maps are not necessarily just 
interventions or representations but rather constitutive performative enactments. The draft of the 
Human Genome, published in 2000, is a map that enacts the human genome and its biological and 
social meanings. I am arguing that biological genes are not passive in this ongoing enactment of the 
genome; they are active participants that are co-constituted along with the practices of genetic 
science, such as gene-sequencing, that often attempt to reify their active and contingent liveliness 
into inert representational maps. I am proposing a performative account of the Human Genome 
Project that emphasises this entanglement of the biological and social. This is important in the 
following discussion of specific research carried out in the 1990s that claimed to discover a genetic 
basis for homosexuality, because it seeks to resist narratives of genetic determinism wherein active 
genes cause sexual identities and behaviours as well as resisting the false distinction between ‘born’ 
and ‘made’ in debates about the origin of homosexuality. This approach also demands a more 
thorough biological understanding of the gene, which I will outline in terms of some of the findings 
of the Human Genome Project. 
Entanglement 
Entanglement is central to Barad’s performative account of matter and meaning, and to my 
thesis as a whole. Throughout this thesis I employ the term ‘entanglement’ to refer to a number of 
different connections and relationships, in a number of different contexts. Entanglement is more 
than simply a connection or a relationship, however, and it is important to draw out some of the 
meanings and associations that I want to evoke when I use the term. Before discussing the specific 
research done in the 1990s that attempted to find a genetic or biological basis for homosexuality, I 
will briefly outline what entanglement is in terms of ‘quantum entanglement’ before exploring 
                                                          
64 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 135. 
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Barad’s insistence on the entanglement of matter and meaning. (Although I am not suggesting that 
my use of entanglement corresponds to the very specific meaning it is assigned in quantum physics, 
the scientific definition is implied in the word’s use and a basic understanding of quantum 
entanglement is illuminating when considering my more general use of the term.) I will also explicitly 
link my use of entanglement with Haraway’s discussion of the game of cat’s cradle in a number of 
ways. Drawing out some of the threads of meanings and associations that are themselves tangled up 
in entanglement will give a clearer understanding of what work I want the term to do within my 
project. 
Entanglement represents one of the counterintuitive elements of quantum mechanics. 
Quantum mechanics allows for two or more particles to interact in a specific way which leaves them 
entangled – such that future measurements of one of the entangled partners simultaneously reveals 
the outcome of measurement on the other partners. This, at first, seems to defy one of the founding 
theories of quantum physics, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle. Very briefly, the uncertainty 
principle specifies a limit to the precision with which particular physical properties of a particle can 
be known simultaneously. Position and momentum of particles are two such properties. The more 
precisely the position of a particle is determined, the less precisely its momentum can be known; 
similarly, as momentum is more precisely determined, the position of the particle becomes more 
indeterminate.65 Albert Einstein, who was critical of the Copenhagen Interpretation of quantum 
mechanics (built upon the uncertainty principle), used the phenomenon of entanglement to 
question the efficacy of quantum mechanics. In a paper written with Boris Podolsky and Nathan 
Rosen, Einstein claimed that because measurement of one entangled particle would reveal 
measurement outcomes in its entangled partner, then either the particles interacted upon 
measurement (despite having been separated), or the measurable outcomes were intrinsic 
properties of the particles and should be considered hidden variables (this was named the EPR 
                                                          
65 For more detail on the uncertainty principle and its relation to indeterminacy see Barad, Meeting the 
Universe Halfway, pp. 19–20, and pp. 295–302. 
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paradox after the authors’ surnames). Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen suggested that the first option 
was impossible as it contravened relativity (the interaction would also have to be faster than the 
speed of light as the effect was instantaneous), and therefore suggested that, as quantum 
mechanics did not allow for hidden variables, the theory was ‘incomplete’.66 Subsequent theoretical 
developments and, more recently, experimental tests support quantum mechanics and the 
uncertainty principle, rather than the EPR paradox.67 
 Barad elaborates the metaphysical consequences of quantum entanglement to emphasise 
the entanglement of matter and meaning. In particular, she draws upon Niels Bohr’s disagreement 
with the EPR paradox. Importantly, for Bohr, measurement is not a disturbance, but rather a specific 
arrangement of the elements of the phenomenon which always includes the observer – the one 
doing the measuring – and all apparatuses of observation. Barad calls this specific arrangement of 
observers and the objects of observation an ‘agential cut’. Barad distinguishes the agential cut from 
a Cartesian cut which involves an inherent distinction between subject and object. She argues that: 
boundaries and properties are only determinate within a given phenomenon through the 
enactment of an agential cut. The agential cut is determined by the materiality of the larger 
experimental arrangement, which delineates ‘measured object’ from ‘measuring agency’, 
while providing the material conditions of possibility for particular concepts to be 
meaningful at the exclusion of others.68 
For Bohr, theoretical concepts such as position and momentum are not intrinsic properties of 
objects or particles, but rather abstractions which are only ‘definable and observable through their 
                                                          
66 Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen, ‘Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality 
be Considered Complete?’, Physical Review, 41 (1935), 777–780.  
67 The paper generally associated with disproving the EPR paradox is John Stewart Bell, ‘On the Einstein 
Podolsky Rosen Paradox’, Physics, 1:3 (1964), 195–200. Experimental support can be found in Alain Aspect, 
Jean Dalibard, and Gérard Roger, ‘Experimental Test of Bell's Inequalities Using Time-Varying Analyzers, 
Physical Review Letters, 49:25 (1982), 1804–1807. Barad also discusses experimental support for the 
uncertainty (or indeterminacy) principle and its relation to entangled particles in Meeting the Universe 
Halfway, pp. 287–317. 
68 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 333 and p. 345. 
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interactions with other systems’.69 Barad suggests that Bohr’s approach be called the ‘indeterminacy 
principle’ rather than the uncertainty principle, as the emphasis is the ontological indeterminacy of 
‘reality’, rather than epistemological uncertainty about a pre-existing reality. Developing this, Barad 
argues that matter and meaning are always entangled and thus inseparable. The ‘real’ world does 
not have definite properties; rather, qualities and states can be measured through specific 
arrangements of the world, in which the observer is a part, rather than separated from the objects 
of observation. Matter is always entangled with meaning, and produced through specific 
arrangements of observers and objects of observation – through specific agential cuts. 
 As well as evoking the quantum associations of entanglement, I also want to explicitly link 
entanglement to Haraway’s game of cat’s cradle. Haraway suggests cat’s cradle as a way of thinking 
through interdisciplinarity. She states: 
I would like to make an elementary string figure in the form of a cartoon outline of the 
interknitted discourses named (1) cultural studies; (2) feminist, multicultural, antiracist 
science projects; and (3) science studies. Like other worldly entities, these discourses do not 
exist entirely outside each other [...] the three names are place markers, emphases, or tool 
kits – knots, if you will – in a constitutively interactive, collaborative process of trying to 
make sense of the natural worlds we inhabit and that inhabit us.70 
Cat’s cradle, for Haraway, is a way of seeing interdisciplinarity as an entanglement. In Haraway’s 
account, this entangled way of approaching interdisciplinary projects emphasises that disciplines and 
discourses – like other worldly entities such as particles – are not discrete individual entities with 
intrinsic and independent properties. Cat’s cradle also emphasises the constitutively interactive, 
collaborative and situated character of all knowledge production. Significantly, Haraway’s cat’s 
                                                          
69 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, p. 296. 
70 Donna Haraway, ‘A Game of Cat’s Cradle: Science Studies, Feminist Theory, Cultural Studies’, Configurations, 
1 (1994), 59–71, p. 66. See also Katie King, ‘Pastpresents: Playing Cat’s Cradle with Donna Haraway’, Party 
Writing for Donna Haraway! (2010) <http://playingcatscradle.blogspot.co.uk> [accessed 7 March 2013]. 
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cradle, like Barad’s agential elaboration of Bohr’s quantum indeterminacy, emphasises the ‘realness’ 
of the ‘real world’, while also emphasising the situated and contingent nature of any and all 
knowledge claims about this world. As Haraway states: ‘the issues here are not “mere” metaphors 
and stories; the issues are about the semiosis of embodiment’.71 Haraway’s cat’s cradle, then, 
tangles up situated knowledges with agential cuts.  
Entanglement is important throughout my thesis, and I use the term in a number of different 
contexts to think about multiple connections, networks and relationships. The word evokes a 
specific scientific tradition, that of quantum mechanics. Although I use the term in a more general 
sense than its specific use in quantum mechanics, I want to evoke this discourse in my use of the 
word for a number of reasons. In particular, quantum entanglement (read through Bohr and Barad’s 
elaboration) is both a description of the ‘real’ world, and recognises the fact that the ‘real’ is 
inseparable from the situated practices that produce the knowledge about the ‘real’. In my 
description of entanglements, I also want to evoke Haraway’s cat’s cradle, and the knotting and 
interknitting of different situated discourses, disciplines and knowledges. This knitting, knotting and 
entangling is always constitutively interactive and collaborative, and is as much about working within 
disciplinary boundaries, as performing the agential cuts that draw these boundaries and create the 
possibility of their redrawing. This is particularly pertinent in this chapter where I am putting genetic 
science, quantum physics, deconstruction and queer theory into conversation with each other. 
These are not discrete areas of definite independent knowledges, but are always already entangled, 
only made intelligible by specific situated agential cuts.  
Gay Gene Research 
 It was against the backdrop of expensive gene sequencing and optimism for the discovery of 
a ‘map’ or comprehensible ‘book’ of life in the Human Genome Project that research into a biological 
                                                          
71 Haraway, ‘A Game of Cat’s Cradle’, p. 71. 
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basis for homosexuality began to search for a hypothetical gay gene. In the early 1990s, two 
influential pieces of scientific research into the genetic basis of sexual orientation were published: J. 
Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard’s twin study, and Dean Hamer’s study of so-called genetic markers 
for homosexuality on the X chromosome.72 I will describe these two pieces of research briefly, 
before analysing some of the claims made and discussing some of the methodological problems with 
the research. Bailey and Pillard published ‘A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation’ in 1991.73 In 
this study, Bailey and Pillard advertised in magazines for gay men with a twin brother, or an adoptive 
brother who had been adopted into the family at an age less than three. These gay men were 
interviewed about their sexuality and the sexualities of their twin, or adoptive, brothers. The 
brothers were then sent questionnaires to determine their sexuality. The twin brothers were also 
asked to confirm if they were monozygotic (identical – from a single egg) or dizygotic (non-identical 
– from two eggs) twins. Of the participants included in the final sample, ‘52% (29/56) of monozygotic 
cotwins, 22% (12/54) of dizygotic cotwins, and 11% (6/57) of adoptive brothers were homosexual’.74 
                                                          
72 Other relevant and influential research contemporary to Bailey and Pillard’s twin study and Hamer’s 
chromosome markers includes Simon LeVay’s famous research into the relationship between brain structures 
and homosexuality (‘A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure between Heterosexual and Homosexual Men’, 
Science 253:5023 [1991], 1034–1037). LeVay’s study suggested a size difference in a cell group of the 
interstitial nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus (INAH 3) between homosexual and heterosexual men. LeVay’s 
research was widely publicised and he enjoyed something of a celebrity status, appearing on numerous 
television news programmes and chat shows, as well as hosting a documentary for Channel 4 (Simon LeVay, 
Born That Way? [Channel 4, 1992]. See also LeVay’s personal website, Simon LeVay, <www.simonlevay.com> 
[accessed 29 April 2011]). He published three popular science books on science and sexuality and co-authored 
a textbook on sexuality as well as a book on lesbian and gay history (Simon LeVay, The Sexual Brain 
[Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993]; Queer Science: The Use and Abuse of Research into Homosexuality 
[Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1996]; Gay, Straight, and the Reason Why: The Science of Sexual Orientation 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011]; Simon LeVay and Sharon M. Valente, Human Sexuality, 2nd edn 
[Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2006]; Simon LeVay and Elisabeth Nonas, City of Friends: A Portrait of the Gay and 
Lesbian Community in America [Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995]). LeVay’s research has been very thoroughly 
critiqued. See, for example: Anne Fausto-Sterling, Myths of Gender: Biological Theories about Women and 
Men, 2nd edn (New York: Basic, 1992), especially p. 249; Marjorie Garber, ‘The Return to Biology’, in Bisexuality 
and the Eroticism of Everyday Life (New York: Routledge, 2000), pp. 268–283; Ruth Hubbard and Elijah Wald, 
Exploding the Gene Myth: How Genetic Information is Produced and Manipulated by Scientists, Physicians, 
Employers, Insurance Companies, Educators, and Law Enforcers, rev. edn [Boston, MA: Beacon, 1999], p. 94; 
and Rebecca M. Jordan-Young, Brain Storm: The Flaws in the Science of Sex Differences (Boston, Mass: Harvard 
University Press, 2010), pp. 101–106. 
73 J. Michael Bailey and Richard Pillard, ‘A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation’, Archives of General 
Psychiatry, 48:12 (1991), 1089–96. Bailey also authored one of the rarer studies of the time on female 
homosexuality: J. Michael Bailey, and D. S. Benishay, ‘Familial aggregation of female sexual orientation’, 
American Journal of Psychiatry, 150:2 (1993), 272–7. 
74 Bailey and Pillard, ‘A Genetic Study of Male Sexual Orientation’, p. 1089. 
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These results led Bailey and Pillard to conclude that there is a genetic basis for homosexuality. 
Pillard, in fact, took this claim further; in an interview in the journal GLQ he stated, ‘we think that the 
hypothesized gay genes are real’.75 Many critics have suggested that the numbers simply do not 
support this genetic conclusion. William Byne and Bruce Parsons state that: 
the concordance rate for homosexuality in nontwin biologic brothers was only 9.2% – 
significantly lower than that required by simple genetic hypothesis, which, on the basis of 
shared genetic material, would predict similar concordance rates for [dizygotic] twins and 
nontwin biologic brothers. Furthermore, the fact that the concordance rates were similar for 
nontwin biologic brothers (9.2%) and genetically unrelated adoptive brothers (11.0%) is at 
odds with a simple genetic hypothesis, which would predict a higher concordance rate for 
biological siblings.76 
Monozygotic twins share identical DNA, yet close to half of the sampled monozygotic twins did not 
share a sexual orientation. Despite this, Pillard interprets the results as proof not only of a genetic 
basis for homosexuality, but as suggesting the existence of a specific gene – or genes – that code for 
homosexuality. 
 Among the methodological problems with Bailey and Pillard’s twin survey is that the sample 
is not random. Bailey and Pillard recruited participants for their research through advertisements in 
gay and lesbian publications. This method of sampling could have affected the results of the survey. 
As clinical psychiatrist Miron Baron argues: 
This method can be deemed questionable because it is highly dependent on the readership 
of these publications and on the motives of those who opt to respond. It may thus lead to 
                                                          
75 Edward Stein, ‘Evidence for Queer Genes: An Interview with Richard Pillard’, GLQ, 1:1 (1991), 93–110 (p. 94). 
76 William Byne and Bruce Parsons, ‘Human Sexual Orientation: The Biologic Theories Reappraised’, Archives of 
General Psychiatry, 50 (1993), 228–239 (p. 229). See also Hubbard and Wald, Exploding the Gene Myth, p. 97; 
and William Byne, ‘The Biological Evidence Challenged’, Scientific American, 270 (1994), 50–55. 
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skewed results – for example, inflated rates of concordant [monozygotic] twins owing to 
preferential participation.77 
The survey method is also not a completely accurate way of testing zygosity of twins. Baron argues 
that although ‘Some data suggest that "perceived" zygosity corresponds to "real" zygosity in 80%-
90% of twin pairs, provided the interviews and questionnaires are thorough and meticulous 
throughout’, this cannot be guaranteed and blood-typing to test for zygosity would be more 
accurate.78 Another problem with Bailey and Pillard’s research is the definition of bisexuality. 
Although participants were asked to score themselves on the Kinsey scale and therefore not 
necessarily categorise themselves along the binary of heterosexual/homosexual, homosexual 
participants and those considered ‘substantially bisexual’ were combined to produce the 52% of 
monozygotic twins considered to be homosexual. 79 
  In 1993, Dean Hamer and others published ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X 
Chromosome and Male Sexual Orientation’. Following on from previous work on the biological basis 
of homosexuality, Hamer took advantage of the developments that the massive multinational 
funding of the Human Genome Project made possible: 
Recent advances in human genome analysis, in particular the development of chromosomal 
genetic maps that are densely populated with highly polymorphic markers, make it feasible 
to apply such methods to complex traits, such as sexual orientation, even if these traits are 
                                                          
77 Miron Baron, ‘Genetics and Human Sexual Orientation’, Biological Psychiatry, 33 (1993), 759–761 (p. 759). 
78 Baron, ‘Genetics and Human Sexual Orientation’, p. 760. 
79 Edward Stein, ‘Evidence for Queer Genes’, p. 94. Marjorie Garber discusses in detail the status of the 
bisexual in Bailey and Pillard’s research, as well as in Hamer’s and LeVay’s, in ‘The Return to Biology’, in 
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Hubbard’s statement that, ‘This way of categorizing people [into strict categories of heterosexual/homosexual] 
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the other sex.’ (Hubbard and Wald, Exploding the Gene Myth, p. 94). 
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influenced by multiple genes or environmental or experiential factors, or some combination 
of these.80 
The subjects of Hamer’s study were self-identified gay men and their relatives over the age of 
eighteen. The final sample consisted of 38 pairs of homosexual brothers and their relatives, with two 
families added from a previous sample. The total participants numbered 114. The 38 families were 
chosen very deliberately, to test the hypothesis that there is a maternally transmitted genetic basis 
for homosexuality.81 The sample demonstrated a high number of homosexual maternal uncles and 
sons of maternal aunts. Following this confirmation of the findings of previous research, Hamer 
looked at the X chromosome for possible genetic markers for homosexuality that are transmitted 
maternally.82 
 Hamer argued that if the X chromosome contained a gene that was in some way related to 
homosexual behaviour, then chromosomal maps would show similar genetic markers among 
homosexual participants: 
If the X chromosome contains a gene that increases the probability of an individual's being 
homosexual, then genetically related gay men should share X chromosome markers close to 
that gene. If no such gene exists, then no statistically significant correlations between sexual 
orientation and X chromosome markers will be observed.83 
                                                          
80 Dean Hamer and others, ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers on the X Chromosome and Male Sexual 
Orientation’, Science, 261 (1993), 321–327 (p. 321). 
81 Dean Hamer, ‘A Linkage Between DNA Markers’, p. 322. 
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Hamer reports that through chromosome mapping, significant correlations were observed; in 
particular he identified links between genetic marker Xq28 and self-reported homosexuality in his 
sample. Hamer concluded that: 
We have now produced evidence that one form of male homosexuality is preferentially 
transmitted through the maternal side and is genetically linked to chromosomal region Xq28 
[...] it appears that Xq28 contains a gene that contributes to homosexual orientation in 
males.84 
As with Bailey and Pillard’s twin studies, there are numerous methodological problems with Hamer’s 
research. Hamer’s sample is limited, and there are also issues of sampling bias, as the research 
focused on a specific group of gay men, with a particular family background. Hamer’s conclusions 
reflect this specificity, as he states that ‘one form of homosexuality is [...] genetically linked to 
chromosomal region Xq28’.85 Not only was the focus on a specific group of gay men, but an 
adequate control group (such as nonhomosexual brothers) was not included.86 Further research has 
also failed to confirm or replicate Hamer’s findings.87 Hamer’s tone in the Science article is 
speculative – in the article he states that the subject is complex and a single genetic locus cannot 
account for the variability of human sexuality.88 However, in his popular science book, The Science of 
Desire: The Search for the Gay Gene and the Biology of Behavior, Hamer states that ‘we didn’t isolate 
a “gay gene”; we only detected its presence through linkage’.89 The implication is that although the 
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research did not identify a gay gene, its existence is not in question and is, if anything, supported by 
the study.90 
What are Genes? 
 In both Bailey and Pillard’s twin survey, and Hamer and others’ chromosome research, genes 
are defined (although not explicitly) as a structural biological unit, a molecule that in some way 
determines behaviour or identity. The word ‘gene’ did not always have such a deterministic 
meaning. In fact, the term was coined in 1909 by botanist Wilhelm Johannsen who wanted a word 
that could simply refer to the evident fact that characteristics were transmitted across generations. 
Johannsen stated: 
The word ‘gene’ is completely free from any hypothesis; it expresses only the evident fact 
that, in any case, many characteristics of the organism are specified in the gametes by 
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means of special conditions, foundations, and determiners which are present in unique, 
separate, and thereby independent ways – in short, precisely what we wish to call genes.91 
Johannsen underscored this point two years later: ‘The “gene” is nothing but a very applicable little 
word [...] As to the nature of the “genes”, it is as yet of no value to propose any hypothesis; but that 
the notion of the “gene” covers a reality is evident in Mendelism.’92 Despite Johannsen’s desire to 
keep genes free from any hypothesis, Evelyn Fox Keller argues that by the 1930s, genes had ‘become 
incontrovertibly real, material entities – the biological analogue of the molecules and atoms of 
physical science’.93 Proof for the reality and materiality of genes came in 1953 with the discovery of 
the function and form of DNA.94 Keller states that, ‘by midcentury, all remaining doubts about the 
material reality of the gene were dispelled and the way was cleared for the gene to become the 
foundational concept capable of unifying all biology’.95 Not only this, but the way was cleared for the 
gene to function in language as a ‘master molecule’ – a word that, far from being free from 
hypothesis, functions rhetorically to support hypotheses of biological determinism.96 Keller refers to 
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this rhetorical use of the gene as ‘gene talk’ and it is a concept I will discuss alongside developments 
in genetics in the late 1990s and early 2000s that problematise a simplistic and reductive definition 
of the gene, and thus, the possibility of finding gay genes.97 
 As my project is concerned with putting social theories into conversation with the theory 
and practice of science, it is essential to briefly explore what the word ‘gene’ refers to in the work of 
biologists. Following the discovery of the double helix, the classical view of the gene was that it was 
a string of DNA that, when translated into messenger RNA (mRNA) would produce a protein. This 
picture of the gene fits with the neo-Darwinian narrative of evolution: DNA is a molecule that 
occasionally mutates, producing morphological differences due to the difference in proteins, and 
evolution proceeds by a cumulative selection of the mutations that result in increased fitness.98 One 
of the unexpected consequences of the large-scale focus on the genome in the 1990s was the 
realisation that this picture was overly simplistic.99 Keller provides a list of some of the discoveries 
that have troubled the classical picture of the gene: 
Techniques and data from sequence analysis have led to the identification not only of split 
genes but also of repeated genes, overlapping genes, cryptic DNA, antisense transcription, 
nested genes, and multiple promotes (allowing transcription to be initiated at alternative 
sites and according to variable criteria). All of these variations immeasurably confound the 
task of defining the gene as a structural unit.100 
Some geneticists have suggested that the word is no longer useful. William Gelbart suggests that  
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we may well have come to the point where the use of the term ‘gene’ is of limited value and 
might in fact be a hindrance to our understanding of the genome [...] unlike chromosomes, 
genes are not physical objects but are merely concepts that have acquired a great deal of 
historic baggage over the past decades.101 
The word gene, although useful for scientists working in specific fields, does not refer to a single 
stable biological entity, and thus must be qualified to have meaning across more than one sub-
discipline of genetics. As Gelbart states elsewhere, ‘I find it sometimes very difficult to tell what 
someone means when they talk about genes because we don’t share the same definition’.102 Francis 
Collins, director of the National Human Genome Research Institute (a role previously held by James 
Watson), supports this view of the gene, saying ‘we almost have to add an adjective every time we 
use that noun’.103 The applicability of Johannsen’s little word is not without its problems; 
ambiguously applied to different biological entities and processes, the word undermines reductive 
narratives of genetic determinism. 
 If the term gene is, as Gelbart suggests, a hindrance to our understanding of evolution and 
heredity, and if geneticists and molecular biologists are suggesting more and more that the gene is 
no more than shorthand for a range of different biological entities and processes, this has not been 
reflected in the popular use of the word. During the 1990s when scientists working on the Human 
Genome Project (as well as those independent from it) were discovering unexpected complexity in 
the form and function of the genome, gene-talk proliferated. Jenny Kitzinger has traced reports in 
the media of the ‘discoveries’ of the early 1990s related to the biological basis of homosexuality, in 
particular Dean Hamer’s chromosomal study. Kitzinger suggests that, while there were some 
headlines and reports that were heavily based on genetic determinism and which accepted 
uncritically the reality of a gay gene, the majority of reports were actually more critical and non-
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deterministic. Her analysis is primarily of the British print news media, and she references several 
examples of headlines that challenged the genetic determinism involved in a narrative of gay genes: 
‘Don’t Panic: Take Comfort, It’s not all in the Genes’; ‘It’s Not in the Genes, It’s in the Culture’; ‘The 
Myth of the Gay Gene’.104 Kitzinger’s research is important because it demonstrates that media 
reports and public understandings of genetics are not simply deterministic, expecting a one gene – 
one behaviour relationship. However, the criticisms in the articles tend to be of the narrow 
definition of human sexuality, rather than of the narrow definition of genes. For example, ‘The Myth 
of the Gay Gene’ from the Observer reflects that: 
Sexual preferences come in a broad array, from the exclusive homosexual to the 
heterosexual [...] who has occasional gay forays, to the exclusive heterosexual who only 
finds members of the opposite sex attractive. The idea that a single gene could control these 
widely varying reactions is utterly ridiculous.105 
The article closes with the statement that further developments in the relationship of genetics to 
behaviour should be anticipated ‘in a spirit of wonderment at their complexity, and not with 
offensive simplicity’.106 The implication is, however, that the complexity that is referred to is the 
complexity of human social behaviour, rather than the complexity of genetics. It is my argument that 
articles such as this are important to challenge the one gene – one behaviour model, yet do little to 
question a simplistic view of human biology and, in fact, contribute to the gene-talk that proliferated 
in the 1990s despite the decline of the master molecule paradigm in genetic research of the time. I 
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want to propose an approach that takes into account the complexity and importance of both the 
social and the biological. 
Queer Science? 
 As I discussed in the previous chapter, feminists in the 1970s and 1980s demonstrated that 
patriarchy structured the theory and practice of science, and they developed a number of critical 
approaches to patriarchy in science. Although patriarchy and heteronormativity are not 
coterminous, I argue that they share political investments and support each other in significant 
ways.107 With this in mind, it is illustrative to attempt a transposition of feminist approaches to 
patriarchy into possible queer approaches to heteronormativity in science. A feminist empiricist 
approach emphasises the importance of the scientific method, and the need to avoid androcentric 
bias in scientific research. From this perspective, there is a value-neutral set of facts that can be 
accessed, which are then subsequently used or abused in society. This approach is echoed by Hamer 
when he states in the conclusion of his paper,  
We believe that it would be fundamentally unethical to use [genetic links to behaviour] to 
try to assess or alter a person's current or future sexual orientation, either heterosexual or 
homosexual, or other normal attributes of human behavior. Rather, scientists, educators, 
policy-makers, and the public should work together to ensure that such research is used to 
benefit all members of society.108 
Although Hamer is sensitive to the ethical and political dangers of genetic determinism in relation to 
sexual identity, his account assumes that the science itself is value neutral, and it is the responsibility 
of scientists, educators, policy-makers and the public to ensure that the research is used wisely, and 
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not abused. This reinforces the distinction between science and society, and between subject and 
object – that is, between scientist and the object of scientific investigation.  
 One possible approach, then, would be to apply a feminist postmodernist approach to the 
kind of research done by Bailey and Pillard, or Hamer. A feminist postmodernist approach 
interrogates the subject-object split in the traditional scientific method, while problematising the 
stable identity of the scientist and the possibility of a singular stable set of knowledge about the 
object on inquiry. This approach is illuminating for a discussion of Bailey and Pillard’s and Hamer’s 
research; from this perspective, the research is performed within the productionist or 
appropriationist logic of the domination of object by subject. Haraway critiques: 
the object both guarantees and refreshes the power of the knower, but any status as agent 
in the productions must be denied the object. It – the world – must, in short, be objectified 
as thing, not as an agent; it must be matter for the self-formation of the only social being in 
the productions of knowledge, the human knower.109 
The research by Bailey and Pillard, and by Hamer and his team, focuses on self-reports of sexual 
orientation. This approach could suggest a productive conversation between the scientists and 
objects of inquiry, and therefore the reduction of distance between subject and object. 
Unfortunately, the strict criteria for categorisation and the underlying assumption of a binary 
organisation of sexual orientation disallow any true agency to the participants. In his interview with 
the journal GLQ, Richard Pillard suggests an organisation of sexual orientation based on sexual 
attraction to one of two strictly binarised genders. Not only this, he considers these to be universal 
human categories; he states that,  
I don’t agree with the assertion that ‘gay’ isn’t a strong category simply because some tribes 
in New Guinea or the American plains don’t have it. Those are small cultural isolates and 
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they might not recognize as many categories as we do just because they lack a large enough 
data base.110 
Bailey and Pillard used a methodology of classification based on the Kinsey scale. Participants were 
therefore asked to classify their sexuality along a scale, rather than as one of two oppositional 
sexualities. This could be interpreted as allowing agency to the objects of scientific investigation, and 
offering situated knowledges of sexuality from the collapse of the subject-object divide. For the 
purposes of statistical analysis, however, the information gathered is organised so as to categorise 
participants as either homosexual or heterosexual. As previously noted, the problematic 
classification of bisexuality illustrates one of the weaknesses with this methodological approach. The 
classification of bisexual as either heterosexual or homosexual reveals the underlying assumption of 
the universal nature of a binary organisation of sexuality. This underlying assumption prevents true 
agency to the participants, for although they are asked to report on their own sexuality, the final 
classification decision is made by the scientists. This disallows agency to the objects of investigation 
(the research participants) and precludes the production of connections and conversations between 
subject and object.  
 The feminist postmodernist approach outlined in the previous chapter is useful for 
questioning biological determinism and underlying assumptions in the scientific research on sexual 
orientation. It does, however, need to be developed to successfully negotiate the false distinctions 
between biology and culture, and between scientific realism and relativism, while ensuring that 
distinctions are not reinscribed through reversal. In Derridean terms, the negotiation must not 
simply be a passing from one concept to another, but rather one that seeks to overturn and displace 
conceptual and nonconceptual orders. With this in mind, I want to suggest a diffractive and queer 
approach that takes into account developments in feminist postmodernism, deconstruction, lesbian 
and gay studies, and science studies. I argue that this approach, informed by Elam’s advocacy of 
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groundless solidarity, Haraway’s metaphors of networks and diffraction, and Barad’s posthuman 
performativity, can queer genetics and offer productive ways to think about the relationship of 
biology, behaviour, science and society. Importantly for my project, this can work towards avoiding 
genetic determinism while attempting to take into account the complexities and specificities of both 
the biological and the social. As I argued in Chapter One, biological determinism is not inevitable and 
attention to the entanglement of the biological and social can offer the possibility of alternative 
narratives, positions and bodies of knowledge. 
Queer(ing) Genes  
To attempt to approach genetics and the search for gay genes from a queer perspective – to 
queer genes – is to attempt multiple negotiations. Queer, in the formulation of theorists such as 
Michael Warner, is necessarily a social process and a negotiation of normativities. Queer theorists 
have also attempted to negotiate a discursive space different from but contiguous with lesbian and 
gay studies. It is my argument that queer is also useful for negotiating the seeming oppositions of 
the real and its representations (an opposition that exists in both realist and constructivist accounts 
of sexuality and sexual difference), and that of the biological and the social. This relates to the 
ongoing debate that surrounds scientific research into sexuality – the question of whether 
homosexuality is biological or social, usually expressed in terms of ‘born versus made’. For some 
commentators, the search for a biological basis of homosexuality is tantamount to a ‘new eugenics’. 
Neuroanatomist Simon LeVay distances his work on structural brain differences in homosexual men, 
along with the work of researchers such as Bailey and Pillard, and Hamer and others, from the 
history of eugenics by stating (rather naïvely) that Nazi eugenic programmes were based not on the 
belief that homosexuality was an immutable biological trait, but rather an infectious social and 
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behavioural problem.111 His argument, in short, is that ‘people who think that gays and lesbians are 
“born that way” are also the most likely to support gay rights’.112 Many theorists and activists have 
questioned this argument. Edward Stein, for example, argues that basing the fight for gay rights on 
biology is dangerous for a number of reasons. In an interview with The Advocate, Stein questions the 
logic behind LeVay’s belief that a biological basis for homosexuality will necessarily promote rights: 
Even if sexual orientation is innate, a gay or lesbian person’s public identity, sexual 
behaviors, romantic relationships, or decisions to raise children are all choices. No theory 
suggests that these choices are genetic. A homophobic person might easily accept that gay 
people do not choose their sexual orientation – while still hating gay people and wanting to 
prevent us from having sex or building queer families.113 
These are important ethical and political issues. However, framing the debate in terms of ‘born or 
made’ relies upon and reinforces a strict distinction between the biological and the social. Queering 
genes, and a performative account of the search for gay genes, deconstructs this distinction, while 
not effacing the important ethical and political implications.  
 One of the most important aspects of my alternative performative account of genes and 
sexuality is an expanded notion of agency. In a representationalist account, agency is denied the 
object of investigation. In a performative account, scientific knowledge is produced within a network 
of human and nonhuman agency. Scientific knowledge can be thought of as a diffraction pattern, 
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produced by particular contingent arrangements of human and nonhuman agencies, or actors, in a 
biological-social network (in which the biological and social are always already entangled). 
Diffraction can intervene in existing networks of actors (both subjects and objects) to produce new 
actors and new networks between them. Haraway’s account privileges ‘interference patterns’ and 
the effects of differences and interferences in ‘material-semiotic’ networks.114 My approach suggests 
that genetic biology is a biological-social network, rather than a system organised in strict binary 
oppositions. This is, in part, an answer to the deconstructive imperative not to pass simply between 
terms but to overturn and displace conceptual and nonconceptual orders, and I suggest that a 
method of queering genes would be to consider genes as active agential actors within biological-
social networks. The Human Genome Project has not revealed genes to provide an interpretable 
code of human life; rather, it has revealed surprising complexity in the form and function of the 
genome. This biological complexity challenges the linguistic use of the gene. Simultaneously, the 
metaphors used to describe the Human Genome Project and other related areas of genetic research 
trouble the status of the gene as a solely biological entity, revealing genes to be involved in complex 
biological-social negotiations of power and ownership. My approach is diffractive, accounting for the 
material quality of genes whilst also recognising that they function through social and linguistic 
articulation. Furthermore, this diffractive approach emphasises that the biological does not simply 
reflect the social meanings of genes, just as any language cannot provide a completely faithful 
representation of the material realm. Instead, it is my argument that genes are biological-social 
actors within a biological-social network, with agency – not in terms of causing identities or 
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behaviours in a linear fashion, but as always creating interference patterns in both biological and 
social accounts. 
Queering the search for a genetic basis for homosexuality should not stop at a 
deconstruction of the binary oppositions apparent in the research, its reception, and discussion of its 
wider implications. It is not simply a matter of ‘born versus made’, nor a collapsing of the two terms 
into one another. It is also not a matter of the impartial scientist (the Baconian ‘good knower’ 
discussed in the first chapter) discovering the object of scientific inquiry, namely the gay gene. I 
argue that genes are not inert biological entities awaiting discovery and classification as gay (or not), 
but are always already queer. Genes are active participants in the networks in which they are 
researched, eluding biological and linguistic classification and reduction. Francis Collins’ statement 
that scientists need to apply a new adjective to the word gene every time they use it suggests that 
the gene both eludes definition and places a demand for adjectives to define it. Similarly, David 
Halperin suggests that the word queer does not have a single referent to which it necessarily refers. 
Putting these two statements into conversation with each other, I propose that a possible adjective 
for genes could be queer. Halperin’s unassuming word and Johannsen’s applicable little word 
combine to suggest irreducibly complex queer genes. These queer genes are not structural biological 
units; instead, the term ‘queer genes’ refers to the complex agential processes of genetics, both in 
their biological and social meaning. This formulation also draws attention to the strangeness and 
surprising nature of genetic process, something revealed by the Human Genome Project, and thus 
linking the social and scientific theories of sexuality and genetics. 
These queer genes, creating interference patterns throughout the network, disallow simple 
biological determinism while never denying the material nature of bodies and sexuality. I want 
explicitly to associate the idea of a biological-social network with Elam’s ‘network of responsibility’ 
discussed earlier to emphasise the necessarily political nature of these biological-social networks. To 
consider genes as actors in a biological-social network, producing diffraction patterns is not to deny 
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genes their material or a political ‘nature'. On the contrary, in my account, the boundaries between 
the biological and the social are revealed to be not strict boundaries at all, and the deconstruction of 
the relations between actors in the network is not a deconstruction of politics; instead it establishes 
human and nonhuman agency as necessarily political. Interference patterns represent the 
unpredictable ways that calls to duty and responsibility can appear within biological-cultural 
networks. As this duty cannot be known in advance it is, like Elam’s feminist obligation, an 
‘obligation that, in effect, comes from nowhere’. A queer approach to the science of sexual 
orientation is a similar obligation; it is an approach that proceeds along connections within 
biological-cultural networks, forming a groundless solidarity with the multiple and unpredictable 
biological and social actors within the network. 
 Conclusion 
In the 1990s, feminism met deconstruction, and the field of lesbian and gay studies met the 
emerging field of queer theory. Both the developments in feminist postmodernism in the 1980s and 
the theories of deconstruction suggested the need for politics based not on essential identities, but 
in groundless solidarity within networks of meaning. Similarly, queer theory began to suggest that a 
queer politics could be formed not through a grounding in lesbian or gay identities, but in contingent 
solidarities strategically positioned in opposition to conservative normativities. I have outlined some 
of the problems involved in queer theory but suggested that, when aligned with feminist 
postmodernism and the groundless solidarity of feminism and deconstruction, queer can be a 
productive approach that can attempt a negotiation between the supposed opposition of relativism 
and realism.  
 In particular, my particular political deployment of queer theory offers a diffractive and 
deconstructive approach to an overarching trope in the seeming oppositions of realism and 
relativism, and scientific realism and social constructivism – that of representationalism. By 
emphasising that the biological is agential and performative, and always already entangled with the 
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social, human genetics can be interpreted as constituted performatively in both its scientific and 
social meanings. Genetic research is performed within certain structural conventions; its repetition 
and iterability is integral to its successful function as legitimate research. However, I have argued 
that quantum physics links productively with performativity, suggesting that the world is not full of 
objects with determinate properties, awaiting measurement, classification, or scientific intervention. 
Instead, I propose an extended diffractive approach that sees the world as full of human and 
nonhuman agency, in which the Human Genome Project and research into human genetics are 
specific interactions and arrangements of agency whose scientific legitimacy is inseparable from 
their social and political meanings and implications.  
This performative account also converges with a deconstructive and queer account, in which 
the queer and non-normative character of the biological is preserved as constitutive and not 
awaiting the conscious intervention of a subject. This builds on the previous chapter, suggesting that 
the boundary breakdown between the subject and object of scientific inquiry can be productive – 
creating the possibility for radical alternative narratives and positions. The agency of the objects of 
scientific inquiry is an important consequence of this approach, and I propose that this does not 
necessarily lead to genetic determinism and conservative social theory and politics. On the contrary, 
my queer account of genetics seeks to attend to the queerness of genes – a queerness that is 
ongoing, and always deconstructively queering itself, producing patterns of interference in biological 
and social accounts that can be never fully known in advance. These insights will be developed 
further in the following chapter on more-than-human agency and kinship, as well the final chapter 
on health, biomedical knowledge and living well. 
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Chapter Three 
Symbiosociality: Bacteria, Humans and More-than-Human Kinship 
 
If humans are thought of as a composite of microbial and human cells, the human 
genetic landscape as an aggregate of the genes in the human genome and the 
microbiome, and human metabolic features as a blend of human and microbial 
traits, then the picture that emerges is one of a human ‘supraorganism’ 
Peter J. Turnbaugh and others, ‘The Human Microbiome Project’1 
 
In the first chapter I discussed Edward O. Wilson’s ‘extension’ of biology and evolutionary theory to 
social organisation which he named sociobiology. Analysed in the terms of feminist engagements 
with science in the 1970s and 1980s I suggested that Wilson’s sociobiology reified a distance 
between scientific subject and object, and thus precluded connections and new knowledges of the 
object – instead reinforcing the identity of the subject. As an alternative to this I explored Elaine 
Morgan’s Aquatic Ape Hypothesis in the light of feminist standpoint and postmodernist 
epistemologies and Donna Haraway’s situated knowledges. Crucial to this investigation was the idea 
of contingent and situated connections, for example between contemporary feminism and the 
female prehominid ape. Essential to this connection is the concept of agency, traditionally denied to 
everything but the scientific subject. In Morgan’s narrative, the prehominid ape is allowed agency 
and the subject-object relation changes from one of distance and identity-reification to one of 
partial connection which allows for the production of situated knowledges. 
                                                          
1 Peter J. Turnbaugh and others, ‘The Human Microbiome Project’, Nature, 449 (2007), 804–810 (p. 804). 
128 
 
 In the second chapter, to continue the interrogation of the relation between the biological 
and social, and in particular the ideas of connections and agency, I discussed genetic determinism in 
the 1990s and its relation to developments in gender and sexuality studies and critical theory. In 
particular I situated attempts to find ‘gay genes’ alongside the development of queer theory and 
feminist engagements with deconstruction. I proposed a diffractive account of gay genes, or perhaps 
more appropriately, ‘queer genes’; rather than thinking of homosexuality in terms of ‘born’ or 
‘made’, I suggested a deconstructive approach to these oppositions. This approach privileges the 
agential character of genes, reconfiguring genes as queer performative actors in biological-social 
networks, in which the biological and the social are always already entangled. The idea of networks 
is important as it can be explicitly linked both to the agency of the human and nonhuman world 
(what I will go on to describe as the ‘more-than-human’ world) and to Diane Elam’s feminist 
deconstructive insight that subjects are not sovereign and autonomous but are always already 
involved in networks of responsibilities to others.  
 In this chapter I will explore Donna Haraway’s work on companion species as a way of 
rethinking the human, and the human’s relationship with the nonhuman or ‘more-than-human’ 
world. In particular I will focus on relations between the human and the bacterial, considering 
whether Haraway’s companion species framework is sufficient for thinking becoming-with the 
nonhuman, when the nonhuman is also non-animal. To conceptualise kinship relations and 
community formations across human-bacterial boundaries, I will explore Lynn Margulis’s scientific 
work on symbiogenesis alongside some work on kinship from gender and sexuality studies that 
emphasises non-voluntary, performative and horizontal kinship, rather than heterobiological family 
models. Building on this, I will expand Paul Rabinow’s concept of biosociality to take account of the 
emergent and always already entangled and entangling relationship between the biological and 
social. I will use insights from previous chapters on human connections with the nonhuman and the 
idea of networks of agency and responsibility to suggest a merger of symbiogenesis and biosociality 
to form symbiosociality. I will explore symbiosociality as a possible way of understanding the 
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relationship between the biological and the social and will explore how this formulation can develop 
queer kinship and rethink more-than-human relations and the emergence of multispecies becoming-
with. Symbiosociality as a word and approach is a merger, combining elements of different theories 
and scientific practices to attempt to preserve the entangled nature of all life. I will be using 
symbiosociality to think human becoming-with bacteria and to raise questions about health and the 
relating to human and more-than-human others. This is important as living well, which I will discuss 
in more detail in the final chapter, is always a negotiation of multispecies relationships, particularly 
with bacteria and viruses. 
Donna Haraway’s Companion Species  
 Much of Donna Haraway’s work on feminism and technoscience has interrogated the 
meanings of kinship and explored ways of expanding and rethinking kinship’s boundaries. In ‘A 
Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s’, Haraway suggests 
that the cyborg is a figure for ‘crucial boundary breakdowns’.2 It is through these boundary 
breakdowns – between humans and animals, between animals and machines, and between the 
physical and non-physical – that new kinship relations are formed. These relations, as Haraway 
states elsewhere, are not based on essential identities, but founded upon ‘partial, locatable, critical 
knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connection called solidarity in politics and shared 
conversations in epistemology’.3 Haraway suggests that ‘a cyborg world might be about lived social 
and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship with animals and machines, 
not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory standpoints’, and asks: ‘What kind of 
politics could embrace partial, contradictory, permanently unclosed constructions of personal and 
collective selves and still be faithful, effective – and ironically, socialist-feminist?’4 Boundary 
                                                          
2 Donna Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs: Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980s’, Signs, 4 
(1987), 1–42 (p. 4). 
3 Donna Haraway, ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial 
Perspective’, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (London: Free Association Books, 
1991), pp. 183–201 (p. 191). 
4 Haraway, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’, p. 8 and p. 11. 
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breakdowns create the possibility of the kinds of connection that Haraway speaks of. The cyborg 
offers Haraway a way of rethinking human and nonhuman connections and relationships as a web of 
partial connections between humans, animals and machines.  
  Haraway expands upon her model of cyborg kinship in 
Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM: Feminism and 
Technoscience. Kinship (and the rethinking of kinship’s possibilities) is a major focus in 
Modest_Witness. Haraway builds upon the possibility of connections between the human and 
nonhuman, and between the organic and inorganic, to draw parallels between transuranic elements 
on the periodic table and transgenic creatures or organisms. Haraway suggests that the periodic 
table ‘stood for traditional family values in the culture of chemistry’, and that the ‘kinship relations 
of the elements are a natural-technical object of knowledge that semiotically and instrumentally 
puts terrans in their proper place’.5 Importantly, for Haraway, the periodic table suggests a ‘natural 
limit’ to the family of elements with uranium, the naturally occurring earthly element with the 
highest atomic number, 92. Simultaneously however, the periodic table allows for the inclusion of 
elements with higher atomic numbers, including plutonium, a transuranic element with an atomic 
number of 94.6 Haraway likens the transuranic elements to transgenic creatures or organisms, 
organisms that carry and transmit exogenous genes (genes from other organisms) to their offspring.  
Like the transuranic elements, transgenic creatures, which carry genes from ‘unrelated’ 
organisms, simultaneously fit into well-established taxonomic and evolutionary discourses 
and also blast widely understood senses of natural limit. What was distant and unrelated 
becomes intimate.7 
                                                          
5 Donna Haraway, Modest_Witness@Second_Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouseTM: Feminism and 
Technoscience (New York: Routledge, 1997), p. 54. 
6 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 54. 
7 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 56. 
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The idea of ‘trans’ in both these examples allows Haraway to think a kinship beyond the traditional 
boundaries of human-animal and organic-inorganic. Modest_Witness places an important emphasis 
on the necessary and non-voluntaristic nature of these kinship relations. As Haraway states: ‘Like it 
or not, I was born kin to Pu239 and to transgenic, transspecific, and transported creatures of all kinds; 
that is the family for which and to whom my people are accountable.’8 For Haraway, kinship both 
suggests classification and ideas of ‘natural’ limits, whilst also offering the possibility of transgressing 
these limits and subverting classification. 
 In more recent work, Haraway has focused on relationships between humans and animals, 
stating: ‘I have come to see cyborgs as junior siblings in the much bigger, queer family of companion 
species, in which reproductive biotechnopolitics are generally a surprise, sometimes even a nice 
surprise.’9 Haraway’s queer family of companion species is introduced in The Companion Species 
Manifesto (2003), and elaborated in When Species Meet, published in 2008. Haraway explores the 
etymology of the terms involved in companion species to foreground some of the reasons for 
bringing these words together: ‘Companion comes from the Latin cum panis, “with bread”. 
Messmates at table are companions’. Companion also suggests a military company, a guide or 
handbook, and as a verb, ‘to companion is “to consort, to keep company”, with sexual and 
generative connotations always ready to erupt’.10 Haraway continues, stating that the word ‘species’ 
is ‘equally promiscuous, but in the visual register rather than the gustatory’:  
The Latin specere is at the root of things here, with its tones of ‘to look’ and ‘to behold’. In 
logic, species refers to a mental impression or idea, strengthening the notion that thinking 
and seeing are clones. Referring both to the relentlessly ‘specific’ or particular and to a class 
of individuals with the same characteristics, species contains its own opposite in the most 
                                                          
8 Haraway, Modest_Witness, p. 62. 
9 Donna Haraway, The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People, and Significant Otherness (Chicago: Prickly 
Paradigm Press, 2003), p. 11. 
10 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 17. 
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promising – or special – way. Debates about whether species are earthly organic entities or 
taxonomic conveniences are coextensive with the discourse we call ‘biology’. Species is 
about the dance linking kin and kind.11 
In the joining of the terms ‘companion’ and ‘species’, Haraway links specere to respecere, the act of 
respect, arguing that: 
To hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay attention, to have 
courteous regard for, to esteem: all of that is tied to polite greeting, to constituting the polis, 
where and when species meet. To knot companion and species together in encounter, in 
regard and respect, is to enter the world of becoming with, where who and what are is 
precisely what is at stake [...] Species interdependence is the name of the worlding game on 
earth, and that game must be one of response and respect. That is the play of companion 
species learning to pay attention. Not much is excluded from the needed play, not 
technologies, commerce, organisms, landscapes, peoples, practices. I am not a 
posthumanist; I am who I become with companion species, who and which make a mess out 
of categories in the making of kin and kind. Queer messmates in mortal play, indeed.12 
Haraway’s companion species approach suggests a set of kinship relations beyond the human: 
relations of regard and respect. Importantly for my project, these relations precede the individuals 
that relate, as each individual is who they become with their companion species. Haraway also 
argues that the multispecies becoming-with that makes up companion species relationships is a way 
of refusing human exceptionalism without invoking posthumanism. 
 
 
                                                          
11 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 17. 
12 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 19. 
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Posthumanism and the Bacterial 
The refusal of human exceptionalism is important to Haraway’s companion species, and is 
essential to my formulation and articulation of symbiosociality in this chapter. Phil MacNaghten and 
John Urry define the ‘doctrine of human exceptionalism’ as encompassing the following beliefs: 
that humans are fundamentally different from and superior to all species; that people can 
determine their own destinies, and learn whatever is necessary to achieve them; that the 
world is vast and presents unlimited opportunities [to humans]; and that the history of 
human society is one of unending progress.13 
McNaghton and Urry argue that human exceptionalism, and the implied juxtaposition of society and 
nature, ‘reached its fullest development in the nineteenth century in the “West”’, and state that: 
Nature came to be degraded into a realm of unfreedom and hostility that needed to be 
subdued and controlled. Modernity involved the belief that human progress should be 
measured and evaluated in terms of the domination of nature, rather than through any 
attempt to transform the relationship between humans and nature.14 
The doctrine of human exceptionalism, then, converges with what I described in Chapter One as an 
appropriationist approach to the relationship between human individuals and ‘nature’. Nature, in 
this approach, becomes solely a passive resource to be appropriated by the only true agents: 
humans. This links to Haraway’s feminist project, as she explicitly links the doctrine of human 
exceptionalism to androcentrism. She argues that, 
Humanity is a modernist figure; and this humanity has a generic face, a universal shape. 
Humanity’s face has been the face of man. Feminist humanity must have another shape, 
other gestures; but, I believe, we must have feminist figures of humanity [...] Feminist 
                                                          
13 Phil MacNaghten and John Urry, Contested Natures (London: Sage, 1998), p. 7. 
14 MacNaghten and Urry, Contested Natures, p. 7. 
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humanity must, somehow, both resist representation, resist literal figuration, and still erupt 
in powerful new tropes, new figures of speech, new turns of historical possibility.15  
Thinking beyond human exceptionalism (and specifically proposing feminist figures of humanity) is 
thus an important project for Haraway, and offers ways of thinking beyond androcentrism and 
patriarchy in science and society, as well as being an attempt at a transformation of the relationship 
between humans and ‘nature’.  
 This is, for Haraway, also a process of ‘other-worlding’. Haraway associates this idea of 
other-worlding with Beatriz Preciado’s expressions: autre-globalisation and autre-modialisation, as 
well as Isabelle Stenger’s cosmopolitics.16 For Haraway, companion species are always about worldly 
encounters; that is, the becoming-with of companion species relationships always emphasises the 
entanglement of the individual in worldly ecological biological-social networks. She argues that: 
To knot companion and species together in encounter, in regard and respect, is to enter the 
world of becoming with, where who and what are is precisely what is at stake. [...] Species 
interdependence is the name of the worlding game on earth, and that game must be one of 
response and respect.17  
For Haraway, species interdependence or entanglement is unavoidable; it is the name of the 
worlding game on earth. Not only this, but knotting companion and species together suggests 
possible other-worldings. My use of the term ‘more-than-human’ (often as an alternative to 
nonhuman that suggests a rather impenetrable barrier between human animals and ‘nonhuman’ 
animals) seeks to invoke this worldly becoming that is at the heart of companion species, and is 
                                                          
15 Donna Haraway, ‘Ecce Homo, Ain’t (Ar’n’t) I a Woman, and Inappropriate/d Others: The Human in a Post-
Humanist Landscape’, The Haraway Reader, ed. by Donna Haraway (New York and London: Routledge, 2004), 
pp. 47–61 (p. 47). This article was originally presented in 1989 at meetings of the American Anthropological 
Association. 
16 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 3. See also Isabelle Stengers, Cosmopolitics I, trans. by Robert Bononno 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2010). 
17 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 19. 
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never finished, but always open to difference, change, and other-worlding.18 This is especially 
important to my proposal that human health and flourishing – living well – is always entangled with 
worldly multispecies agencies. 
 At this point it is useful to explore Haraway’s use of figures. Figuration, for Haraway, is an 
important rhetorical practice and is ‘about resetting the stage for possible pasts and futures’.19 For 
Haraway, figuration represents a rhetorical strategy that offers radical possibilities of political 
change. Figures themselves are not immaterial but rather real and material entities that are also 
historically and culturally specific sites of meaning. As she argues: 
Figures are not representations or didactic illustrations, but rather material-semiotic nodes 
or knots in which diverse bodies and meaning co-shape one another. For me, figures have 
always been where the biological and literary or artistic come together with all the force of 
lived reality. My body itself is just such a figure, literally.20 
Examples of figures in Haraway’s work include the cyborg, gene, chip, bomb, foetus, and more 
recently companion species. These are not metaphors, but rather sites where the material and the 
semiotic, the biological and social, come together to produce bodies and meanings in a performative 
co-constitution. In this chapter, I am approaching the bacterial in a similar way. Bacteria do not 
function in my project as an immaterial metaphor; instead they are real material sites (or nodes, or 
knots) where the biological and social are co-constituted and produce and shape a diverse set of 
meanings and bodies, and contribute to transformations in more-than-human relationships. 
                                                          
18 Haraway adopts the phrase ‘more-than-human’ from Thom van Dooren’s ‘Seeding Property: Nature, 
Human/Plant Relations and the Production of Wealth’ (unpublished thesis, Australian National University, 
2007). Van Dooren’s published work on the more-than-human world includes ‘Terminated Seed: Death, 
Proprietary Kinship and the Production of (Bio)wealth’, Science as Culture, 16:1 (2007); ‘Inventing Seed: The 
Nature/s of Intellectual Property in Plants’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26:4 (2008); and 
‘Genetic Conservation in a Climate of Loss: Thinking with Val Plumwood’, Ecological Humanities in the 
Australian Humanities Review, 46 (2009). 
19 Haraway, ‘Ecce Homo’, p. 47. 
20 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 4. 
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There is a shift in Haraway’s work between ‘Ecce Homo’ and her work on companion 
species. Whereas in previous work she uses posthumanism as a useful way of thinking through 
possible alternatives to the modernist figure of humanity, and suggesting figures of feminist 
humanity, in her work on companion species she deliberately tries to avoid using posthumanism. In 
fact, Haraway sees companion species as a refusal of both human exceptionalism and 
posthumanism. She argues that,  
human/posthuman is much too easily appropriated by the blissed-out, ‘Let’s all be 
posthumanists and find our next teleological evolutionary stage in some kind of 
transhumanist techno-enhancement.’ Posthumanism is too easily appropriated to those 
kinds of projects for my taste. Lots of people doing posthumanist thinking, though, don’t do 
it that way. The reason I go to companion species is to get away from posthumanism.21 
Haraway sees posthumanism as being too easily associated with and appropriated by 
transhumanism – with a humanist project informed by teleological narratives of evolution and the 
use of technology to enhance the human and thus supporting the idea of the sovereign stable 
human subject. Her approach is to move away from posthumanism to companion species, with the 
focus on the more-than-human and the responsibility that the human bears for its kinship in 
multispecies relationships and becomings. 
A more equivocal approach to the issues involved in posthumanism and transhumanism can 
be found in the work of sociologist Richard Twine. Twine uses the tensions in the arguments and 
histories of different posthumanisms as a way to think about the ways in which ‘nature’ and ‘the 
human’ is conceptualised in genomics. In particular, he suggests that, ‘The various constellations of 
posthumanist thought are invested in rethinking the “human” albeit in different ways.’22 Twine 
                                                          
21 Nicholas Gane, ‘When We Have Never Been Human, What Is to Be Done? : Interview with Donna Haraway’, 
Theory, Culture and Society, 23:7–8 (2006), 135–158 (p. 140). 
22 Richard Twine, ‘Genomic Natures Read Through Posthumanisms’, The Sociological Review, 58 (2010), 175–
195 (p. 175). 
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outlines humanism in similar terms to MacNaghten and Urry’s articulation of human exceptionalism, 
describing critical posthumanism as a challenge to humanism’s ‘view of the “human” as the measure 
of all value, the axiomatic pinnacle of evolution, and the taken for granted mastery of other 
species’.23 Although Twine associates transhumanism with this ‘mastery of “nature” and celebration 
of the autonomous subject’, he proceeds to outline his methodological approach as ‘including 
transhumanism, critical posthumanisms and also antihumanism as all residing within the 
posthuman, speaking to a plural and partially overlapping terrain of posthumanisms’.24 Twine’s 
image of a ‘terrain’ of the posthuman (resonating with Haraway’s ‘post-humanist landscape’) is 
useful as it allows for an engagement with Haraway’s companion species, without necessarily 
abandoning critical posthumanism. I would align my approach with Twine’s, suggesting that the 
terrain of the posthuman can include critical posthumanism and companion species, without either 
being appropriated by a transhumanist project that simply reiterates the doctrine of human 
exceptionalism. Specifically I take a critical posthumanist approach, but one that explores the 
importance of the idea of ‘species’ as well as ideas of connection, kinship and companionship 
between the human and the more-than-human through the entanglement of the human and the 
bacterial. 
It is important to refuse human exceptionalism in my project for a number of reasons. 
Certain scientific controversies such as climate change – coupled with the extinction of human and 
nonhuman populations due to human activities such as deforestation – provide a striking example of 
the role of the human in more-than-human environmental phenomena.25 As well as environmental 
arguments, there is the question of how the nonhuman is used in science for human benefit. 
Thinking this question through thoroughly requires an ethics of the more-than-human, a politics 
                                                          
23 Twine, ‘Genomic Natures’, p. 180. 
24 Twine, ‘Genomic Natures’, p. 176. For further detail on what constitutes critical posthumanism, see Neil 
Badmington, ‘Theorizing Posthumanism’, Cultural Critique, 53 (2003), 10–27. 
25 See Deborah Bird Rose, ‘Love in the Time of Extinctions’, Australian Journal of Anthropology, 19:1 (2008), 
81–84. 
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beyond human exceptionalism. There is also a scientific argument to be made, that considering the 
human as the pinnacle of evolution obscures evolutionary science with unhelpful metaphors of 
progress. These metaphors of progress distort, as they locate the human in the more-than-human 
world, whilst simultaneously lifting the human above the nonhuman. This is particularly evident in 
work on non-animal life, as is my focus in this chapter. Bacteria have functioned as a model organism 
in science since the early twentieth century. Different bacteria (most significantly, E. coli) have been 
put to use in an attempt to solve human problems including those relating to health and disease. 
The bacterial ability to swap genes, along with E. coli’s long history being cultured in the lab and the 
ease with which it can be manipulated, has made it a model organism for the study of genetics. E. 
coli was integral in the work in the 1930s on recombinant DNA that became the foundation of 
modern biotechnology.26  
Currently, bacteria are used in the laboratory in the hopes of finding bacterial answers to 
very human problems.27 Bacteria are regularly used in experimental science where it would be 
considered unethical to use human subjects. This both suggests the proximity of bacteria and 
humans (otherwise E. coli’s role as model organism would be redundant) as well as drawing a clear 
ethical distinction between the two.28 This both acknowledges and attempts to ignore the bacterial 
ancestry of human bodies (a point that is key to my thesis, and to which I will return later in the 
chapter). This is also illustrated in the fact that bacteria generally fall outside animal rights discourse 
(as, taxonomically, bacteria are not animals), the academic discourse of animal studies and 
philosophical questions of human-animal relations. The importance of bacteria to biological sciences 
(in particular biochemistry, biotechnology and bioengineering) as well as the bacterial ancestry of 
                                                          
26 Eugene Russo, ‘The Birth of Biotechnology’, Nature, 421 (2003), 456–457. 
27 These include: producing human hormones such as insulin and a range of other pharmaceuticals, fuel, 
plastics, amino acids, and food; being used in bioremediation of polluted environments, water purification, 
and pest control; and being used as a model organism for the study of human evolution and disease. 
28 For an exploration of the epistemological function of model organisms and some of the issues involved in 
this, see Rachel A. Ankeny, ‘Wormy Logic: Model Organisms as Case-Based Reasoning’, Working Papers on The 
Nature of Evidence: How Well Do ‘Facts’ Travel? (2006) <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/22541/1/0706Ankeny.pdf> 
[accessed 28 February 2012]. 
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human physiology and the importance of bacterial processes (such as production of ATP by 
mitochondria and the production of enzymes in the gut for the digestion of food to be discussed in 
more detail later in the chapter) for human life call for a rethinking of human-bacterial boundaries in 
biology, philosophy and discourses of the animal. This rethinking of human-bacterial boundaries also 
offers possible rewards in the area of health care and medicine. An example of this approach in 
scientific practice is the Human Microbiome Project. Described as the ‘logical conceptual and 
experimental extension of the Human Genome Project’, the Human Microbiome Project proposes 
that the human body be thought of as a ‘supra-organism’ (a collection of organisms that function as 
an organic whole, such as an ant colony).29 Peter J. Turnbaugh and others suggest that applying this 
approach to genomic science demands the sequencing of the genetic material from all the 
organisms that make up the human body, referred to as the microbiome. Specifically, they claim that 
the Human Microbiome Project can have positive effects on personal medicine (in particular for the 
treatment of malnourishment, obesity, autoimmune disorders, and some cancers) as well as 
providing answers to ‘some of the most inspiring, vexing and fundamental scientific questions 
today’.30 It is, of course, important not to frame the bacterial as passive resource or non-agential 
object for the improvement of the human subject. (Bacteria clearly demonstrate their agency in 
relation to health practices in the example of bacteria’s – including in particular human gut 
microbiota – increasing resistance to antibiotic medicine.)31 Rather, I propose an approach that 
recognises bacteria as agential and which emphasises the symbiotic (and what I will come to call 
‘symbiosocial’) entanglement of all life, but in particular the co-constitution of the human and the 
bacterial.  
 
                                                          
29 Turnbaugh and others, ‘The Human Microbiome Project’, p. 804. 
30 Turnbaugh and others, ‘The Human Microbiome Project’, p. 805, p. 804. 
31 See Abigail A. Salyers, Anamika Gupta and Yanping Wang, ‘Human Intestinal Bacteria as Reservoirs for 
Antibiotic Resistance Genes’, Trends in Microbiology, 12:9 (2004), 412–416. 
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Symbiogenesis 
 Haraway’s ‘world of becoming with’ through species interdependence suggests that the 
human is necessarily involved in more-than-human networks of regard, respect and responsibility. 
As anthropologist Anna Tsing argues: ‘Human nature is an interspecies relationship’.32 Haraway 
suggests that becoming with the more-than-human converges with the scientific theories of Lynn 
Margulis, who has written extensively on symbiosis in evolution. Haraway focuses on ‘one kind of 
transformative merger practice’ in theories of symbiogenesis: failed digestion.33  
Trying to make a living, critters eat critters but can only partly digest one another. Quite a lot 
of indigestion, not to mention excretion, is the natural result, some of which is the vehicle 
for new sorts of complex patternings of ones and manys in entangled association.34 
Failed digestion is just one kind of transformative merger practice; Haraway states that ‘critters form 
consortia in a baroque medley of inter- and intra-actions’.35 Haraway employs Karen Barad’s term 
‘intra-action’ here to stress the performative and entangled nature of these symbiotic relationships 
and the identities that emerge. Haraway states: 
Yoking together all the way down is what sym-bio-genesis means [...] It is turtles all the way 
down; the partners do not pre-exist their constitutive intra-action at every folded layer of 
time and space. These are the contagions and infections that wound the primary narcissism 
                                                          
32 Anna Tsing, ‘Unruly Edges: Mushrooms as Companion Species’, Party Writing for Donna Haraway! (2010) 
<http://tsingmushrooms.blogspot.com/> [accessed 30 November 2011] (para 9 of 35). 
33 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 31. 
34 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 31. 
35 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 31. Haraway explains her use of the term critter: ‘I use the idiomatic term 
critter to mean a motley crowd of lively beings including microbes, fungi, humans, plants, aminals, cyborgs and 
aliens. Critters are always relationally entangled rather than taxonomically neat’ (When Species Meet, p. 330 n. 
33). See also Jeffrey J. Williams, ‘Donna Haraway’s Critters’, The Chronicle Review, 18 October 2009 
<http://chronicle.com/article/A-Theory-of-Critters-/48802/> [accessed 12 December 2011]. 
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of those who still dream of human exceptionalism. These are also the cobblings together 
that give meaning to the ‘becoming with’ of companion species in naturecultures.36 
Margulis’s work, first on the endosymbiotic theory of cell evolution and then on symbiogenesis as 
the main mechanism by which evolutionary novelty is created, is important for considering 
Haraway’s companion species, and for thinking human-bacterial relations as a performative 
becoming-with the more-than-human. 
 Although previous scholars had suggested endosymbiotic theories as early as 1905, Margulis 
formalised and substantiated this theory in her 1967 article, ‘On the Origin of Mitosing Cells’.37 In 
this article, Margulis suggests that eukaryotic cells (cells with a membrane-bound nucleus) 
originated through the merger of previously free-living prokaryotic cells (cells lacking a nucleus). In 
particular, she hypothesises in the article that mitochondria, the basal bodies (organelles that form 
the bases of the flagella), and the photosynthetic plastids (such as chloroplasts in plants) can all be 
‘considered to have derived from free-living cells, and the eukaryotic cell is the result of the 
evolution of ancient symbioses’.38 Margulis suggests that mitochondria – organelles within the 
eukaryotic cell that have distinct DNA and are involved in the production of adenosine triphosphate 
(ATP), a source of chemical energy – were once non-nucleated prokaryotes that survived absorption 
by another cell. The surviving prokaryote’s (now defined as an endosymbiont, a symbiotic organism 
                                                          
36 Haraway, When Species Meet, pp. 31–32. The phrase ‘turtles all the way down’ refers to the problem of 
infinite regress. The ‘turtles all the way down’ story was popularised in Stephen Hawking’s A Brief History of 
Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes (London: Bantam, 1988) in which he wrote: ‘A well-known scientist 
(some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He described how the earth orbits 
around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. 
At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: "What you have told us is 
rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise." The scientist gave a superior 
smile before replying, "What is the tortoise standing on?" "You're very clever, young man, very clever," said 
the old lady. "But it's turtles all the way down!"’ (p. 1). For an investigation of infinite regress in epistemology, 
see Yair Neuman, ‘Turtles All the Way Down: Outlines for a Dynamic Theory of Epistemology’, Systems 
Research and Behavioral Science, 20:6 (2002), 521–30. Neuman suggests that the most basic unit of 
epistemology is always a process of self-referential differentiation. Haraway argues that the weakness of 
Neuman’s argument is the reliance on self-referentiality: ‘The self-referential part is the trouble. I want an 
idiom for both–and: “self-other referential” all the way down.’ (When Species Meet, pp. 315–16 n. 41). 
37 Lynn Margulis [published as Lynn Sagan], ‘On the Origin of Mitosing Cells’, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 
14:3 (1967), 255–274.  
38 Margulis, ‘On the Origin of Mitosing Cells’, p. 226. 
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living within a host) ability to provide energy through respiration provided the host cell with an 
evolutionary advantage. Similarly, chloroplasts – organelles that convert carbon dioxide into organic 
compounds including sugars using energy from sunlight – are thought to have once been 
photosynthesising prokaryotes that survived absorption. Like the mitochondria, chloroplasts offered 
their host cells an evolutionary advantage through the production of energy. Margulis suggests that 
this originary absorption and symbiosis happened somewhere between 2.7 and 1.2 billion years ago, 
due to geological evidence that poisonous oxygen began to flourish in the atmosphere during this 
time.39 Although not accepted at the time they were published, Margulis’s theories on the origins of 
mitochondria and chloroplasts have since become widely accepted.40 It is important to understand 
Margulis’s original proposal as it structures all her following scientific work, as well as Haraway’s 
work on companion species. It also demonstrates the bacterial ancestry of parts of the human cell 
which is an essential part of my argument in this chapter. 
Margulis has subsequently developed this theory and published widely on endosymbiosis, 
and her theory of symbiogenesis.41 Symbiosis refers to long-term stable physical and behavioural 
association of different types of organisms. Symbiogenesis refers to a long-term stable symbiosis 
                                                          
39 Margulis, ‘On the Origin of Mitosing Cells’, p. 226. 
40 Other scientists have recognised Margulis’s refusal to give up on her endosymbiotic theory against the 
prevailing paradigm science of the time. Richard Dawkins stated: ‘I greatly admire Lynn Margulis's sheer 
courage and stamina in sticking by the endosymbiosis theory, and carrying it through from being an 
unorthodoxy to an orthodoxy. I'm referring to the theory that the eukaryotic cell is a symbiotic union of 
primitive prokaryotic cells. This is one of the great achievements of twentieth-century evolutionary biology, 
and I greatly admire her for it.’ (Quoted in Margulis, ‘Gaia is a Tough Bitch’, The Third Culture: Beyond the 
Scientific Revolution [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995], pp. 129–146 [p. 129]). 
41 Margulis expanded her ‘On the Origin of Mitosing Cells’ article into a book: The Origin of Eukaryotic Cells 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970). The Origin of Eukaryotic Cells was subsequently expanded and 
republished as Symbiosis in Cell Evolution: Life and its Environment on the Early Earth, currently in its second 
edition (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1981). Margulis describes this book as her ‘life’s work’ (Margulis, ‘Gaia is 
a Tough Bitch’, p. 136). For further articulation of Margulis’s symbiogenesis theory, see Margulis, ‘Big Trouble 
in Biology: Physiological Autopoiesis versus Mechanistic neo-Darwinism’, in Slanted Truths: Essays on Gaia, 
Symbiosis, and Evolution, eds. Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1997); Lynn 
Margulis, Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution (Amherst, MA: Perseus, 1998); Lynn Margulis and Rene 
Fester, Symbiosis as a Source of Evolutionary Innovation: Speciation and Morphogenesis (Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press, 1991); Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, Acquiring Genomes: A Theory of the Origins of Species (New 
York: Basic, 2002); and Lynn Margulis and Karlene Schwartz, Five Kingdoms: An Illustrated Guide to the Phyla of 
Life on Earth, 3rd edn (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1998). 
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that leads to evolutionary change.42 Symbiogenesis theory emphasises the creative force of 
symbiosis. Free-living organisms are usually considered the object of natural selection; however, if 
two individuals form a close enough symbiotic relationship the association of organisms – or 
assemblage – can become the target of selection. For example, certain animals have acquired 
photosynthetic symbionts, just as did the eukaryotes that became plants.43 Examples include the 
green sea slug Elysia viridis, whose ancestors failed to digest certain green algae which now 
permanently reside in the slug’s tissue. Adult green sea slugs do not gain their energy from 
digestion, but rather from sunlight, in much the same way as plants do. As Margulis states: ‘Green 
animals provide graphic examples of symbioses that lead to symbiogenesis.’44 Margulis argues that 
symbiosis is actually the primary mechanism of evolutionary novelty and speciation, rather than the 
gradual accrual of genetic mutation and variation. Margulis and Sagan describe their approach as 
‘Darwinism not neodarwinism’.45 Margulis and Sagan argue that ‘random mutation, a small part of 
the evolutionary saga, has been dogmatically overemphasised’ in paradigmatic neo-Darwinism.46 
Symbiogenesis is not anti-Darwinian; on the contrary, ‘symbiogenetic acquisition of new traits by 
inheritance of acquired genomes is rather an extension, a refinement, an amplification of Darwin’s 
idea’.47 The ancestors of Elysia viridis failed to digest green algae which provided the slug with an 
evolutionary advantage – the ability to gain energy directly from sunlight. The strong and stable 
symbiotic merger of slug and algae became the target of selection, or – for the purposes of natural 
selection – the individual. Slugs with the evolutionary advantage were selected for and produced 
more offspring, whereas those without did not. Margulis argues that this example of symbiogenesis 
                                                          
42 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 12. 
43 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 207. The word ‘assemblage’ has Deleuzian connotations that I will 
not be exploring in this chapter. For assemblages in Deleuze’s theory, see Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s A 
Thousand Plateaus, trans. Brian Massumi (London: Continuum, 2004 [1984]). A Thousand Plateaus also 
includes Deleuze and Guattari’s engagement with the animal. For Haraway’s critique of Deleuze and Guatteri’s 
argument see When Species Meet, pp. 27–30. In my use of the term ‘assemblage’, I am following Margulis’s 
use, as well as biologists Ruth E. Ley and others, whose work on gut microbiota I will be discussing later in the 
chapter. 
44 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 13. 
45 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, pp. 3–33.  
46 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 15. 
47 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 15. 
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is not an anomaly, but rather illustrates the fact that symbiosis is the major force of novelty and 
speciation in evolution. Importantly, this approach emphasises the role of natural selection, but 
deemphasises random variation and mutation – Darwinism, but not neo-Darwinism. 
 It is important to note that Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis does not simply suggest that 
metaphors of competition should be replaced with cooperation. For Margulis, these are both 
imperfect metaphors that do not successfully represent the complexity of biological and 
evolutionary processes. Social analyses that favour symbiotic cooperation over neo-Darwinian 
competition include Peter Kropotkin’s Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution.48 Published in 1902, Mutual 
Aid was part of a tradition of Russian evolutionary thought that emphasised symbiosis and 
cooperation over competition and struggle.49 Written in response to the social Darwinism of the late 
nineteenth century, Kropotkin argues that competition is overemphasised in evolutionary and social 
accounts and cooperation (or mutual aid) is the most important factor in the evolution and 
development of species and society. In contrast, Margulis argues that competition and cooperation 
are both insufficient terms: 
The time has come in serious biology to abandon words like competition, cooperation, and 
selfish genes and replace them with meaningful terms such as metabolic modes 
(chemoautotrophy, photosynthesis), ecological relations (epibiont, pollinator), and 
measurable quantities (light, heat, mechanical force). So many current evolutionary 
metaphors are superficial dichotomizations that come from false clarities of language. They 
do not beget but preclude scientific understanding.50 
                                                          
48 Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (London: William Heinemann, 1904 [1902]). 
49 For an example of Russian work on symbiosis and evolution see Boris Mikhaylov Kozo-Polyansky, 
Symbiogenesis, trans. by Victor Fet, ed. by Victor Fet and Lynn Margulis, and introduced by Peter H. Raven 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010). This book translates Kozo-Polyansky’s 1924 work, as well as 
providing commentary on which parts of his work can be translated into modern scientific terms, and which 
statements do not hold up alongside contemporary science. 
50 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, pp. 16–17. 
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For Margulis, symbiosis is not about cooperation rather than competition, as both of these terms are 
too closely linked to economic metaphors of cost and benefit: ‘Symbiosis has nothing to do with cost 
or benefit. The benefit/cost people have perverted the science with invidious economic analogies.’51 
Metaphors of competition and cooperation are both abstractions and do not aid scientific 
understanding, but rather obscure the biological complexity of evolutionary processes. I would link 
this to my discussion of scarcity and competition for resources and their relation to patriarchy in 
Chapter One. 
Species Problems 
 One of Margulis’s main arguments with neo-Darwinism is its focus on organisms ‘big like us’, 
in particular animals – a phenomenon she names ‘zoocentrism’.52 Margulis and Sagan define the 
features of zoocentrism thus: 
Preoccupation with animals, including humans, as if animals were the main organisms in 
existence, and/or the only ones worthy of study. Great disregard for members of the other 
four kingdoms of life, dismissal of them as ‘lower’ forms, ignores the major impact that 
these four kingdoms have upon members of the animal kingdom and Earth’s ecosystems.53 
In Five Kingdoms: An Illustrated Guide to the Phyla of Life on Earth, Margulis and Schwartz describe 
the history of the classification of life on earth, stating that from Aristotelian classifications to the 
middle of the twentieth century, life was generally divided into two kingdoms: plant and animal.54 
Scientific developments, particularly in electron-microscopy and biochemistry, led to a proposal of a 
                                                          
51 Margulis, ‘Gaia is a Tough Bitch’, p. 135 
52 For en elaboration of the ‘big like us’ approach, see Myra J. Hird, The Origins of Sociable Life: Evolution after 
Science Studies (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), pp. 21–26. I find the phrase ‘big like us’ useful as it 
illustrates the anthropocentrism that is inherent in zoocentrism. 
53 Margulis and Saga, Acquiring Genomes, p. 217. 
54 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 6. 
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five-kingdom classificatory system by Robert Whittaker in 1959. Margulis uses this system of five 
kingdoms throughout her work:  
Briefly, our five kingdoms are Bacteria (with its two subkingdoms, Archae and Eubacteria), 
Protoctista (algae, protozoa, slime molds, and other less-known aquatic and parasitic 
organisms), Animalia (animals with or without backbones), Fungi (mushrooms, molds and 
yeasts), and Plantae (mosses, ferns, and other spore- and seed-bearing plants).55 
Alternatives to the five-kingdom system include Carl Woese’s system of three domains: ‘two 
domains (Archaea and Bacteria) consisting of prokaryotic cells and one domain (Eukarya) containing 
all other organisms’.56 Margulis favours the five kingdom system as it emphasises the importance of 
symbiogenesis ‘as the major source of innovation in the evolution of eukaryotes’.57 Also, Margulis 
argues that the three-domain system is based solely on molecular sequencing, whereas each 
kingdom in the five-kingdom system can be ‘uniquely defined by using all features of the whole 
organism – molecular, morphological and developmental’.58 The five-kingdom system offers 
Margulis a scheme that recognises the importance of symbiogenesis, as well as one that attempts to 
avoid the reductionism that occurs in classificatory systems that focus solely on the molecular and 
ignore morphological and developmental traits. It is not my intention to comment on the scientific 
legitimacy of this or any other form of taxonomic classification; rather, I include it here to draw 
attention to the intellectual and practical labour that goes into making the agential cuts that 
produce taxonomy. 
 Scientists use a system of binomial nomenclature at the level of species, a practice that was 
established by Carl Linnaeus in the eighteenth century. (Species are grouped into genera, genera 
into families, families into orders, orders into classes, classes into phyla, phyla into kingdoms.) The 
                                                          
55 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 7. 
56 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 7. 
57 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 9. 
58 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 9. 
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first part of the name represents the genus, and the second refers to the species within the genus. 
Margulis and Schwartz give the example of three species of the Acer genus, the maple tree: Acer 
saccharum, the sugar maple; Acer nigrum, the black maple; and Acer rubrum, the red maple.59 In 
1942, biologist Ernst Mayr wrote that ‘species are groups of actually or potentially interbreeding 
natural populations, which are reproductively isolated from other such groups’.60 This is generally 
known as the Biological Species Concept, which defines species as groups of organisms that can 
reproduce with each other and are unable to reproduce with organisms of other populations. There 
are many other species concepts, but the Biological Species Concept is generally the concept used by 
zoologists, and is useful for botanists as well.61 However, this species concept is limited when applied 
to the kingdoms Animalia, Fungi and Protoctista, as it favours organisms that reproduce through 
sexual reproduction (the terms ‘sex’ and ‘reproduction’ will be considered in more detail later). W. 
Ford Doolittle and R. Thane Papke suggest that ‘the exercise of formulating a useful “species 
definition” and the quest for an underlying “species concept” are not the exactly same [sic]’.62 
Speaking of bacterial species problems, Doolittle and Papke argue that a species definition must 
provide a ‘set of easily applied and stable rules by which to decide when two organisms are similar 
enough in their genomic and/or phenotypic properties to be given the same name’, whereas a 
species concept should provide ‘a genetic and/or ecological model of bacterial diversification and 
adaptation’.63 They argue that, ideally, the species concept ‘would make sense of our definition, 
justifying the choice of one particular set of rules for defining species as less arbitrary, or more 
natural, than another’.64 A unifying species concept would be one that would fit with species 
definition, and reveal a ‘natural’ and ‘objective’ definition of species. As Doolittle and Papke state, 
                                                          
59 Margulis and Schwartz, Five Kingdoms, p. 3. 
60 Ernst Mayr, Systematics and the Origin of Species (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942), p. 120. 
61 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, pp. 4–5. 
62 W. Ford Doolittle and R. Thane Papke, ‘Genomics and the Bacterial Species Problem’, Genome Biology, 7:9 
(2006), 116. 
63 Doolittle and Papke, ‘Genomics and the Bacterial Species Problem’, p. 116. 
64 Doolittle and Papke, ‘Genomics and the Bacterial Species Problem’, p. 116. 
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however: ‘The more we learn about genomes, however, the more unlikely it seems that any unifying 
species concept will be possible.’65  
 Margulis and Sagan argue for a symbiogenetic species concept, based on a traditional 
morphological model. Importantly, this model is based on how an organism looks. As noted by 
Haraway earlier: ‘The Latin specere is at the root of things here, with its tones of “to look” and “to 
behold”.’66 The morphological species concept assumes that organisms can be meaningfully grouped 
into species based on observable morphological similarities. Margulis and Sagan argue that the 
‘morphological species [...] is the external manifestation of the symbiogenetic species’.67 Margulis 
and Sagan elaborate their symbiogenetic species definition as follows: 
We suggest that if organism A belongs to the same species as organism B, then both are 
composed of the same set of integrated genomes, both qualitatively and quantitatively. All 
organisms that can be assigned to a unique species are products of symbiogenesis. That is, 
because A and B share the same number of the same different kinds of integrated genomes 
that are assigned to the same species.68 
Margulis and Sagan argue that the Biological Species Concept should be renamed the ‘zoological-
botanical concept of species’, as it only applies to those animals and plants that reproduce 
sexually.69 Bacteria prompt Doolittle and Papke to suggest the necessity of redefining species 
concepts, while they prompt Margulis and Sagan to suggest that they simply do not have species, 
and that the traditional morphological model is adequate. Crucially, the species problems discussed 
in this section illustrate the taxonomic difficulties posed by bacteria. If companion species 
frameworks are to work with human-bacterial entanglements, as is my proposal in this chapter, then 
they must inherit this difficulty, and not offer a simplistic view of the work of the term ‘species’. This 
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67 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 6. 
68 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 6. 
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also goes some way to support Haraway’s claim in Modest_Witness that kinship relations can both 
support and breach ideas of ‘natural’ limits. Bacteria draw attention to the problems inherent to 
taxonomic classificatory practices. They both emphasise and problematise the theory and practice of 
boundary-making in biological science.  
Horizontal Gene Transfer 
 Another way that bacteria complicate species boundaries is through the phenomenon of 
horizontal gene transfer. Horizontal (or lateral) gene transfer is the process whereby organisms 
obtain genetic material, or even whole genomes, through horizontal rather than vertical inheritance. 
That is, an organism gains genetic material from another organism, rather than from an ancestor. At 
this point, it is important to be clear about some of Margulis and Sagan’s terms – in particular the 
difference between sex and reproduction. In Origins of Sex, Margulis and Sagan define sex as 
follows: 
By sex we mean a process characteristic of live organisms only: the complex set of 
phenomena that produces a genetically new individual, an individual that contains genes 
(genetic material, DNA) from more than one single source [...] It is crucial to understand that 
sex as the production of genetically new beings from different parents has nothing 
necessarily to do with reproduction, often an entirely different process.70 
They define reproduction and explain the crucial difference between this process and sex: 
Reproduction is an increase in the number of individuals. Whereas sex means the mixing of 
genetic sources, reproduction means copying resulting in the creation of additional live 
beings. Beings can be both new in the sexual sense and additional in the reproductive sense, 
                                                          
70 Lynn Margulis and Dorion Sagan, Origins of Sex: Three Billion Years of Genetic Recombination (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1986), p. 9. 
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in which case they are members of a sexually reproducing species. But this need not be the 
case.71 
Margulis and Sagan argue that the focus on sexual reproduction and the assumption that sex and 
reproduction are necessarily linked is zoocentric. This is crucial for my argument in this chapter, 
linking scientific classification with social theories of gender and sexuality. As Margulis and Sagan 
emphasise: ‘Most organisms in the world in fact reproduce asexually, whether they sexually 
recombine or not.’72 Furthermore, sexual reproduction is relatively recent, in evolutionary terms, 
starting only 300 million years ago.73 Sex is not necessarily reproduction: the phenomenon of 
horizontal gene transfer results in mixed genetic material, but no increase in the number of 
organisms. Reproduction can also occur without a mixing of genetic material, for instance the 
reproduction of a new organism from one asexual member of the genus Amoebae.74 
 Horizontal gene transfer and bacterial sex problematises bacterial species distinctions, as 
there is seemingly no reproductive isolation among different species of bacteria. Bacterial species 
groups can be suggested based on common features, but these groupings are contingent and 
constantly changing due to the transfer and swapping of genes. As Margulis and Sagan state: 
Bacteria pass genes back and forth. All can simply reproduce, and thus at any given time 
have but a single parent. The intervention of sex, the formation of a new bacterium with 
genes from more than a single source is a unidirectional affair. The genes pass from a donor 
                                                          
71 Margulis and Sagan, Origins of Sex, p. 9. 
72 Margulis and Sagan, Origins of Sex, p. 9.  
73 J. L. Mackay, ‘Why Have Sex?’, British Medical Journal, 322:7286 (2001), 623. Margulis and Sagan describe 
the familiar mammalian form of sexual reproduction as ‘a very late and special variation on a far more general 
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noting that from a symbiogenetic point of view, rather than a zoocentric one, sex is hardly ubiquitous, and 
sexual reproduction (which is what Schecter means by ‘sex’ in this article) is certainly not. 
74 Margulis and Sagan, Origins of Sex, p. 10. 
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individual to a recipient ... but donors can change to recipients and vice versa in minutes. 
Furthermore the gene swapping is entirely optional. If a bacterium can survive and grow 
under conditions in which it finds itself, sex is dispensable at all times. Indeed bacteria are 
willing and able to ‘have sex’ with naked DNA molecules that they absorb from the water in 
which they are bathed.75 
Bacterial features are contingent, and depend upon a history of opportunistic gene-swapping in 
response to environmental pressures. As noted above, Doolittle and Papke attempt to alter the 
criteria by which bacterial species are defined, in order to make the taxonomic concept of species fit 
with the biological reality of the microbiological. Margulis and Sagan take a different approach, 
arguing after Sorin Sonea and Léo G. Matthieu that ‘bacteria do not have species at all (or, which 
amounts to the same thing, all of them together constitute one single cosmopolitan species)’.76 This 
view fits with Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis:  
Since no bacterium (whether eubacterium or archaebacterium) evolved from symbiotic 
integration of formerly independent cells, bacteria lack species; the process of speciation 
began with the earliest eukaryotes (the first protists, or organisms with nuclei).77 
The behaviour and contingent morphological features of bacteria problematises species boundaries. 
Among the findings of the microbiological sciences, the widespread practice of horizontal gene 
transfer – the sharing of genetic material among bacteria in close proximity – further problematises 
the attempt to designate fixed bacterial species boundaries. 
 Horizontal gene transfer, and what Margulis and Sagan call the ‘prokaryotic brand of sex’, 
are essential to the symbiogenetic theory of the origin of life and the evolution of species.78 Margulis 
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and Sagan argue that ‘bacteria-style sex’ was important in the Archean Eon to respond to 
environmental changes and emergencies, and essential in the evolution of nucleated cells, ‘as a way 
of genetically “locking” together symbiotic mergers between very different organisms’.79 This locking 
together of symbiotic mergers problematises any attempt to create a universal ‘tree of life’. (I will 
return to the practices of constructing phylogenies, or trees of life, in the following chapter.) For 
now, it is important to stress that sex and reproduction are not necessarily linked and not all genetic 
inheritance is vertical. The over-emphasis on sexual reproduction is a zoocentric view of the many 
and complex ways that organisms have historically transformed and gained new genetic material, 
and how this process continues today. It is also important to note that in this chapter I will be 
referring to bacterial species, while keeping in mind the difficulties that bacteria pose to the process 
of taxonomic classification. I am using bacterial species (rather than ‘strains’ for example) to 
emphasise the contingent nature of all taxonomic practice, and to inherit what could be called 
‘species trouble’ into my symbiosocial account of more-than-human kinship and multispecies 
becoming-with. As Haraway argues, ‘Species is about the dance linking kin and kind.’80 Bacterial 
species illustrate the entanglement and negotiation – or dance – linking more-than-human kinship 
and the classification practices that define biological kinds. 
The Human Body as an Ecosystem 
 The ability of bacteria to share genetic material is particularly evident in the genetic make-up 
of the bacteria that permanently live inside the human alimentary tract, or gut. These gut bacteria 
(or ‘human gut microbiota’) supply the human body with energy from food through the production 
of carbohydrate active enzymes, or CAZymes. Specifically, gut bacteria produce enzymes absent 
from the human genome, which allow humans to gain energy from polysaccharides in terrestrial 
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153 
 
plants.81 As Ruth E. Ley and others emphasise, these plants have dominated diet throughout human 
evolution. Ley and other’s research demonstrates the symbiotic relationship between human and 
bacteria, through a comparison of ‘the bacterial assemblages that are associated with humans and 
other mammals, metazoa and free-living microbial communities that span a range of 
environments’.82 Importantly, this research emphasises the consequences this symbiotic relationship 
has had on bacterial, as well as human evolution. They state that their ‘analyses indicate that gut-
associated microbiotas are profoundly different from other free-living microbiotas from across the 
biosphere’.83 The symbiotic co-evolution of human and gut bacteria has shaped the morphology and 
behaviour of both humans and gut bacteria. Neither is viable without the other; human gut 
microbiota have evolved to live in the specific environment of the human gut, while humans have 
evolved to depend upon food that could not be fully digested without this specific internal symbiotic 
community.  
 The community of human gut microbiota is also a site of gene sharing among symbiotic and 
non-symbiotic bacteria, illustrating bacteria’s ability to use horizontal gene transfer to ‘their’ and 
‘our’ advantage (the distinction is often hard to make – a point which has consequences for health 
practices and scientific research such as the Human Microbiome Project). Research into the diversity 
of gut microbiota in humans has discovered that the array of CAZymes in gut microbes is highly 
diverse.84 Jan-Hendrik Hehemann and others used comparative gut metagenome analyses to 
research the possibility that ‘this diversity evolved by acquiring new genes from microbes living 
outside the gut’.85 In their analyses they characterised enzymes from a particular species of marine 
bacteria which live with marine red algae of the genus Porphyra. Importantly, their research 
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demonstrates that genes coding for the enzymes that specifically aid digestion of Porphyra algae 
have been transferred to a particular gut bacterium isolated from Japanese individuals. Hehemann 
and others show that these CAZymes and the genes that code for them are frequent in the Japanese 
population and are absent from North American individuals. They suggest that nori seaweed makes 
a large contribution to daily diet in Japan, and hypothesise: 
seaweeds with associated marine bacteria may have been the route by which these novel 
CAZymes were acquired in human gut bacteria, and [...] contact with non-sterile food may 
be a general factor in CAZyme diversity in human gut microbes.86  
Human digestion is dependent upon the diversity of enzymes produced by the population of 
microbiota living in the gut. This community of bacteria, living in a symbiotic relationship with and 
within the human body, illustrates the importance of horizontal gene transfer to both bacterial and 
human life. Genes for an enzyme that specifically targets Porphyra have been transferred laterally 
into the genome of a bacterium in the gut of Japanese but not North American individuals. The 
example of human gut microbiota illustrates that human living and digestion is dependent upon 
multiple genomes, and that these genomes are not just inherited vertically. This demonstrates that 
the multispecies (or more-than-human) community commonly thought of as a human individual eats 
well (and lives well), to a large extent, due to the bacterial phenomenon of horizontal gene transfer. 
 It is my argument that, based on the scientific research just discussed, the human body can 
be thought of as an emergent multispecies assemblage. The essential process of human digestion is, 
in fact, a co-evolved multispecies phenomenon. Gut microbiota illustrate the boundary breakdown 
between ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ within the traditional boundary of the human.87 This is further 
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complicated by Margulis’s research on the endosymbiotic origin of organelles within the human cell. 
Margulis’s theory that organelles, in particular mitochondria, are bacterial in origin (a theory borne 
out by research made possible by recent advances in genome sequencing technology) makes it 
impossible to make a distinction between human and bacteria, even at the level of the cell.88 As 
sociologist Myra J. Hird states, ‘animals are, both ancestrally and currently, literally made up of 
bacteria’.89 Hird’s approach is useful as she emphasises the need to recognise the agential nature of 
bacteria as well as the difficulty of making the agential cut between human and nonhuman. She 
emphasises that, 
my encounter with bacteria must somehow recognize that bacteria do precede my relating 
with them. It must also somehow recognize that ‘I’ am bacteria, that bacteria are us [...] The 
animal cell, typically understood as the smallest unit of structure and function, is already a 
symbiont.90  
Human cells are bacterial in origin and human living and digesting is made possible by bacteria. It is 
impossible to separate the human from the bacterial, either in the context of evolutionary ancestry 
or in the context of the current response of the human organism to its environment. It is important 
to stress, however, that although bacteria do precede the human in evolutionary terms, in my 
performative account neither the human nor the bacterial (in contemporary terms) precede their 
relating: both are co-constituted and co-shaped in their biological-social intra-action. 
 This symbiogenetic view of the human, which Hird describes as ‘thinking (with) bacteria’, 
prompts a rethinking of the body.91 Specifically, symbiogenesis and becoming-with the bacterial 
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redefines the human body as an assemblage. Margulis and Sagan draw attention to the fact that this 
redefinition of the body opens up a number of questions: 
The idea that people are really walking assemblages, beings who have integrated various 
other kinds of organisms – that each of us is a sort of loose committee – opens up too many 
challenging speculations. When ‘the committee’ gets sick, is simply a single animal getting 
sick, or is illness more a rearrangement of the members? We imagine that pathogenic 
microbes attack us, but if such pathogens are part of the committee that makes up each of 
us to begin with, isn’t health less a question of resistance to invasion from the outside and 
much more an issue of ecological relationships among committee members? Yes.92 
The human body is an ecology at the level of bodily functions such as digestion as well as at the level 
of the cell. Thinking of the human body as an ecology, assemblage, or committee prompts a 
rethinking of the relationship of the human to the microbiological. Crucially, it encourages thinking 
of relationships with microbiological organisms outside the frame of pathogenesis. The ecological 
more-than-human body is necessarily a network of kinship relations that precede the agential cuts 
that produce recognisable human and bacterial ‘individuals’. As Hird states, ‘“I” am bacteria [...] 
bacteria are us’. 
Human-Bacterial Kinship 
Thinking with bacteria, and conceptualising human-bacterial kinship relations poses certain 
difficulties. The prevalence of zoocentrism, along with ‘big like us’ approaches, in the study of the 
more-than-human and multispecies relationships makes conceptualising kinship relationships 
between the human and bacterial difficult. For this reason, I will discuss some work from gender and 
sexuality studies that can help conceptualise more-than-human kinship. In particular I am focussing 
on Judith Butler’s work on the performative nature of kinship relations and Michael Warner’s work 
                                                          
92 Margulis and Sagan, Acquiring Genomes, p. 19. 
157 
 
on non-familial kinship and the importance of horizontality in the formation of kinship relations and 
communities. Both of these theorists are important to my argument in this chapter as they help to 
think of kinship beyond choice and voluntarism, suggesting that significant and meaningful kinship 
relations are not necessarily chosen; rather, individuals are always already involved in a number of 
different relations, are in fact co-constituted by these necessary and obligate relationships. 
Feminist and queer scholars have suggested that traditional models of familial kinship – that 
is, Western heterobiological models of the nuclear family – are inadequate to describe or account 
for human relations and intimacy.93 Judith Butler argues that:  
If we understand kinship as a set of practices that institutes relationships of various kinds 
which negotiate the reproduction of life and the demands of death, then kinship practices 
will be those that emerge to address fundamental forms of human dependency, which may 
include birth, child-rearing, relations of emotional dependency and support, generational 
ties, illness, dying, and death (to name a few).94 
Through an exploration of, and critical engagement with, traditional anthropological kinship models, 
Butler emphasises this performative nature of kinship. Crucially, for Butler, kinship is a set of 
practices – a doing that enacts its own assemblage of significations.95 Kinship relations are enacted 
through the practices of human intimacy and dependency. In her performative account of kinship, 
‘not all kinship relations last, but whatever relations qualify for kinship enter into a norm or a 
convention that has some durability, and that norm acquires its durability through being reinstated 
time and again’.96 Kinship is a set of practices that create enduring and significant relationships. 
Importantly for Butler, it is the repetition and reiteration of norms that produce kinship relations 
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through their enactment. Butler uses debates surrounding gay marriage to argue against reducing 
sexuality to the parameters of kinship, and reducing kinship to marital and familial relations. For 
Butler, although rights to marriage, adoption and reproductive technologies should be secured for 
individuals outside of the frame of marital kinship, if marriage and the family define the parameters 
within which sexual life could be thought then this would be a drastic curtailment of sexual politics.97  
Queer scholar Michael Warner also discusses the debates around gay marriage in terms of 
kinship in The Trouble with Normal, published in 1999. For Warner, traditional models of kinship do 
not adequately allow for the kinds of performative, shifting and non-normative kinship relations he 
sees at work in the gay community. Warner states: 
There are almost as many kinds of relationship as there are people in combination. Where 
there are patterns, we learn them from other queers, not from our parents or schools or the 
state. Between tricks and lovers and exes and friends and fuckbuddies and bar friends and 
bar friends’ tricks and tricks’ bar friends and gal pals and companions ‘in the life’, queers 
have an astonishing range of intimacies.98 
For Warner, these relationships are important because, ‘only a fine and rapidly shifting line 
separates sexual culture from many other relations of durability and care’.99 Warner suggests that 
non-normative sexual relationships can produce non-normative cultures, as well as durable queer 
kinship relations of responsibility and care. Interestingly Warner suggests that there are as many 
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kinds of relationship as there are people in combination which motions towards Karen Barad’s 
argument that the relation always precedes the individuals that relate, and is suggestive in the light 
of Haraway’s statement that ‘I am who I become with companion species’. These accounts converge 
in the idea that it is the relationship and the relating that is important for thinking communities, 
rather than individuals. For Warner, the important point is specifically that thinking of kinship and 
intimacy only within a single frame (that of the heterobiological family) is insufficient as this could 
never possibly cover the many and varied relations of durability and care. Warner’s polemical book 
suggests that kinship and community possibilities within the legitimacy of marriage are 
impoverished compared to the possibilities of queer kinship and for this and other reasons, Warner 
argues that gay marriage would be normalising and preclude the possibilities of queer kinship.  
 In a sociological study published in 2004, Judith Stacey suggests that Warner is right to argue 
that non-normative sexual encounters can lead to enduring social relations. Queer kinship, or 
‘rainbow kinship’, is for Stacey both a subversion of traditional norms and a set of practices that can 
instate new kinship norms. As she states: 
The gay cruising arena of unencumbered, recreational sex certainly does disrupt 
conventional family norms and practices. At the same time, however, it also generates 
bonds of kinship and domesticity. Gay male sexual cruising serves, I suggest, as an 
underappreciated cultural resource for the creative construction of those ‘families of choice’ 
and ‘invincible communities’ that scholars have identified as the distinctive character of non-
heterosexual family and kinship formations.100 
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Stacey suggests that rainbow kinship is a conscious coalition of relationships and practices that both 
disrupt and affirm familial kinship. Stacey argues that ‘gay male “promiscuity” is not as inherently 
antithetical to healthy, committed, or even to comparatively conventional, family values, as its critics 
and some of its champions imagine’.101 Stacey’s research supports Butler’s claim that new kinship 
structures are possible through the creation and repetition of norms. Stacey’s research is, however, 
committed to expanding familial kinship to include a rainbow alliance of queer relations. It is my 
argument that this approach is ultimately limited, and I would develop Butler and Warner’s warning 
against reducing kinship to familial relations to argue that although Stacey’s approach may expand 
the terms of kinship to include many queer relationships, thinking in terms of ‘families of choice’ 
may overemphasise either family kinship relations or voluntaristic relations of choice, and therefore 
may ignore many important non-familial and obligate relationships of responsibility and care.  
 Butler and Warner’s approach to kinship are useful for thinking through human-bacterial 
kinship. In this approach, kinship relations are performative, and individuals and communities are 
constituted through horizontal connections: connections that cannot always be predicted in 
advance. Thinking of kinship in terms of the family (or even families) threatens to ignore or efface 
the many complex ways in which people relate to other people and is consequently an inadequate 
way of thinking multispecies becoming-with and more-than-human kinship. Similarly, thinking of 
kinship in terms of choice and voluntarism effaces and ignores the many important and constitutive 
relationships that are not chosen, but which individuals are always already involved and entangled 
within. Companion species relationships are not necessarily family relationships, nor are they 
necessarily deliberately chosen and constructed. What they must be, however, is relationships of 
respect (of respecere). That is, this queer kinship must be developed to take into account the 
demand of response and responsibility in more-than-human kinship relations. For this reason I turn 
to Jacques Derrida’s work on sociality and responsibility to the nonhuman. 
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More-than-human Sociality 
 Thinking with bacteria prompts a rethinking of sociality as always including the more-than-
human. Derrida, in his 1997 lecture published in 2002 as ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to 
Follow)’, recounts the experience of standing naked before his cat in his bathroom one morning. This 
encounter provokes Derrida to consider seeing and being seen by the animal. Derrida suggest that 
this encounter, this being seen naked by the animal, is missing from the work of Western 
philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, Heidegger, Lacan and Levinas: ‘The experience of the seeing 
animal, of the animal that looks at them, has not been taken into account in the philosophical or 
theoretical architecture of their discourse.’102 Derrida suggests that this is part of the reason that, 
since Descartes, animals have been accorded only the ability to react, as animal-machines.103 This 
tradition suggests that animals are capable of reacting, but not of communication, or speaking. 
Interestingly, Derrida identifies the critical question as not whether the animal can speak instead of 
just reacting, but rather whether it is possible to know what it means to respond, to be responsive, 
or response-able. The question is not whether animals communicate, or can speak, but rather 
whether the human can be open to the possibility of response. Ultimately, this responsiveness (a 
response-ability) relates to an ethical responsibility. To be open to response is to be open to a 
responsibility to the more-than-human. This is fundamental to my approach, as I will argue that 
human-bacterial kinship is always open to a number of transformative relationships of respect and 
responsibility that cannot be known in advance. 
 Haraway emphasises the importance of Derrida’s meeting with his cat. In particular, 
Haraway emphasises the need to follow Derrida in considering animals: ‘He understood that actual 
animals look back at actual human beings [...] Further, Derrida knew he was in the presence of 
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someone, not of a machine reacting’.104 Derrida is clear that his cat is a single, individual, real cat and 
not a representation of all cats, or of all animals. However, as Haraway argues: ‘Even if the cat did 
not become a symbol of all cats, the naked man’s shame quickly became a figure for the shame of 
philosophy before all of the animals.’105 I agree with Haraway that shame is an important and 
legitimate response as it leads to important philosophical questions of suffering and pity, but she 
suggests that curiosity may be full of more promise. Haraway argues that ‘with his cat, Derrida failed 
a simple obligation of companion species; he did not become curious about what the cat might 
actually be doing, feeling, thinking, or perhaps making available to him in looking back at him that 
morning’.106 For this reason, she argues that Derrida ‘came right to the edge of respect, of the move 
to respecere, but he was sidetracked by his textual canon of Western philosophy and literature and 
by his own linked worries about being naked in front of his cat’.107 Companion species demand 
curiosity; in fact, Haraway describes curiosity as ‘one of the first obligations and deepest pleasures of 
worldly companion species’.108 Haraway argues that Derrida’s meeting with his cat offered an 
opportunity of response and respect through curiosity about this specific nonhuman other. She 
emphasises that Derrida’s engagement with the textual canon of Western philosophy and literature 
is important, but that from the perspective of companion species this represents a lack of curiosity 
and engagement with the more-than-human. 
 In When Species Meet, Haraway emphasises this curiosity as the obligation of becoming 
worldly with companion species. In particular, she asks the curious question:  
Whom and what do I touch when I touch my dog? How is becoming with a practice of 
becoming worldly? When species meet, the question of how to inherit histories is pressing, 
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and how to get on together is at stake. Because I become with dogs, I am drawn into the 
multispecies knots that they are tied into and that they retie by their reciprocal action.109  
Haraway suggests that through touching her dog, she is interpellated into kinship relations beyond 
human-animal relations, traditionally conceived. She suggests that these kinship relations demand a 
consideration of histories (both biological and social), and the responsibilities that these histories 
entail. Here, Haraway’s multispecies knots converge with her discussion of nonhuman kinship in 
Modest_Witness. As discussed earlier, In Modest_Witness Haraway states that: ‘Like it or not, I was 
born kin to Pu239 and to transgenic, transspecific, and transported creatures of all kinds; that is the 
family for which and to whom my people are accountable.’ Haraway’s phrase, ‘like it or not’ is 
important here, as it illustrates her argument that kinship relations are not always chosen. Rather, 
individuals are ‘drawn into’ kinship relations with the more-than-human. Haraway’s multispecies 
knots are performative kinship relations that, like Butler’s elaboration of kinship, are sets of 
practices – each a doing that enacts its own assemblage of significations. 
 Hird employs Haraway’s companion species framework to explore what it takes to ‘meet 
well with’ the more-than-human, suggesting that ‘considering an ethics of (human)animal relations 
confronts enduring humanist foundational assumptions [...] To think beyond the animal seems 
literally and figuratively beyond our ken’.110 Haraway’s main focus in When Species Meet is the 
relationship of human and dog. Hird’s work attempts to elaborate this, in the light of Margulis’s 
symbiogenesis to think a more-than-human ethics that is decidedly non-zoocentric. Hird draws 
attention to the fact that bacteria problematise taxonomic definitions such as species, and sketches 
a ‘microontology’ of kinship relationships with companion species that are not species at all: 
‘companion with not-species as it were’.111 Hird elaborates microontologies of self, sex and 
environment. Hird’s microontology of self focuses on the relationship between self and other in 
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terms of the economies of gift-giving and the importance of symbiosis with the bacterial. Through 
microontologies of sex, Hird suggests that thinking sex and reproduction outside of the frame of the 
human could add to feminist work on sex and gender. Finally, microontologies of environment look 
at Margulis’s work with James Lovelock on the Gaia hypothesis to consider how Gaian theories of 
the environment could inform social science.112 Hird’s work demonstrates the ways in which 
curiosity about bacteria can have effects on other discourses, such as sociology and feminist 
projects.  
 Haraway argues for curiosity as a critical practice. She claims that curiosity is ‘one of the first 
obligations and deepest pleasures of worldly companion species’ and requires ‘knowing more at the 
end of the day than at the beginning’.113 Curiosity is a useful critical practice; however, it needs 
careful elaboration, so as to differentiate curiosity from scopophilic or voyeuristic practices that 
maintain distance between subject and object. Haraway argues that curiosity is about knowing more 
at the end of the day than the start. This could be read as dangerously close to suggesting that 
curiosity as a practice stabilises, or perhaps enhances and improves, the position of the sovereign 
knowing subject. I want to argue, however, that the practice of curiosity is not just about knowing 
more, but also includes the possibility of knowing less, nothing, or questioning the ability of the 
individual to know at all. The important element of curiosity, and that which must be emphasised, is 
danger. The phrase ‘curiosity killed the cat’ is a familiar warning about the dangers of curiosity, and I 
argue that curiosity as a critical practice is always dangerous and threatens the position of any 
knowing subject. Curiosity is about entering into a series of relationships that can forever alter the 
individuals relating and the relationships between them. This is, consequentially, about knowing 
more at the end of the day than at the start, but with knowledge understood as a particularly 
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situated biological-social practice. I would link this to Haraway’s work on situated knowledges 
discussed in the first chapter, rather than the production of knowledge through separation of 
subject and object. As Haraway states, ‘[c]uriosity should nourish situated knowledges and their 
ramifying obligations’.114 The collapse of distance between subject and object is threatening to both, 
and enters both into a relationship of danger where each can be radically changed, but can produce 
new knowledges and responsibilities in a multispecies becoming-with.  
Eating Well, and Failing to Digest 
 The collective more-than-human community commonly recognised as the human body 
relies upon bacterial digestion to live. Gut microbiota provide the clearest and most readily 
observable example of this (although the ATP-producing mitochondria of human cells provide 
another important example). Unlike plants (and some bacteria and green animals such as Elysia 
viridis) that gain energy directly from sunlight, human beings must digest organic and chemical 
compounds in order to gain energy. The enzyme-producing gut microbiota are essential for the 
process of breaking down matter into these digestible compounds. The entanglement of human and 
bacteria is therefore essential to eating and digesting. Gut microbiota are the living descendants of 
free-living bacteria eaten but not digested by organisms that would evolve (or more precisely co-
evolve with their bacterial symbionts) into humans. Not only this, but the process of digestion is a 
human-bacterial co-evolved phenomenon; deriving energy from food is impossible without bacteria. 
Eating and digestion, then, are important processes and phenomena for thinking human-bacterial 
relations. Bacteria enable the human to ‘eat well’, and human-bacterial digestion illustrates the 
more-than-human kinship relations that the human is always already entangled in and provides 
ways of thinking through questions of sociality and ethical relating to the other. In particular, 
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human-bacterial digestion provides an illustration and elaboration of some of Derrida’s arguments 
on social relations. 
 Derrida explores the question of eating, subjectivity and relating to the other in ‘“Eating 
Well”, or the Calculation of the Subject’. In this interview Derrida suggests that with the limits 
between the living and non-living and between human and animal put into question, the morality of 
killing and eating animals as well as the ethics of relating self to other become about eating well, 
rather than eating or not eating (or eating this and not that). Derrida argues,  
if, in the (symbolic or real) experience of the ‘eat-speak-interiorize’ the ethical frontier no 
longer rigorously passes between the ‘Thou shalt not kill’ (man, thy neighbor) and the ‘thou 
shalt not put to death the living in general’, but rather between several infinitely different 
modes of the conception-appropriation-assimilation of the other, then, as concerns the 
‘Good’ [Bien] of every morality, the question will come back to determining the best, more 
respectful, most grateful, and also most giving way of relating to the other and of relating 
the other to the self.115 
For Derrida, the question is not one of whether or not it is good to eat the other, or if the other is 
good to eat; rather, the relationship of eating must be considered as necessary and reciprocal and 
eating must be a relation of giving as well as receiving. Derrida argues that: ‘“One must eat well” [“il 
faut bien manger”] does not mean above all taking in and grasping in itself, but learning and giving 
to eat, learning-to-give-the-other-to-eat.’116 Eating is always a social experience; that is, it involves 
the eating individual in networks of response and responsibility. As Derrida states: ‘One never eats 
entirely on one’s own: this constitutes the rule underlying the statement, “One must eat well”. It is a 
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rule offering infinite hospitality.’117 Nowhere is Derrida’s argument more evident than in failed 
digestion. Gut microbiota have been eaten but not digested, illustrating that eating is a process that 
opens the individual up to the possibility of internalising but not destroying or assimilating what is 
eaten and thus becoming a host to the surviving organisms. Eating well is a process that is always 
open to the failure of digestion and the internalisation but non-assimilation of the other. Eating well 
offers infinite hospitality; to eat well is to be open to becoming-host.118 The dangers of this must not 
be underplayed, and I will discuss this in more detail when considering the infection of bodies with 
viruses (becoming-host to viral inhabitants) in the final chapter. 
 Haraway develops Derrida’s notion of eating well to suggest that companion species 
relationships are always about learning how to eat well together. Haraway explicitly links companion 
species to the breaking bread of the Latin, cum panis, suggesting that companion species are always 
‘[q]ueer messmates in mortal play’.119 Crucially, Haraway recognises the importance of indigestion 
and the fact that eating well is always open to failed digestion and becoming-host. Eating well is an 
example of Haraway’s becoming-with: it depends upon nonhuman others and involves the ‘eater’ in 
more-than-human kinship networks of responsibility.  
Multispecies human and nonhuman ways of living and dying are at stake in practices of 
eating [...] Derrida argued that any real responsibility must be excessive. The practice of 
regard and response has no preset limits, but giving up human exceptionalism has 
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Philosophy, 85:11 (1988), 632–644; Of Hospitality, trans. by Rachel Bowlby (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2000); and ‘The Principle of Hospitality’, Parallax 11:1 (2005), 6–9. 
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Parasite, trans. by Lawrence R, Schehr (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1982). I will return to 
parasitism in the next chapter, in the form of viruses. 
119 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 19. 
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consequences that require one to know more at the end of the day than at the beginning 
and to cast oneself with some ways of life and not others in the never settled biopolitics of 
entangled species.120 
For Haraway, ‘nourishing indigestion’ is necessary for eating well together.121 Specifically, to eat well, 
the other must never be fully digested; companion species ‘cannot and must not assimilate one 
another but [...] must learn to eat well, or at least well enough that care, respect, and difference can 
flourish in the open’.122 Eating is attempted assimilation; indigestion is eating well and failing to 
assimilate. Nourishing indigestion and eating well together is, for Haraway, an essential part of 
becoming-with the more-than-human in companion species relationships. This is a particularly 
pertinent example for my thesis of the ways that health and living well depend upon the more-than-
human world. 
 Indigestion is also integral to the process of symbiogenesis. Symbiogenesis argues that the 
main mechanism of evolutionary novelty and speciation is the ingestion, but not digestion, of the 
other within the self. As Margulis and Sagan state: 
Symbiotic relationships occur under specific environmental conditions. In some of these 
relationships, one partner in the symbiosis feeds off the other to its detriment and even 
death. Such exploitative associations are called ‘parasitic’ or ‘pathogenic’. They tend to be 
highly sensitive to environmental stress. The parasite that invariably and virulently kills its 
partner kills itself. With time and circumstance the nature of associations tended to change. 
The relationships that interest us most here are modulated coexistence between former 
predators, pathogens and their hosts, their shelter and food sources. As members of two 
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121 Haraway, When Species Meet, p. 300. 
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species respond over time to each other’s presence, exploitative relationships may become 
convivial to the point where neither organism exists without the other.123 
Gut microbiota (along with the previously discussed example of mitochondria in the human cell) are 
observable in their current form because of symbiotic relationships that have developed over time. 
Crucially, these relationships were varied and included that of predators, pathogens and their hosts, 
shelter and food sources. These relationships can change and over time become a long-term 
inextricable symbiosis. Margulis and Sagan’s notion of ‘modulated coexistence’ is interesting as it 
illustrates the productive and transformative effect that relationships have on all of the organisms 
relating. Modulated (and modulating) coexistence converges with Haraway’s notion of becoming-
with, as each organism or individual is formed only in and through more-than-human kinship 
networks of otherness. 
 The symbiogenetic focus on the relations between and with the bacterial – or as Hird 
describes it, ‘companion with not-species’ – problematises any strict boundary between self and 
other, as well as suggesting the possibility of human-bacterial kinship outside of the frame 
pathogenesis. Symbiogenesis suggests that in every relationship of eating or attempted assimilation, 
there is the radical possibility of indigestion and modulated (and modulating) coexistence. In 
Haraway’s terms, this possibility must be nourished for species-meetings that promote the 
flourishing of care, respect and difference. In a symbiogenetic framework the self is always already 
host to communities of organisms, or others. Importantly, and building on insights from the previous 
chapters, these ‘others’ are active and agential, and the entangled relationship produces biological-
social effects and consequences for all the partners that are entangled. A symbiogenetic eating well 
with bacteria prompts questions of how to relate to the other, how to formulate kinship and how to 
think about sociality beyond the human.  
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Biosociality 
 More-than-human kinship depends on an entanglement of the social and biological. 
Sociologist Paul Rabinow, writing in 1992, suggests that this entanglement is particularly noticeable 
in sociality produced, affected, or made visible by new genetic technologies, such as the large-scale 
gene sequencing made possible by the Human Genome Project. Rabinow argues that new genetic 
technologies create new bio-social identities and communities (he gives the example of support 
groups for people with neurofibromatosis – a genetically inherited disorder that causes nerve tissue 
to grow tumours). He argues that these new relations, which are at once biological and social, do not 
replace ‘older forms of cultural classification of bio-identity such as race, gender and age [...] 
although the meanings and the practices that constitute them certainly are changing’.124 He does, 
however, argue that ‘these older cultural classifications will be joined by a vast array of new ones, 
which will cross-cut, partially supersede and eventually redefine the older categories in ways that 
are well worth monitoring’.125 It is these new classifications, new ways of producing and performing 
kinship relations that Rabinow calls ‘biosociality’.  
In the future, the new genetics will cease to be a biological metaphor for modern society 
and will become instead a circulation network of identity terms and restriction loci, around 
which and through which a truly new type of autoproduction will emerge, which I call 
‘biosociality’. If sociobiology is culture constructed on the basis of a metaphor of nature, 
then in biosociality, nature will be modelled on culture understood as practice. Nature will 
become known and remade through technique and will finally become artificial, just as 
culture becomes natural. Were such a project to be brought to fruition, it would stand as the 
basis for overcoming the nature/culture split.126 
                                                          
124 Paul Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment: From Sociobiology to Biosociality’, in Incorporations (New 
York: Zone, 1992), pp. 234–253 (p. 245).  
125 Paul Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment’, p. 245. 
126 Paul Rabinow, ‘Artificiality and Enlightenment’, pp. 241–242. For further elaboration of Rabinow’s 
biosociality, see Rabinow, French DNA: Trouble in Purgatory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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Rabinow’s term biosociality is partly an attempt to subvert the determinism of sociobiology and 
works to question the relation of the biological to the social. It is important for my project, however, 
not to approach biosociality in too naïve or uncritical a light, as the hypothetical ‘overcoming’ of the 
nature/culture split through technology such as gene-sequencing (to use Rabinow’s example) can 
have problematic consequences. 
Sarah Franklin discusses some of the problematic conservative dimensions of thinking 
kinship through new genetic technologies in her article ‘Biologization Revisited: Kinship Theory in the 
Context of the New Biologies’. Franklin suggests that despite the transformations made to kinship 
theory, the question of the significance of biological facts in kinship is ‘as easy to fall into as it is 
difficult to leave behind’.127 Franklin suggests that the meanings associated with biology have shifted 
from being those of stability and fixity to being visibly associated with innovation and change. She 
suggests, however, that there are both possibilities and dangers involved in thinking kinship through 
new biological technology and innovation. She suggests that the dangers are threefold: first, there is 
an assumption that new forms of biological reproduction are places to look for new forms of kinship 
which could further the association between genealogy, biology and kinship; second, there is a 
danger of overestimating the novelty and determinism of new forms of technological innovation (for 
example cloning, transgenics and new reproductive technologies); and third, there is the fact that 
biological innovation is not of interest to everyone in the same way – the question of for whom 
biological innovation is of interest represents an important discourse.128 Franklin argues that new 
biological technology and innovation prompts a number of questions about kinship and the 
relationship between the biological and social. Crucially she emphasises the need to be vigilant 
against complacency about the ‘overcoming’ of the boundary between nature and culture. 
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128 Franklin, ‘Biologization Revisited’, p. 317. 
172 
 
 Ian Hacking explores biosociality and the formation of new identities in the light of the 
findings of the Human Genome Project. He argues that the complexity that the project discovered 
created opportunities to produce and perform new identities and communities. He states: 
After an initial deterministic enthusiasm, almost everyone came to realize that everything is 
not in our genes [...] Nevertheless, the biological, and then the genetic, imperatives are facts 
of modern life. And far from increasing determinism and limiting opportunity, the life 
sciences are creating more choices. On the one hand, we have, in a sense, more biologies to 
choose from than we anticipated. On the other hand, new societies form along newly 
recognized (or, at any rate, newly asserted) biological or genetic lines, forging new alliances 
and loyalties. Forging new identities.129 
Hacking’s emphasis on genetic technologies and biosociality is important as it illustrates the fact that 
the Human Genome Project problematised genetic determinism through its scientific findings. His 
use of the term, however, does not fully inherit the important Foucauldian connotations of 
biopower that Rabinow makes explicit in his articulation of biosociality, and which are important in 
the light of Franklin’s elaborations of the dangers of thinking kinship through biological technologies 
and innovation. Rabinow describes his work as ‘a new articulation of the discourses and practices of 
biopower’, defined by Michel Foucault as that which ‘brought life and its mechanisms into the realm 
of explicit calculations and made knowledge-power an agent of transformation of human life’.130 
Rabinow draws on Haraway’s approach to biopower in ‘A Cyborg Manifesto’, where she argues that 
contemporary forms of biopower function differently to that described by Foucault in The Birth of 
the Clinic: ‘Our dominations don’t work by medicalization and normalization anymore; they work by 
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of Foucauldian biopower see Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception, 
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networking, communication design, stress management.’131 New technologies create opportunities 
for the production and performance of new identities and communities. These new biosocial 
arrangements also entail new discourses and practices of biopower, which do not replace older 
forms of biopower, but rather add to, change, or redefine them. It is essential, in my use of the term, 
to emphasise that biosociality is an elaboration of biopower and as such, always entails 
consideration of the political nature of kinship networks. 
 Biosociality is important to my project as it recognises the entangled relationship of the 
biological and the social. As I argued in the previous chapters, the biological and social are 
performatively co-constituted, rather than discrete areas or terms in opposition. Neither the 
biological nor the social acts as the solid ground beneath the other. Once again, it is ‘turtles all the 
way down’. Biosociality is also useful as it stresses the political nature of kinship relations and 
highlights the fact that kinship is never solely familial or biological, but rather a set of practices that 
are historically specific, as well as biologically, socially and technologically mediated. It is important 
for my project, however, that the entangled and performative nature of the relationship between 
biology and sociality is emphasised and maintained. To these ends, I find Margulis’s symbiogenesis 
theory a helpful resource for stressing the entangled nature of the biological and the social, as well 
as the creative force of symbiotic connection and relation. With this in mind, I suggest thinking of 
biosociality as necessarily a symbiosociality. Life is always an entangled process of becoming with. 
Symbiosociality also gestures to a linguistic symbiosis of symbiogenesis and biosociality (both 
already symbiotic mergers themselves). The symbiotic nature of this term is also reflected in its 
mixed pedigree (canine pun intended). The Greek symbios and the Latin socius are from different 
linguistic stock, but in their merger they produce something new. Neither is assimilated wholly by 
the other, but rather contributes to etymological novelty and the creation and proliferation of 
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multiple shifting meanings. Hacking emphasises that Rabinow’s biosociality was invented ‘partly as a 
joke’ and I suggest symbiosociality in a similar manner.132  
Symbiosociality and Networks of Responsibility 
 One of the most important consequences of symbiogenesis (and thus one that must be 
preserved unassimilated – eaten but not digested – in symbiosociality) is the impossibility of thinking 
in terms of individuals. As Margulis states: 
of all the organisms on Earth today, only prokaryotes (bacteria) are individuals. All other live 
beings (‘organisms’ – such as animals, plants and fungi) are metabolically complex 
communities of a multitude of tightly organized beings. That is, what we generally accept as 
an individual animal, such as a cow, is recognizable as a collection of various numbers and 
kinds of autopoietic entities that, functioning together, form an emergent entity – the cow. 
‘Individuals’ are all diversities of co-evolving associates.133 
This diversity of co-evolving associates is observable at the level of symbiotic gut microbiota and at 
the level of the human cell. It is impossible to think in terms of individual human bodies, as these 
bodies are emergent entities formed through the co-evolution of more-than-human agencies. As 
Dorion Sagan describes: ‘The human body [...] is an architectonic compilation of millions of agencies 
of chimerical cells.’134 Symbiosociality emphasises the necessarily entangled symbiotic community 
nature of ‘individuals’. One of the most important implications of Rabinow’s biosociality is the 
impossibility of maintaining a clear distinction or boundary between the biological and social. The 
kinship relations that are made possible by new technologies emphasise the boundary breakdown 
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between the biological and the social, including the technological. In Rabinow’s example of 
communities formed around genetic diseases, the kinship relations that individuals are interpellated 
into through genetic screening and related technologies are both biological and social, though not 
necessarily familial. Not only are individuals not individuals at all but entangled symbiotic 
communities, but these are also always already involved in performative kinship relations that are 
themselves entanglements of the biological and social. This understanding of kinship relations as 
biosocial is essential for my articulation of the concept of symbiosociality. ‘Individuals’, symbiotic 
entanglements themselves, are always already interpellated into symbiotic entanglements of the 
biological and the social. 
I want, at this point, to explicitly link these entangled symbiosocial kinship networks with the 
biological-social networks discussed in the previous chapter in reference to queer genes. As in its 
formulation in the previous chapter, a biological-social network is formed by often unpredictable 
and incalculable partial connections between historically situated human and nonhuman agency. 
Again, this follows Andrew Pickering’s insight that the world is composed of human and nonhuman 
agency: 
One can start from the idea that the world is filled not, in the first instance, with facts and 
observations, but with agency. The world [...] is continually doing things, things that bear 
upon us not as observation statements upon disembodied intellects but as forces upon 
material beings.135  
The bacterial and the human are constantly ‘doing things’, things that bear upon each other as 
material forces, for example in the co-evolution of human and gut microbiota. In this way, a 
symbiosocial approach is also a diffractive approach, as it privileges the active agential nature of 
matter. Symbiosociality focuses on the potential of connections and relations to produce 
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interference and difference. It also elaborates on the ability of symbiotic connection and merger to 
produce evolutionary novelty, suggesting that thinking of becoming-with the more-than-human in 
this way is an opportunity for new ways of thinking of relating to the other, as well as emphasising 
the imperative of response and responsibility.  
 Symbiosocial kinship networks are biological-social networks and as such are always 
necessarily political, always about the move to respecere. Once again, Diane Elam’s notion of 
‘networks of responsibility’ is useful here.136 Derrida emphasises the importance of being open to 
animal response in ‘The Animal That Therefore I Am (More to Follow)’, and it is the obligation to 
openness to the response of nonhuman others that he privileges over discussions of whether or not 
the animal can speak. Haraway develops Derrida’s argument by suggesting that curiosity is a way of 
being open to nonhuman response, as well as asking what networks of connection, histories and 
responsibilities are inherited in the connection to the more-than-human. Crucially, symbiosocial 
kinship networks are always networks of responsibility, with the recognition that human and more-
than-human agencies bear upon each other with both biological and social effects. Not only this but 
being open to more-than-human response, and responsibility to the more-than-human, is also a 
radical openness to change and an infinite hospitality. As human geographer Nigel Clark argues, ‘to 
enter into a close relationship with another species is not to enter a circle of calculable effects of 
equivalent exchanges, but to open a network of unknowable and immeasurable outcomes’.137 My 
articulation of symbiosociality suggests the possibility of becoming-with unknown human and more-
than-human others, as well as the necessity of being open to networks of unknowable connections, 
responses and responsibilities, and the infinite hospitality of becoming-host. 
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Queer kinship: Becoming-with the More-than-human 
 Symbiosociality is a queer approach to sociality. In the previous chapter I suggested that 
‘queer’ is a useful term for attempting to preserve the strangeness of scientific objects, and thus the 
active agential nature of the biological. Simultaneously, I suggested that it gestures to the 
constructed nature of all knowledge. Symbiosociality converges with this queer approach as it 
emphasises the queerness of the biological; the complexity and non-determinism of symbiogenesis 
and biological becoming-with suggests an openness and hospitality to networks of unpredictable 
outcomes and responsibilities. Simultaneously, it emphasises the entanglement of the biological and 
the social; biosociality illustrates both the effects of biology and biological technologies on the social, 
but also the political nature of connections between the biological and social. Symbiosociality is a 
queer approach to the entanglement of biological and social and also an approach that attempts to 
avoid human exceptionalism by emphasising the importance of curiosity about symbiosocial 
connections to the more-than-human world. I agree with Hird that the imperative is to ‘survive 
humanism’, and with Haraway that ‘we have never been human’.138 Thus, symbiosociality is a more-
than-human approach – that is, a critical posthumanist and companion species approach.  
 Symbiosociality, as a queer approach, suggests ways of rethinking kinship. Warner suggests 
that: ‘There are almost as many kinds of relationship as there are people in combination.’139 A 
symbiosocial approach suggests that in every relationship to the other there is the possibility of 
radical change; to eat well with the other is to offer infinite hospitality, to be open to the possibility 
of becoming-host. For this reason, then, I want to take Warner’s claim even further: each 
relationship with the other opens up the individuals relating to many new unpredictable kinship 
relationships. It is also essential to remember that in this approach, the ‘people in combination’ are 
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always already more-than-human combinations. There are at least as many kinds of relationship as 
there are people in combination (if not more), and there is always the possibility of the radical 
shifting and multiplication of these relationships. Symbiosociality also offers an approach to 
evolutionary narratives such as Elaine Morgan’s Aquatic Ape Hypothesis. Morgan’s narrative of the 
descent of the female ape begins from female embodiment and attempts to rethink the evolution of 
the species with the agential nature of the female body taken into account. Although Morgan 
ultimately falls back on biological determinism, symbiosociality can once more provide a more 
positive (re)reading of her project. Morgan’s Aquatic Ape Hypothesis attempts to create a 
connection between the contemporary female human and the prehominid ape. This is both an 
attempt to forge a political connection, and a recognition of the biological evolutionary links 
between humans and prehominid ancestors. Entering into a close relationship with the nonhuman 
other is, in Clark’s terms, to open a ‘network of unknowable and immeasurable outcomes’. The 
Aquatic Ape Hypothesis describes a close relationship between contemporary female embodiment 
and the female prehominid ape which, although not a becoming-with in the sense of a symbiosis, 
opens a network of unknowable and immeasurable outcomes. This is the promise of any close 
relationship to the other: the possibility of mergers that can create radical and unpredictable 
novelty. In this example, the novelty that becomes possible is the rethinking of the androcentrism of 
evolutionary narratives, as well as the way female embodiment and experience is thought in 
contemporary society. Through the forging of a kinship connection to the more-than-human world, 
Morgan opens up networks of relationships and responsibilities, creating the possibility of new and 
politically useful situated knowledges. 
 Earlier I suggested that Haraway’s becoming-with is supported by the emphasis in 
symbiogenetic research on the modulated coexistence of symbiogenetic mergers. Both of these 
notions – becoming-with and the idea of modulated coexistence – are integral to symbiosociality. It 
is important to emphasise this, as symbiosociality illustrates that being is always a becoming, and 
becoming is always entangled and entangling: a becoming-with. Thus, symbiosociality is always 
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about emergence; it emphasises the openness of all relationships (whether peaceful or defined by 
struggle) to connections that are themselves emergent and entangled networks of unknowable and 
immeasurable outcomes and responsibilities. Symbiosis is never complete; it suggests a radical 
openness to change and further symbiotic merger. Hird’s microontologies provide a necessary 
elaboration of Haraway’s companion species framework. Crucially, for Hird, being human is always a 
becoming-with the bacterial. In both ancestral terms and in the ability of the human to live (and eat) 
well, the human and bacterial are always symbiotically entangled. Hird’s work is also important as it 
emphasises Margulis’s warning against zoocentrism in its attempt to think with bacteria. It also 
offers a way to think a critical posthumanism and companion species framework together and do 
the important work needed to refuse human exceptionalism.  
The kinship between symbiosociality and Haraway’s companion species means that curiosity 
must be an imperative of symbiosocial approaches. Haraway’s question of who and what she 
touches when she touches her dog can be rephrased as a useful interrogation of the more-than-
human symbiosocial relations that the human is always already involved in, for example kinship with 
gut microbiota. Who and what am I already touching (and being touched by) in the process of 
digestion, when I eat? A symbiosocial approach to this question emphasises the more-than-human 
entanglements that make living and eating possible. It thus interpellates the human into an 
evolutionary history of ingestion but failed digestion of more-than-human others and the collective 
assemblage-nature of the individual human body. The curiosity of companion species demands an 
investigation of the specifics of these internal nonhuman others. This curiosity, then, also involves 
the human in specific cultural histories of food production (as illustrated clearly in the example of 
the differences between the genomes of gut microbiota in Japanese and North American people). 
Not only does this emphasise the diversity and specificity of the body in response to environment, 
but actually reframes the body as itself an environment and ecology, which I will discuss in the next 
chapter. This in turn prompts a rethinking of health in different terms than a bounded self protected 
from infection from the outside by pathogens. Symbiosocial kinship relations with internal more-
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than-human others also prompts a rethinking of health practices in relation to the sequencing of the 
human microbiome and the phenomenon of bacterial antibiotic resistance. This approach stresses 
the agency of bacteria and emphasises the fact that human health and flourishing is always and 
necessarily entangled with bacterial and more-than-human health and flourishing.  
Symbiosociality, as a symbiotic merger of symbiogenesis and biosociality is a queer approach 
that privileges the active and agential nature of the biological, whilst emphasising the social and 
political histories that are always performatively entangled with the biological. As an approach to 
kinship it is an attempt to respond to Haraway’s call, in her famous article, ‘A Manifesto for Cyborgs’ 
for a world of ‘lived social and bodily realities in which people are not afraid of their joint kinship 
with animals and machines, not afraid of permanently partial identities and contradictory 
standpoints’.140 Symbiosocial kinship recognises the more-than-human biological networks that 
sustain human life, while simultaneously emphasising their social and historical construction and 
mediation. In the process, symbiosociality prompts the rethinking of bodily boundaries as well as 
social relations between the self and other, as well as redefining human health in terms of 
entanglement – both with the internal and external more-than-human world. 
Conclusion 
 In this chapter I expanded upon earlier discussions of agency. In the first chapter, the female 
prehominid ape was reinterpreted through the work of Morgan and Haraway. Chapter Two sought 
to reconceptualise genes as queer, active and agential – always already entangled in performative 
constitutive biological-social relations. To explore agency beyond the human, in this chapter I 
explored Haraway’s articulation of a companion species framework, and explored the possibilities 
for applying this to human-bacterial relationships and kinship. Human-bacterial entanglements and 
kinship can be a useful resource for refusing human exceptionalism and conservative narratives of 
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humanism that place humans at the pinnacle of evolution and grant them mastery over that which is 
defined as not-human. To explore the material specificity of bacteria and human-bacterial 
entanglement I analysed Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis. Among the implications of Margulis’s 
work is the difficulty of thinking in terms of individuals and types. Bacterial entanglement draws 
attention to the biological-social boundary-making practices (or agential cuts) that go into producing 
the idea of individual and discrete human bodies. The material specificity of bacteria also draws 
attention to the agential cuts involved in taxonomic practice, and the difficulty of producing and 
maintaining clear species categories. 
Human-bacterial kinship reconfigures the body as an ecosystem – as entangled in an 
ecology, but also an ecology itself. To think through the possibilities of human-bacterial kinship I 
turned to feminist and queer engagements with kinship theory in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
that suggested exploring kinship outside of familial relationships. Some critics in this area argued 
that the reduction of kinship to biological-familial relations represents a curtailment of sexual 
politics. In particular, questions of queer community and the political call for gay marriage were 
considered within the frame of traditional kinship and non-normative sexual community formation. 
At the same time, scholars were starting to question how the changing theories, practices, 
technologies and innovations of biological science affected models of biological kinship. With this 
context in mind, Haraway’s notion of being interpellated into obligate kinship relations whether you 
‘like it or not’ is particularly informative. Some queer scholars focusing on non-normative sexual 
communities have suggested a focus on ‘families of choice’, a reinterpretation of queer community 
and expansion of the boundaries of the family. In this chapter I argued that this is limited as it 
ignores many important and constitutive relationships, connections and responsibilities. Haraway’s 
focus on kinship relations that are not chosen, but rather that individuals are always already 
involved in, is more useful, and this converges productively with Butler’s performative view of 
kinship as a set of practices that enacts its own assemblage of significations.  
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To think through the political and ethical dimensions of this kinship, I used resources from 
deconstruction, specifically associating Derrida’s notion of eating well with Haraway’s notion of 
indigestion. Indigestion is an important part of companion species, and offers insights both into the 
material specificity of human gut microbiota, and into the entangled and entangling relationships 
that the human is always already involved in. I argued, using Haraway’s companion species 
framework, that these more-than-human kinship relations (that the human is always already 
involved in) are performative and constitutive. In particular, I argued that the relationship between 
the bacterial and the human is actually a complex network of connections that involves evolutionary 
history, new biological technologies such as genome sequencing, and specific environmentally-
determined histories of individual organisms. To produce a framework with which to conceptualise 
this complex network of biological and social connections, I explored Margulis’s symbiogenesis and 
Rabinow’s biosociality, before suggesting a merger of the two into symbiosociality.  
Symbiosociality is a queer approach to kinship relations, emphasising that the world is full of 
agency and that human and nonhuman biological agencies are always acting upon each other with 
biological and social consequences. In fact, I argued that the human is not singular and stable, nor 
can the human be defined independently of nonhuman (or more-than-human) bodies and agencies. 
Symbiosociality emphasises the entanglements, connections and symbioses that are performative 
and constitutive, and all the way down. Focusing on the examples of the importance of human gut 
microbiota in digestion and the material specificity of mitochondria in all cells, I argued that humans 
and bacteria are always already involved in obligate and queer kinship entanglements. I also 
emphasised the political nature of all connections and entanglements, and the fact that in any 
relation to the other, the self is opened up to multiple networks of responsibility. Symbiosociality is 
thus a useful tool with which to rethink kinship and becoming-with the other in the more-than-
human world. This is of particular significance when thinking about health, and in the next chapter I 
will explore possible ways of conceptualising more-than-human kinship with another 
microorganism: the virus. Once again, agency and the possibilities offered by the conversations 
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between scientific and social theories will be key, particularly concerning biomedical knowledge and 
human health practices. 
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Chapter Four 
Interruptions: Viral Biopolitics, Queer Ecologies and Monstrous 
Futures 
 
‘If anything, life is catastrophic, monstrous, nonholistic, and 
dislocated, not organic, coherent, or authoritative. Queering 
ecological criticism will involve engaging with these qualities’ 
Timothy Morton, ‘Queer Ecology’1 
 
The previous chapters have developed an approach to the relationship between the biological and 
the social that relies upon notions of connection, entanglement and symbiosis. In the third chapter I 
named this approach ‘symbiosociality’, having developed it as a response to the conservatism of 
sociobiology, and subsequently elaborating it alongside and through notions of diffraction and 
interference, as well as the evolutionary phenomenon of symbiogenesis. Essential to the 
symbiosocial approach is the idea that the world is active and agential, unpredictable and lively, 
prior to human intervention. I engaged with this insight from a number of different science studies 
scholars, and linked it to a queer approach that emphasises the strangeness of material bodies and 
the non-normative meanings that these bodies can produce.  
Throughout this thesis I have focused on the biological so as to trouble a series of binary 
oppositions. These have included the opposition between the active and passive, agent/resource 
                                                          
1 Timothy Morton, ‘Queer Ecology’, PMLA, 125:2 (2010), 273–282 (p. 275).  
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binary in evolutionary narratives; the false choice between born and made in discussions of 
hypothetical gay genes; and between the biological and social and the human/nonhuman 
distinction. A binary opposition left uninterrogated so far is that between the living and the non-
living. This is a fundamental opposition which I will argue structures biological science and has real 
consequences for individuals and communities. This final chapter serves as an interruption to the 
trajectory of the thesis so far; in fact, I will argue that interruption is a necessary and productive 
critical practice. In particular I will be focusing on viruses as interruptive material agents, to 
interrogate whether the symbiosocial framework developed in earlier chapters is useful for thinking 
about companion species relationships with biological or material agents that are arguably neither 
organisms nor alive. The description of viruses as either biological or material agents reflects the 
problematic status of viruses as either living or non-living. The question of whether the bios (life) of 
biology can fully be applied to such liminal agents is discussed in more detail later in the chapter. 
Viruses are material agents that problematise and draw attention to the culturally and historically 
situated nature of the agential cut that distinguishes between living and non-living.  
The boundary between the living and non-living structures the theory and practice of the 
science of biology. In this chapter I will be arguing that the virus, as an ‘organism at the edge of life’, 
interrupts understandings of life and death as well as interrupting linear, teleological and 
progressive narratives of evolution.2 I will argue that the living/non-living binary (with its corollaries 
of life/death, animate/inanimate, organic/inorganic) is important as it not only influences how life 
forms are defined, but also how ‘forms of life’ and ways of living are defined and perceived. This is a 
political point, and I will use the example of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and theories that 
address people living with HIV/AIDS, to interrogate the relationship between the problematic liminal 
status of the virus and the forms of life that are considered acceptable in the wake of the AIDS 
                                                          
2 I take the description of viruses as ‘organisms at the edge of life’ from E. P. Rybicki, ‘The Classification of 
Organisms at the Edge of Life, or Problems with Virus Systematics’, South African Journal of Science, 86 (1990) 
182–186. 
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epidemic. To argue this I will also be focusing on the role of viruses in human genomics as well as in 
evolution, to suggest that the virus is a figure that interrupts linear temporalities of evolution and 
queers any attempt to produce heteronormative and linear genealogies of the natural world. I will 
use work from recent developments in the field of queer ecologies to once again contextualise the 
human (biologically and socially) within the more-than-human world; this, along with companion 
species insights from the previous chapters will offer a way of resisting heteronormative and reified 
‘tree’ metaphors, whether in genealogy or evolutionary phylogeny. I will also argue that this 
approach, focusing on the biopolitics of HIV/AIDS, can be a useful way of thinking through how 
different individuals, groups and communities can wield or resist biopower, and how to live with the 
virus. This builds on the insight from previous chapters that attention to the biological sciences (and 
the complex agency of the biological) can offer the possibility for new and alternative positions, 
narratives and bodies of knowledge. This has clear political consequences, as these alternative 
positions, narratives and knowledges can resist conservative or oppressive regulatory mechanism 
relating to life forms and forms of life. This is as much about dying as it is about living, and about 
practices of dying as much as ways of living.  
 In the previous chapter I focused on Donna Haraway’s companion species and Myra J. Hird’s 
microontologies to elaborate the notion of symbiosociality. In this chapter I want to suggest that 
Hird’s microontologies and Haraway’s becoming-with dogs need to be carefully analysed and 
employed, as they could be read in a too positive light: too much emphasis on becoming without 
adequate focus on the negative and threatening possibility of unbecoming. As I described, Hird’s 
bacteria are productive, creative, constitutive others that the human is always necessarily entangled 
with, and Haraway’s curiosity about her dog is formulated as a responsibility to the more-than-
human, one that demands knowing more, and becoming-with. Both of these approaches are 
important to my queer project of more-than-human relations and responsibilities. However, it is 
critical that these approaches are not simply read as emphasising production, creation, and 
becoming, as this risks a return to overly romantic notions of nature, a reinvestment in the idea of 
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the self (now multiple) and the uncritical appearance of narratives dependent upon normative linear 
temporality, ideas of development and progress. Rather than criticising Haraway or Hird, I want to 
suggest that there is a risk, a tension, and a political urgency in their writing that must be maintained 
and not collapsed. As Haraway states: ‘My multispecies storytelling is about recuperation in complex 
histories that are as full of dying as living, as full of endings – even genocides, the killing of kinds – as 
beginnings.’3 I gestured towards this in the previous chapter in my discussion of Haraway’s proposed 
use of curiosity as a critical practice. Curiosity must be as much about the danger of knowing 
nothing, of unbecoming, as of becoming-with and knowing more. As I argued in the previous 
chapter, knowing itself can be read as dangerously close to a distancing of subject and object; the 
kind of ‘knowing’ that Haraway is suggesting here, however, is the situated knowledge of 
connections and conversations, as articulated in the first chapter. Haraway’s situated knowledges 
and multispecies becoming-with are integral to my project. For this queer project, unbecoming is 
also important; unbecoming can counter narratives of development and progress – narratives that 
are linked to heteronormativity in ideas of reproduction, family and vertical inheritance.4 
Unbecoming is also important as becoming-with the virus – I will be specifically discussing the 
example of people living with HIV/AIDS – is also a biopolitical unbecoming, and this must be 
reckoned with, as it has real biological-social effects for the possibility of some biopolitical citizens to 
live well. 
I will be using the virus as a figure, to think through knots of meaning that are at once 
biological and social. To link the virus and the queer I will be focusing on an additional figure – that 
of the monster. I will suggest that the knotting of the queer, the virus and the monster can offer 
                                                          
3 Donna Haraway, ‘Cosmopolitical Critters: Companion Species, SF and Staying with the Trouble’, unpublished 
paper presented at Cosmopolitan Animals, John Coffin Memorial Lecture, Institute of English Studies, 26 
October 2012. A recording is available online at Youtube, 19 November 2012 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMIm0SeRRY4> [accessed 17 February 2013]. See also Haraway, ‘When 
Species Meet: Staying with the Trouble’. 
4 Unbecoming also has queer connotations related to ‘proper’ or normative behaviour. Behaviour unbecoming 
of an individual is that behaviour that is deemed improper, inappropriate, or unseemly. Unbecoming, in this 
chapter, carries all these non-normative connotations. 
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ways of rethinking possibilities of queer futurity – not only beyond norms of heterosexual 
reproduction but also for possible future ways of living-with the virus. In this final chapter, then, I 
will go beyond bacterial becoming-with, and employ a symbiosocial approach to the role of viruses 
in human genomics and evolution. I will explore the role of viruses as integral to life yet also 
threatening to it (in fact as questioning the very meaning of ‘life’); as productive in the phenomena 
of horizontal gene transfer and gene-shuffling; as dangerously interruptive to narratives of 
development, production and creation; and as figures that – through their liminal status and their 
interruptive abilities – can be useful for thinking futurity outside the normative concepts of familial 
kinship, development, progress and vertical inheritance. I will argue that this is especially pressing, 
as imagining and bringing about a future where we live without AIDS is important, but this can 
threaten to relegate people currently living with HIV/AIDS to a non-living category. Imagining and 
bringing about alternative futures of living with the virus is thus also essential for living well and 
dying well in the more-than-human world.  
What is a Virus? 
 I will be exploring the virus as a figure, but as I discussed in the previous chapter, figures are 
not metaphors or representations, but rather ‘material-semiotic nodes or knots in which diverse 
bodies and meaning co-shape one another’.5 Figures are ‘real’ material entities and also culturally 
and historically situated sites of meaning. It is therefore important for my project, which emphasises 
the agential character of the more-than-human, to explore the material and biological specificity of 
viruses (including their discovery/construction in and through the discourses of the biological 
sciences). Scientists had been aware that diseases could be caused by infectious microbes since the 
                                                          
5 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 4. 
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work of Louis Pasteur in Paris and Robert Koch in Berlin in the mid-nineteenth century.6 Robert Koch, 
in particular, conclusively demonstrated in 1876 that Bacillus anthracis caused anthrax disease.7 
Around the same time, German agricultural chemist Adolf Mayer was attempting to isolate the 
cause of the tobacco mosaic disease, which was devastating Dutch tobacco crops, stunting plant 
growth and causing mosaics of living and dead tissue on the plants’ leaves.8 Mayer eliminated the 
possibility of fungi and parasites, and began to investigate the possibility of infectious bacteria. He 
incubated cultures of bacteria from the sap of the plants, but failed to infect healthy plants with 
these bacteria, and his research concluded unsuccessfully. Then Martinus Beijerinck, a Dutch soil 
microbiologist, who had been working with Mayer, ground up diseased plants and passed the 
resultant fluid through a filter fine enough to block plant and bacteria cells. Beijerinck found that not 
only could he infect healthy plants with this filtered fluid, but he could then repeat the process with 
the newly-infected plants and infect more healthy plants. He thus concluded that there was 
something smaller than bacteria in the liquid, something that could spread disease and could self-
replicate.9 
 The properties of viruses were not defined scientifically until Pierre Roux, Director of the 
Pasteur Institute in Paris, described three characteristics of viruses: viruses were filterable (they 
could pass through filters which retained bacteria), invisible (they could not be seen with a light 
microscope), and non-culturable (unlike bacteria, they could not be grown on culture plates).10 It is 
                                                          
6 Dorothy H. Crawford, The Invisible Enemy: A Natural History of Viruses (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), especially pp. 11–15. My account of the discovery of viruses in the biological and chemical sciences is 
taken mainly from this source, and from Carl Zimmer, A Planet of Viruses (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2011). These are accounts of the discovery and spread of specific viruses, written for a lay audience. They are 
both useful texts for this chapter, as they place the discovery of viruses within social and historical contexts as 
well as exploring the relationship between the material specificity of HIV and other viruses and their personal 
and global effects. 
7 This was published in German as Robert Koch, ‘Untersuchungen über Bakterien: V. Die Ätiologie der 
Milzbrand-Krankheit, begründet auf die Entwicklungsgeschichte des Bacillus anthracis’ [‘Investigations into 
Bacteria: V. The Etiology of Anthrax, based on the Ontogenesis of Bacillus anthracis’], Cohns Beitrage zur 
Biologie der Pflanzen, 2:2 (1876), 277–310. 
8 Carl Zimmer, A Planet of Viruses, p. 13. 
9 Carl Zimmer, A Planet of Viruses, pp. 13–14. 
10 Crawford, The Invisible Enemy, pp. 13–14. 
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interesting to note that even when defined in this way, viruses are still problematic. Two out of three 
of these criteria are negative characteristics: a material agent’s invisibility or non-culturability makes 
it difficult to isolate, define and study. Filterability is also somewhat of a negative criterion: the 
ability to pass through a filter also represents the inability to capture the virus in a filter. Because of 
their invisibility to a light microscope, the physical structure of viruses was not revealed until the 
invention of electron microscopy in the 1930s. Wendell M. Stanley received the Nobel Prize for 
Chemistry in 1946 for his role in isolating, purifying and crystallising the tobacco mosaic virus in 1935 
and providing evidence that viruses are molecules similar in some respects to inert chemical 
substances. Stanley stated in 1961 that viruses are notoriously difficult to define. He argues: ‘About 
the only definition that all scientists will accept is: Something ... infectious and extremely small, 
which has the ability to cause disease in almost all living things, and which can reproduce only within 
living cells.’11 The advent of genomics has expanded this definition only slightly. N. J. Dimmock, 
Andrew J. Easton, and Keith Leppard’s Introduction to Modern Virology provides, by way of a 
definition, a list of six properties common to all viruses: 
 Viruses have a nucleic acid genome of either DNA or RNA. 
 Compared with a cell genome, viral genomes are small, but genomes of different viruses 
range in size by over 100-fold (c. 3000 nt [nucleotides] to 1,200,000 bp [base pairs]) 
 Small genomes make small particles – again with a 100-fold size range. 
 Viral genomes are associated with protein that at its simplest forms the virus particle, 
but in some viruses this nucleoprotein is surrounded by further protein or a lipid bilayer. 
 Viruses can only reproduce in living cells. 
 The outermost proteins of the virus particle allow the virus to recognize the correct host 
cell and gain entry into its cytoplasm.12 
                                                          
11 Wendell M. Stanley, Viruses and the Nature of Life (London: Methuen, 1961), p. 8. 
12 N. J. Dimmock, Andrew J. Easton, and Keith Leppard, Introduction to Modern Virology, 6th edn (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2007), p. 5. 
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The essential definition remains the same. Viruses are extremely small, infectious, and can only 
reproduce within living cells. Electron microscopy and genomics have shown that viruses are 
comprised of a genome and a protein layer. The question of whether or not viruses are classified as 
alive, however, is still highly problematic and it reinforces and expands the taxonomic difficulties 
posed by bacteria discussed in the previous chapter. 
 The classification of viruses as living or non-living is a contemporary concern in the biological 
sciences. The question relates to issues of phylogenetics and the construction of a tree of life, the 
origins of living matter, and what exactly counts as living and non-living in biological scientific theory 
and practice. In 2009 two articles were published in Nature that argued opposite sides of the debate. 
The first was entitled, ‘Ten Reasons to Exclude Viruses from the Tree of Life’, and the second – a 
response – was published four months later under the title, ‘Reasons to Include Viruses in the Tree 
of Life’. I will briefly summarise some of the main arguments put forward in these articles, with the 
intention of emphasising the problematic liminal nature of viruses: ‘organisms on the edge of life’. It 
is not my intention to attempt to settle the debate, or to agree with either of the two opposing 
views. Rather, I want to preserve the liminal status of the virus. I also want to draw attention to the 
fact that the definition of the boundary between life and death, much like the taxonomic practices 
involved in defining species boundaries, discussed in the previous chapter, is complicated and 
problematic, as well as being always a socially and historically contingent practice. This has particular 
relevance as I am arguing that the boundary not only structures the theory and practice of science, 
but has political consequences for human health and living well. 
 It is important, at this point, to emphasise that there are a number of different oppositions 
relating to life that are at work throughout this discussion, and which function in slightly different 
ways. These oppositions are not just living/non-living, but also (and this is not an exhaustive list): 
life/non-life, living/dying, life/death, organic/inorganic, animate/inanimate (with its connotations of 
spirit), functioning/non-functioning (or ‘junk’, in genetics and genomics), and the distinction 
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between citizenship or political life (bios) and bare life (zoē) from Agamben which I will explore in 
more detail shortly. These oppositions are similar and are at times intersectional and contiguous; 
however they are not interchangeable. In this chapter I will be focusing mainly on the virus as a 
material agent and some of the ways in which it problematises the living/non-living binary. However, 
thinking with the liminal virus can complicate the other related binary oppositions. Crucial to my 
project is the liminal status not just of the virus, but of people living with the virus – specifically their 
relation to the oppositions of living/dying and life/bare life. More specifically, people living with 
viruses are placed into a complicated relationship with the living/non-living status of their viral 
companions, their own life and death, as well as with their ability to live a political life, and to resist 
their categorisation as bare life.  
 Evolutionary biologist David Moreira and microbiologist Purificación López-García’s article, 
‘Ten Reasons to Exclude Viruses from the Tree of Life’, suggests that it could be argued that viruses’ 
status as either living or non-living is somewhat arbitrary. The authors, however, argue that: ‘We 
believe that considering viruses alive or not is not just a matter of opinion, contrary to a commonly 
held view, but rather is a matter of inference and logic starting from any given definition of life.’13 
Moreira and López-García’s argument is that from an agreed definition of life, viruses can be 
unproblematically defined as either living or not. From this starting-point, they outline ten reasons 
why viruses should not be considered living within their definition of life. These include the lack of 
an identifiable viral lineage correspondent to a genetic lineage or phylogeny, as well as the lack of an 
inherited structure that would suggest a common ancestor, unlike that which can be suggested for 
cells. Also, viral dependence on other organisms to self-sustain and self-replicate is used as evidence 
of the virus’s status as non-living. For an organism to be alive, in Moreira and López-García’s view, it 
                                                          
13 David Moreira and Purificación López-García, ‘Ten Reasons to Exclude Viruses from the Tree of Life’, Nature 
Reviews Microbiology, 7 (April, 2009), 306–311 (p. 307). 
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must self-sustain and self-replicate autonomously, and be classifiable within a vertical scale of 
genetic or biological inheritance.  
 In their letter of response, microbiologist Nagendra R. Hegde and others outline the 
opposite view, that viruses should be considered living organisms. They argue that it is misleading to 
classify organisms as living or not depending on whether they can autonomously self-sustain and 
self-replicate. They argue that: 
Although viruses need host cells for survival and replication, we cannot argue that viruses 
will not survive in nature if we leave them alone, as hosts themselves are part of the 
continuum of nature. In fact, even animals and birds are not sustained in nature unless they 
obtain food from other sources of life, that is, plants or other animals. Thus, similarly to 
viruses, animals and birds are dependent on other species to be sustained in nature.14 
Hegde and others propose that to argue that viruses are non-living, due to their dependence upon 
other organisms, would call into question the status of all living organisms; all organisms are, in 
some sense, dependent upon other organisms for their survival. They also argue that evidence from 
virus-plant interactions suggests that viruses have existed and evolved since the origin of life, 
although they have evolved at a much higher rate than other organisms. This, for the authors, would 
explain the polyphyletic character of viruses – the fact that viruses resist being classified into a single 
branching tree or phylogeny. Viral evolution seems to emphasise the impossibility of producing a 
clear singular tree of life, or at least draw attention to the contingency of boundary-making practices 
such as taxonomic classification.  
 The liminal status of the virus, and the difficulties that arise in the classification of viruses as 
either living or non-living, draw attention to the distinction between the living and non-living and 
how this distinction is maintained. Viruses draw attention to the agential cut that produces the idea 
                                                          
14 Nagendra R. Hegde and others, ‘Reasons to Include Viruses in Tree of Life’, Nature Reviews Microbiology, 7 
(August, 2009), 615 (p. 615). Birds are, of course, animals. It is unclear why the authors make this distinction. 
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of the living and non-living in opposition to each other. Essential to this cut is the way in which ‘life’ 
is understood and defined. Crucially, I will argue that the agential cut that defines life in opposition 
to the non-living has consequences for how ‘forms of life’ and ways of living are considered. I will 
give a brief and selective history of the concept of ‘life’ in order to draw out some of the implications 
for the definition of viruses and their role in evolution and contemporary genomics. Taking this a 
step further I will introduce the example of the HIV virus to illustrate that the liminal status of the 
virus and the material bodily experience of people living with viruses are entangled with both the 
definition of life forms and forms of life or ways of living. Initially, however, I will explore 
contemporary understandings of the virus in relation to genomics, to illustrate how contemporary 
scientific theory and practice negotiate the liminal status of the virus, and how the virus 
problematises any clear distinction between living and non-living. 
Viral Genomes 
 As discussed in Chapter Two, one of the consequences of the Human Genome Project, and 
the related large-scale focus on gene-sequencing in the 1990s was the realisation that genes were 
more complex than previously thought, and that only a small percentage of the genome actually 
coded for proteins. Previously, scientists had estimated that the human genome would contain 50-
100,000 protein-coding genes yet the Human Genome Project revealed that it only included 20-
25,000 (as a comparison, fruit flies have 13,000, roundworms 19,000 and some plants, such as rice, 
have as many as 46,000).15 Also, it became clear that these protein-coding genes actually make up 
only roughly 1.5% of the genome. Viral or viral-like genetic material is more prevalent than protein-
coding genes in the human genome. Human endogenated retroviruses (HERVs), ancient viruses that 
have been integrated into the genome, make up about 9%, and virus-like material makes up roughly 
                                                          
15 Carninci Piero and Hayashizaki Yoshihide, ‘Noncoding RNA Transcription beyond Annotated Genes’, Current 
Opinion in Genetics and Development, 17:2 (2007), 139–144. 
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another 34% of the human genome.16 The material in the genome that does not code for protein, or 
whose function is unknown, is often referred to as ‘junk DNA’.  
 The term ‘junk DNA’ was coined in 1972 by geneticist and evolutionary biologist Susumu 
Ohno to refer to sequences of amino acids that make up genes, but that seemingly have no 
function.17 The term continues to be used to refer to any portion of genome sequences that have no 
known function, even though the term is potentially misleading. It has been suggested that the term 
‘junk DNA’ actually holds back research.18 Theresa Marie MacPhail argues that the distinction 
between coding and non-coding genes (or between functioning and ‘junk’ DNA) is closely related to 
the distinction between the living and the non-living.19 To illustrate this point, and to put into 
question the gene as symbol for life, she uses the example of pseudogenes or ‘dead genes’. She 
refers to an article in Science, where Michael Snyder and Mark Gerstein define pseudogenes as: 
similar in sequence to normal genes, but they usually contain obvious disablements such as 
frameshifts or stop codons in the middle of coding domains. This prevents them from 
producing a functional product or having a detectable effect on the organism’s phenotype.20 
MacPhail argues that pseudogenes are still classified as genes, albeit false or dead versions of their 
living or functioning counterparts. This classification is not always easy to make, as non-functioning 
(or ‘dead’) genes in one organism can be functional (or ‘living’) in another, even within the same 
species. Snyder and Gerstein make this clear when they state: ‘The boundary between living and 
dead genes is often not sharp.’21 Contemporary research into ‘junk DNA’ is also beginning to suggest 
that non-coding genetic material has a variety of genomic functions, complicating and questioning 
                                                          
16 Frank Ryan, ‘I, Virus: Why you’re Only Half Human’, New Scientist, 29 January 2010. 
17 Susumo Ohno, ‘So much “Junk” DNA in our Genome’, Brookhaven Symposium on Biology, 23 (1972), 366–70. 
18 Wojciech Makalowski, ‘What is Junk DNA, and what is it Worth?’, Scientific American , 296:5 (2007), 104 
(p.104). 
19 Theresa Marie MacPhail, ‘The Viral Gene: An Undead Metaphor Recoding Life’, Science as Culture, 13:3 
(2004), 325–345. 
20 Michael Snyder and Mark Gerstein, ‘Defining Genes in the Genomics Era’, Science, 300 (2003), 258–260 (p. 
258). 
21 Snyder and Gerstein, ‘Defining Genes in the Genomics Era’, p. 259. 
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the distinction between the functioning/non-functioning, living/non-living, alive/dead in genomics.22 
The classification of genes as either living or ‘dead’, based on whether they code for proteins or have 
a known function, draws attention to the agential cut being made between life and non-life. At the 
same time, the prevalence of ‘dead’ material within a ‘living’ genome further complicates our 
understanding of genomics, as well as problematising the practice of creating and maintaining a 
distinction between the living and non-living. 
 The prevalence of virus-like material, as well as HERVs in the human genome further 
problematises the distinction between living and non-living in relation to genetic material. As 
MacPhail asks: ‘What would it mean if some of that non-coding “junk” were viruses or leftover viral 
remnants? Where would that leave the boundary between coding and non-coding, gene and virus, 
living and non-living, human and non-human?’23 Viruses are liminal material agents ‘on the edge of 
life’, not easily classified as either living or non-living. Within the gene, the virus’s liminality is 
compounded. As part of what was once considered ‘dead’ or ‘junk’ material within the genome, 
material that is only very recently being thought of as having a more active role, the virus somewhat 
collapses or threatens the distinction between the living and the non-living in genomics. MacPhail 
appropriates the metaphor of genes writing the book of life, and suggests thinking of the ‘viral gene’ 
as ‘death “scripting” life’.24 Importantly, the distinction between the living and the non-living is 
brought into question by the virus, and it is this interruptive ability of the virus – the ability to 
                                                          
22 The Encyclopedia of DNA Elements (ENCODE) published their findings in several articles in the journals 
Nature, Genome Biology, and Genome Research. In these articles they claim that approximately 80% could be 
functional, ascribing more functionality to genetic material that regulates the expression of the coding genes. 
The publications are all collected, along with further information, at ‘Research Papers’, Nature: ENCODE 
<http://www.nature.com/encode/category/research-papers> [accessed 24 February 2013]. Biologists are not, 
however, in agreement with the ENCODE findings. For particularly strident criticism, see Dan Graur and others, 
‘On the Immortality of Television Sets: “Function” in the Human Genome according to the Evolution-Free 
Gospel of ENCODE’, Genome Biology and Evolution, published online 20 February 2013 
<http://gbe.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2013/02/20/gbe.evt028.full.pdf+html> [accessed 24 February 
2013]. 
23 MacPhail, ‘The Viral Gene’, p. 332. 
24 MacPhail, ‘The Viral Gene’, p. 337. 
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interrupt and threaten normative classificatory practices – that I will draw on later in this chapter in 
relation to heteronormativity and temporality. 
MacPhail’s figure of the viral gene emphasises the existence of viral material in the human 
genome. She suggests that the distinction between genes and life, and viruses and death (or non-
life) is unsustainable: 
Genes are viruses are genes. From this perspective, there are no metaphysical polar 
opposites; therefore the definition of the gene must expand to include the possibility of non-
coding viruses or viral segments acting as exons. The comfortable conception of the gene as 
the fundamental unit of life and of the virus as an agent of disease or death becomes 
untenable. A new metaphor begins to emerge – one that draws upon ‘death’ as one of the 
central ‘authors’ of life.25 
It is worth noting that for MacPhail, this is a new metaphor; however, as I will discuss shortly, Michel 
Foucault argues that death is both frontier and structural interior to life and the very theory and 
practice of biology as a science, despite the attempt to enforce a living/non-living opposition. In 
Chapter Two I argued that genes are active agents, causing interference within biological-social 
diffraction patterns. Viral material with the genome further emphasises the complexity and non-
fixity of genomics. Viral agency within the gene also reflects the symbiosocial character of this 
diffraction pattern: genes themselves are not individual actors, but entangled biological-social 
agencies that are themselves formed in assemblage and relation with, among other agencies, the 
viral. Once again, it is turtles all the way down. As I explained in the previous chapter, 
symbiosociality inherits a Foucauldian history and is always about situated and specific instances and 
negotiations of biopolitics and biopower. The definition and maintenance of the boundary between 
living and non-living is an historically and culturally situated practice. The definition of life is always 
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socially mediated; as I will argue, the definition of life forms is always entangled with the definition 
and consideration of forms of life, or ways of living. To make this connection explicit I will explore 
the scientific question of what constitutes life, before looking at theorists that have elucidated the 
links between the biological and social definitions of life: that is, between life forms and forms of life.  
Life Forms and Forms of Life 
 The question of how to define life was posed by physicist Erwin Schrödinger in his 1944 
book, What is Life?, written for a lay audience. In this book, he approaches the question of how to 
define life from the perspective of physics and chemistry. Specifically, he asks: ‘How can the events 
in space and time which take place within the spatial boundary of a living organism be accounted for 
by physics and chemistry?’ The book is short and speculative, both in terms of physics and 
philosophy. However, Shrödinger states that the ‘inability of present-day physics and chemistry to 
account for such events is no reason at all for doubting that they can be accounted for by those 
sciences’.26 Schrödinger, one of the founders of quantum mechanics, held that life is material, and 
must be inherited through a molecule that repeats its structure. Published before the discovery of 
the helical structure of DNA, What is Life? suggests the existence of an ‘aperiodic crystal’ that he 
tentatively calls a ‘gene’ and suggests could be the ‘material carrier of life’.27 Lynn Margulis and 
Dorion Sagan, writing more than 50 years later suggest that Schrödinger’s original text was, despite 
his insistence on the materiality of life, a celebration of the complexity of life rather than a reduction 
of life to mechanical principles.28 In their book, What is Life? Margulis and Sagan attempt to ‘put the 
life back into biology’ and update Schrödinger’s enquiry.29 Throughout the book Margulis and Sagan 
define life as the complex relations between organisms of all sizes that make up the biosphere. 
                                                          
26 Erwin Schrödinger, What is Life? The Physical Aspect of the Living Cell (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1951 [1944]), p. 1–2. 
27 Schrödinger, What is Life?, pp. 3 and 29. 
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Crucial to their definition of life is the concept of autopoiesis. Margulis and Sagan define autopoiesis 
as metabolism, self-perpetuation through chemical activity, energy expenditure and ‘the making of 
messes’.30 For Margulis and Sagan, an organism is alive if it self-perpetuates, metabolises and 
increases the disorder in its immediate environment. Using this set of criteria, Margulis and Sagan 
reject reproduction (or replication) as a criterion of life, arguing that focusing on replication rather 
than autopoiesis would, for example, relegate mules (the sterile offspring of a horse and a donkey) 
as well as ‘humans who no longer, never could, or simply choose not to reproduce’ to the status of 
‘nonliving’.31 Interestingly, this comment gestures to (even though it avoids fully commenting on) 
the close relation between how life is defined biologically and how ways of living are considered 
socially.  
 Michel Foucault emphasises the relation between the definition of life and the discourse of 
science as a social practice in The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. Foucault 
argues that at the end of the eighteenth century the classificatory practices of natural history began 
to change; specifically he claims that a new division between the living and non-living – between the 
organic and inorganic – began to structure the theory and practice of a new science, called biology.  
Historians want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but they do not 
realize that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been 
familiar to us for a hundred and fifty years is not valid for a previous period. And that, if 
biology was unknown, there was a very simple reason for it: that life itself did not exist. All 
that existed was living beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted 
by natural history.32 
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Foucault argues that classification and the practice of taxonomy existed in the eighteenth century as 
part of a discourse of natural history. Biology, however, was fundamentally structured over the 
binary oppositions of living/non-living, organic/inorganic. He states that at the end of the eighteenth 
century:  
The organic becomes the living and the living is that which produces, grows, and reproduces; 
the inorganic is that non-living, that which neither develops nor reproduces; it lies at the 
frontiers of life, it is so as that element within it that destroys and kills it.33 
For Foucault, the discourse of biology and the opposition of life and death – of the living and non-
living – were co-constitutive. The emergence of ‘something resembling a biology’ enabled and was 
enabled by the emergence of a fundamental opposition of life and death.34 Foucault draws attention 
to the fact that the seeming opposition of living and non-living in biology does not, in fact, function 
as an opposition. This insight supports MacPhail’s work on viral material within the human genome. 
Nonlife is both life’s frontier and internal to its structure and function. 
 Nikolas Rose expands upon Foucault’s argument, as well as that of Giorgio Agamben in 
Homo Sacer, in his influential work on the politics of ‘life itself’.35 Agamben argues in Homer Sacer 
that the definition of life is always political. In particular, he claims that a healthy body politic 
requires the control and elimination of individuals and communities that are perceived as 
threatening its health. Agamben draws a distinction between zoē, what he calls ‘bare life’ and bios. 
Agamben describes the difference as follows: zoē refers to ‘the simple fact of living common to all 
beings’ or ‘bare life’, while bios indicates ‘the form or way of living proper to an individual or a 
group’.36 For Agamben, biopower functions through defining and excluding bare life from the life of 
                                                          
33 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 252. 
34 Foucault, The Order of Things, p. 252. 
35 Nikolas Rose, ‘The Politics of Life Itself’, Theory, Culture and Society, 18:6 (2001), 1–30; and The Politics of 
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the body politic. As Rose summarises, ‘Agamben asserts that “the camp” is the “biopolitical 
paradigm of the modern”: when the collective body of the people becomes the principal resource 
for politics, the purging of defective individuals becomes an essential part of the care of life.’37 Rose 
agrees with Agamben’s formulation of biopower as far as the first half of the twentieth century is 
concerned. He claims, with Agamben, that:  
Health was understood as fitness, and the problem was framed in terms of the political 
importance attached to the fitness of the national population considered en masse, as it 
competed with other national populations. Population fitness was liable to threats from 
within and without, and national governments had the obligation to guard against these 
threats and to take measures to enhance that fitness through policies that were formulated 
by, and enacted through, the apparatus of the state.38 
Rose argues, however, that biopower does not function in quite the same way in contemporary 
science, politics and health practices. In a conclusion that I will return to and question in relation to 
HIV/AIDS and recent US immigration policy, he claims that biopower no longer functions through the 
classification, identification, elimination or constraint of individuals considered dangerous to the 
overall health or fitness of the population, nation or race. Rather, he claims that contemporary 
biopolitics functions primarily through risk management.39 
 The interpretation and elaboration of Foucault’s biopolitics, Rose’s ‘politics of life itself’, and 
Agamben’s bare life that I find most useful for my project and will be employing here is that put 
forward by Stefan Helmreich in Alien Ocean: Anthropological Voyages in Microbial Seas. Helmreich 
usefully explores the distinction and relation between biological ‘life forms’ and social ‘forms of life’ 
(as corollaries to Agamben’s zoē and bios).40 For Helmreich, Rose’s formulation of a molecular 
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Press, 2009), p. 82. 
202 
 
biopolitics suggests the possibility of transfer, building on the phenomenon of horizontal gene 
transfer, as well as protein and tissue transfer and transplantation: ‘transfer may be the practice 
through which new biopolitical links – between persons and patent, polymorphisms and politics – 
will be forged’.41 Helmreich suggests that: 
The mobility and delocalization facilitated by the dynamics of transfer also mean that 
nation-states are no longer the exclusive bankers of biopower; corporations, universities, 
patient advocacy groups, and many others reshuffle not just the substance at stake in 
biopower but also relations between society and biology to begin with.42 
Crucial to my project is Helmreich’s articulation of ‘life forms’ and ‘forms of life’. Although the virus 
is arguably not a life form, its classification matters and is caught up in the biopolitics of what forms 
of life are proper or acceptable to individuals or groups. The virus is part of the body politic in that it 
must be closely identified, watched, detected, and controlled. It is, in fact, central to biopolitics. 
Also, Helmreich emphasises the always political nature of this distinction; in the example I will 
explore shortly – people living with HIV/AIDS – individuals are often relegated to the status of bare 
life and denied political citizenship. Not only this, but practices and communities (forms of life) are 
also placed under threat. Importantly for my argument, however, is the possibility of alternative 
positions. In this articulation, communities such as patient advocacy groups can resist dominant 
deployments of biopower, through horizontal community formation, and the mobilisation and 
delocalisation of knowledge and power through the dynamics of transfer. 
Living with the Virus: HIV 
 While still preserving the problematic and liminal position of the virus somewhere between 
living and non-living, between an organism and the inorganic, I want to discuss a particular example 
of a virus. I will be applying Haraway’s insistence upon curiosity as the first obligation of companion 
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species, asking – in a similar vein to the bacterial question posed in the previous chapter – who and 
what are the biological-social partners touching in human-viral relations? Specifically I will be 
focusing on HIV and exploring the companion species relationships between humans and viruses, 
and thinking through some of the biological and political consequences. As I have previously stated, 
it is important for my project to pay close attention to the specificity of the material agent in 
question when starting from the assumption that the world is active and agential, and not just a 
passive resource for either scientific or social theories. Thus, a brief exploration of HIV’s material 
specificity is important. HIV, or human immunodeficiency virus, is a retrovirus. Virologist Dorothy 
Crawford (who, interestingly, describes viruses as ‘organisms’ – and therefore presumably living – 
throughout her work The Invisible Enemy) describes retroviruses as follows:  
Retroviruses [...] are so called because of their unique survival strategy. Their genetic 
material is carried as RNA, whereas in all organisms except RNA viruses the genetic code is 
carried as DNA which is only translated into RNA as a prelude to making protein from an 
individual gene.43 
Retroviruses contain their RNA and an enzyme called reverse transcriptase which reverses a cell’s 
usual process of converting DNA into RNA so as to convert the viral RNA into a DNA copy. This copy 
is then integrated into the host cell’s own DNA and can remain inside the cell for its lifetime as a 
latent infection.44  
 With HIV, the latent infection stage is an average of 10 years in the west. Initial infection 
results in mild flu-like symptoms or an illness similar to glandular fever. Crawford explains: 
At this stage, levels of HIV in the blood are very high, the virus spreads throughout the body 
in CD4 T cells [important white blood cells that activate or direct other immune cells] and 
even lodges in the brain. This infection is brought under control 2–3 weeks later when the 
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immune response is fully operational and the person recovers to remain healthy for an 
average of 10 years.45 
Initially, the immune system controls the spread of the virus through the body, but the virus 
reproduces extremely quickly and every time it reproduces it produces mutations that can evade 
detection. Viruses that have mutations that can evade the immune system are favoured by natural 
selection; they therefore proliferate wildly until the immune system catches up, by which time new 
mutations have arisen and the process repeats.46 HIV can destroy 1 to 2 billion CD4 T cells every day 
throughout this process.47 In the early stages of the infection, new cells made in the bone marrow 
make up for the deficit, but Crawford uses the metaphor of a sink with inflowing water from a 
running tap and outflowing water through a drain. As soon as outflow (the number of cells killed by 
HIV) exceeds inflow (new CD4 T-cells from the bone marrow), immune deficiency follows.48 This, 
along with opportunistic infections from other viruses, bacteria and fungi, can lead to the final stage 
of infection – AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome).49 
 The origin of HIV is hard to determine, but many virologists and epidemiologists believe that 
it originated in sub-Saharan Africa, and crossed the species barrier from monkeys and 
chimpanzees.50 Robin A. Weiss and Richard W. Wrangham, molecular biologist and primatologist 
respectively, emphasise in an article in Nature that the hypothesised origin of HIV-1 in chimpanzees 
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(HIV-2, the strain of the virus localised to West Africa is thought to have originated in monkeys) 
bears upon a number of issues including viral evolution, disease transmission including trans-species 
infection, and conservation.51 The virus’s origin story is, in fact, not what is most important here; 
what is important is rather that even in its hypothetical origin, the virus is entangled up in 
multispecies knots.52 Furthermore, upon spreading worldwide and becoming a pandemic, HIV also 
became a site of intersection for a number of other issues. HIV is primarily spread by sexual 
intercourse but has also spread through needle-sharing in drug use, emphasising the role of drug 
policies and enforcement. Crawford describes how policies in Edinburgh at the beginning of the 
1980s – such as discouraging pharmacists and surgical supply shops from supplying needles to drug 
users, as well as the removal of injection equipment whenever drugs were seized – led to a greater 
number of cases of HIV than anywhere else in the UK. Chief among the dangerous phenomena that 
arose in the face of such drug policy was that of ‘shooting galleries’, where numerous intravenous 
drug users would gather and inject on site, sharing equipment between up to forty people, and leave 
without incriminating evidence such as syringes. Drugs policy, as well as complex issues of class (as 
Crawford points out, ‘most intravenous drug users in Edinburgh were young, local people who never 
left the city’) here intersect with virology, disease transmission and public health.53  
 I am exploring HIV/AIDS as a figure – a very real biological-social agent that knots together a 
number of biological, social and political threads, including issues of class, nation, policy and 
conservation. HIV/AIDS has been devastating to gay communities as well as to black and 
disadvantaged communities across the world. The virus, and its dangerous and deadly effects, 
illuminates the intersections of class, sexuality and race through the definition of both life forms and 
forms of life. As early as 1983, Larry Kramer drew attention to the intersection of class, sexuality and 
race in the biopolitics of HIV/AIDS and its scientific research and medical treatment: 
                                                          
51 Robin A. Weiss and Richard W. Wrangham, ‘From Pan to Pandemic’, Nature, 397 (1999), 385–86. 
52 See Deborah Bird Rose, ‘Multispecies Knots of Ethical Time’, Environmental Philosophy, 9:1 (2012), 127–140. 
53 Crawford, The Invisible Enemy, p. 66. 
206 
 
There have been no confirmed cases of AIDS in straight, white, non-intravenous-drug-using, 
middle-class Americans. The only confirmed straights struck down by AIDS are members of 
groups just as disenfranchised as gay men: intravenous drug users, Haitians, eleven 
haemophiliacs (up from eight), black and Hispanic babies, and wives or partners of IV drug 
users and bisexual men.54 
Although the spread of HIV/AIDS has affected many other groups since the early 1980s, 
disenfranchised communities are still disproportionately affected. As an example of complex and 
intersectional biopolitics, the example of HIV/AIDS also prompts a reconsideration of Rose’s 
argument that biopower no longer functions through the classification, identification, elimination or 
constraint of individuals considered dangerous to the overall health or fitness of the population, 
nation or race. Until 2010, the United States continued to deny immigrants citizenship on the basis 
of HIV/AIDS status. The ban on people with HIV/AIDS entering the USA and becoming US citizens 
was enacted in 1988 and only lifted in 2010.55 Considering this alongside Kramer’s statement from 
1983, demonstrates the complex ways in which forms of biopower have in some sense changed and 
in some sense remain the same. In Rose’s formulation of biopower, the nation state no longer 
protects itself and the notion of national health by identifying and eliminating or constraining 
individuals considered dangerous. The US ban demonstrates, however, that biopolitics can still 
function by eliminating groups or individual from the body of the nation, despite a shift in 
biopolitical meaning such as Rose describes. 
Crucially, the US ban suggests that an individual with HIV/AIDS is considered a dangerous 
entity – much like a virus – that must be prevented from entering the body of the nation. The law led 
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to many people living with HIV/AIDS in the US becoming liminal figures, not just in terms of their 
illness but in terms of their national identity. Judith Butler, glossing Agamben, states that: 
a subject deprived of rights of citizenship enters a suspended zone, neither living in the 
sense that a political animal lives, in community and bound by law, nor dead and, therefore, 
outside the constituting condition of the rule of law.56 
Thus, a person living with HIV/AIDS is reconfigured as a threat to the nation state, a dangerous 
liminal individual positioned somewhere between life and non-life. However, the mobility and 
delocalisation facilitated by the dynamics of transfer, as outlined by Helmreich, may also allow for 
the wielding and resisting of biopower by interest groups other than the nation state. This is an 
important point and can be seen in the ways that patient advocacy groups have worked to change 
the meanings associated with living with HIV/AIDS as well as reconfiguring infected bodies as active 
sites of biomedical knowledge rather than passive resource for biomedical science.57 A more 
complex formulation of biopower and biopolitics is needed for the consideration of HIV/AIDS – a 
formulation that also takes into account the complex intersection of sexuality, economic power and 
race, as well as virology, epidemiology, national and international legal policy and issues of ecology, 
conservation, and multispecies worlding. 
Queer Ecologies and Viral Evolution 
 I want to propose a queer ecological approach that recognises the fact that the human is 
always already embedded in networks of more-than-human agency, as well as stressing the 
biological-social, and also political, character of these networks. A queer ecological approach, I want 
to suggest, emphasises the entanglement of the biological and the social, and the ways in which life 
forms and forms of life are connected. My queer ecological approach will also be symbiosocial; the 
constitutive entanglements never resolve into individual actors. Sketching a preliminary framework 
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of queer ecology, Timothy Morton asks: ‘Ecology stems from biology, which has nonessentialist 
aspects. Queer theory is a nonessentialist view of gender and sexuality. It seems the two domains 
intersect, but how?’58 Morton’s framework of queer ecology is useful as he recognises the 
dangerous and chaotic character of the world. As he states, ‘If anything, life is catastrophic, 
monstrous, nonholistic, and dislocated, not organic, coherent, or authoritative. Queering ecological 
criticism will involve engaging with these qualities.’59 Morton’s queer ecology is non-deterministic, 
something which he claims sets it apart from feminist ecocriticism. (Morton implies, rather unfairly, 
that the majority of feminist ecocriticism relies too heavily on rigid gender binaries and biological 
determinism.) Morton’s framework embeds the human in a network of living and non-living 
agencies, and through doing this, opens the human up to unpredictable encounters with strange and 
unknowable others. For Morton, queer ecologies are always ‘to come’, echoing Derridean concepts 
of the future and the monstrous arrivant: a figure that I will discuss in more detail towards the end 
of this chapter. 
 As I argued in Chapter Two, queering is about relationality. My queer account is one that 
draws attention to discourses, narratives, bodies, communities and practices and how they intersect 
and relate, and how these relationalities can structure and be structured by norms of gender and 
sexuality. More specifically, my queer account draws attention to the political uses of scientific 
narratives and the fact that narratives and knowledges are formed in a dynamic relationality with 
each other and issues of gender and sexuality, as well as social and political forces of normativity and 
resistance. In Chapter Three I looked at queer kinship to rethink the definition of the human, and to 
question individuality and autonomy in biological and social accounts of organisms. What is clear 
from Chapter Three’s discussion of Lynn Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis is that all bodies are full 
of multispecies agencies and entangled in multispecies relationships. In fact, all bodies are always 
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already infected. If we have never been individuals, then neither have we been uninfected and pure. 
Although there remains a pervasive social stigma attached to particular infected, ill or diseased 
bodies, all bodies are always already infected, even from before birth. Viewing all bodies as 
multispecies assemblages – rather than seeing bodies as either clean, healthy and pure, or infected, 
unhealthy and impure – could have consequences for how infected bodies are conceived of, and 
therefore treated and cared for. This is both a biological and a political point, and is central to my 
queer account of the body, and of non-normative practices and communities. 
 A queer ecological approach draws attention to the innumerable constitutive relations and 
interconnections in which the human is always already entangled. The virus is an interesting figure, 
or knot, within this entangled ecology. Human entanglement with the virus is not just a 
contemporary phenomenon, but is also historical, temporal and ancestral. Scientists have 
speculated that viruses may have had a more active role in the evolution of, and possibly the origins 
of, life than previously thought. Also, scientists are increasingly recognising the importance of 
horizontal gene transfer to evolution, and recognising viruses’ roles within this phenomenon.60 
Helmreich suggests that, since Darwin, evolutionary biologists have tended to try to arrange 
evolutionary descent in a tree-like system. However, microbiological research suggests that this 
practice may be misinformed: 
It may be difficult to build trees, not only because of the tools scientists use, but because 
genes may often be transmitted laterally, within generations, in addition to cascading 
vertically ‘down’ generations. Microbes shuffle genes back and forth with their 
contemporaries, an activity mixing up their own and others’ genealogies. Such lateral gene 
transfer could make it extremely difficult to arrive at a root for the tree of life.61 
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The prevalence of horizontal gene transfer in bacterial evolution and the importance of bacterial 
symbiogenesis in the process of speciation and descent complicate the overly-simplistic metaphor of 
the tree of life. Helmreich recounts a conversation with biochemist Ford Doolittle, an opponent of 
the view of evolutionary descent as a bifurcating tree stemming from a single common ancestor, in 
which Doolittle complains that ‘people have deep paradigmatic commitments to trees; they are 
wedded to genes and trees’.62 Elsewhere Doolittle has questioned whether this commitment to 
trees in fact limits and obscures attempts to study the evolutionary histories of organisms:  
To what extent is our desire to look at early evolution in terms of cellular lineages preventing 
us from seeing that it is about genes and their promiscuous spread across taxonomic 
boundaries, which then have no permanent significance?63 
Doolittle and his colleagues’ suggestion is a ‘Synthesis of Life’ which involves a rethinking of 
phylogenesis as the ‘development of a species or other group of organisms through a succession of 
forms’, which, ‘in no way requires that species or other groups be produced solely through 
divergence, nor that diagrammatic representation of the evolutionary development of species must 
be a bifurcating tree’.64 While Helmreich agrees with Doolittle’s argument that the tree of life 
metaphor does not accurately represent microbial evolutionary relations, he draws attention to the 
fact that this ‘Synthesis of Life’, although it questions the reliance on trees, does not question the 
reliance on the symbol of the gene as ‘life itself’, and thus reifies the boundary between life and non-
life. As Helmreich states: ‘What is preserved in this new map [...] is the figure of the gene, continuing 
to serve as a token, a black box, representing the flow of “life”.’65 It is my argument that viruses act 
as an interruption to this flow of ‘life’ through the gene, and draw attention to the blurring of the 
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boundaries of the life/non-life binary in the ecological mesh. Through their real material interruption 
and penetration of cells, they also further demonstrate the contingent and situated definition of 
autonomy and individuality, an important point for my thesis as a whole. 
 I employ the term ‘mesh’ at this point, following Morton, as he uses this image to think 
through the interconnectedness of all living and non-living agencies. For Morton, a mesh is a better 
metaphor than a tree. He argues that with a mesh there is no clear starting point, and that the 
relations and connections between organisms (or, more properly, all living and non-living agencies) 
are not linear. In the mesh, each point is ‘both the center and edge of a system of points, so there is 
no absolute center or edge’.66 Furthermore: 
‘Mesh’ can mean the holes in a network and the threading between them. It suggests both 
hardness and delicacy. It has uses in biology, mathematics, and engineering and in weaving 
and computing – think stockings and graphic design, metals and fabrics. It has antecedents 
in mask and mass, suggesting both density and deception. By extension, ‘mesh’ can mean ‘a 
complex situation or series of events in which a person is entangled; a concatenation of 
constraining or restricting forces or circumstances; a snare’. In other words, it's perfect.67 
For Morton, the mesh is both a network and the spaces in between. I find the mesh a useful figure, 
as it suggests at once the possibilities that interconnectedness bring while also emphasising the 
constraining or restricting nature of connections: the responsibilities that are inherent in all 
relationships to the other. The mesh is also analogous to a diffraction pattern – a biological-social 
network where relations, connections, interferences and differences matter. I do not agree that the 
mesh should necessarily replace the idea of the network, especially when considering the 
importance of ‘networks of responsibility’ described in previous chapters. The mesh is useful, 
however, for considering the interconnectedness of human agency with viral and bacterial agencies 
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that rely on horizontal gene transfer, complicating and challenging attempts to construct and reify a 
model of a tree.  
 Viruses are also thought by some scientists to be intimately linked to the origin of life itself. 
The discovery of a virus bigger than some bacteria and visible with a light microscope prompted 
some scientists to suggest a viral ancestry to the nucleus in the cell (similar to the bacterial ancestry 
of mitochondria).68 The virus was named the mimivirus and was previously thought to be a 
bacterium. Some go further, suggesting that the mimivirus is evidence that the Last Universal 
Common Ancestor to all life on earth, or LUCA, was viral. Interestingly, a single universal common 
ancestor is only possible with very strict and straight phylogenies or trees, and it is exactly these 
trees that viral gene-shuffling and evolution make impossible to construct. Virologist Luis Villarreal, a 
proponent of the theory that LUCA was viral said of the mimivirus discovery: ‘The genes and gene 
functions suggest that we're dealing with one of the earliest and oldest forms of life. Mimivirus really 
stretches our sense of scale of what a virus can be.’69 For some scientists, the discovery of mimivirus 
and other findings in the field of virology suggest that ancient viruses were significant in the creation 
of DNA from its chemical constituents, and thus the creation of life.70 Once again, the gene as a 
symbol for life, strictly distinct from non-life, is interrupted by the virus. The suggestion that DNA, 
the sacred symbol for life, was ‘born’ of viruses, material agents that are so closely associated with 
disease and death, further complicates the ‘viral gene’ framework that MacPhail suggests. Villarreal 
suggests that this confusion and complication can be explained by a misunderstanding of viruses’ 
parasitic nature: 
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I think what confuses people is their assumption that parasites are only damaging things [...] 
How do you get creation and complexity out of them? You do because they persist, and to 
do that you have to take on all comers. You come up with inventions that prevent you from 
being displaced.71 
It is important to emphasise that Villarreal does not suggest that viruses be thought of as creative 
rather than destructive, but rather that through their capability for infection and destruction, they 
have ‘come up with inventions’, in an evolutionary sense, that may have had significant effects on 
the creation and evolution of life. Viruses are not replacements as symbols for the creation of life, 
nor do they simply represent death and disease. Rather, they are liminal agents that draw attention 
to the boundary-making practices that go into defining the relationship of life and death, or creation 
and destruction. 
Interruptions: Failure and Unbecoming  
 Viruses function as interruptions to attempts to construct or reify a tree of life, suggesting 
that a mesh-like network of connections, entanglements and transfer is more appropriate. The idea 
of interruption is important here. I propose that interruption is an important and useful critical 
practice, not only because critical interruption can function as an intervention to narratives, theories 
or practices going awry, but also because interruptions can deliberately trip, skew, queer or 
encourage their going awry.72 Interruptions can be moments of potential difference – or 
interference, to evoke interruption’s diffractive character – within narratives of progress that 
reinforce or unquestioningly reproduce the status quo. Not only does classifying organisms within an 
ossified ‘tree of life’ not reflect the work of horizontal gene transfer, symbioses and viruses in 
evolution, but it implicitly supports human exceptionalism and an overemphasis on sexual 
reproduction and vertical inheritance. Mary Midgeley draws attention to the humanist undertones 
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of the tree metaphor when she claims that Darwin, in fact, ‘developed his own view of selection on 
the humbler model of a bush – a rich radiation of varying forms, in which human qualities cannot, 
any more than any others, determine a general direction for the whole.’73 Midgeley’s argument 
suggests that attempts to arrange organisms into trees are inclined to organise the tree in terms of 
human qualities which would determine direction, progress and norms. A classification of organisms 
into a ‘tree of life’ also focuses on sexual reproduction and vertical inheritance. Lynn Margulis and 
Dorion Sagan argue that this is zoocentric, while Hird argues that feminist engagements with biology 
can benefit from a focus on microontologies, as discussed in the previous chapter. Trees of life also 
function through ‘straight time’: that is, a linear ordering of the past, present and future structured 
around heterobiological reproduction, normative development and progress.74 Once again, scientific 
narratives can be used for a variety of political purposes. Trees of life can have a number of 
normative connotations, and can support human exceptionalism as well as overemphasising vertical 
inheritance and heterobiological reproduction. 
 In the face of heteronormative narratives of development and progress, Halberstam 
suggests celebrating what she calls, ‘the queer art of failure’.75 Halberstam argues that queer failure 
is a preferable alternative to conventional understandings of success, which she argues equate ‘too 
easily to specific forms of reproductive maturity combined with wealth accumulation’.76 Halberstam 
suggests that: ‘Under certain circumstances failing, losing, forgetting, unmaking, undoing, 
unbecoming, not knowing may in fact offer more creative, more cooperative, more surprising ways 
                                                          
73 Mary Midgeley, Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Stranger Fears, rev. edn (London: Routledge, 
2002 [1985]), p. 7. Although Darwin expressed that the metaphor of trees ‘largely speaks the truth’, about the 
relationship between members of the same biological class (Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by means 
of Natural Selection: Or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life [London: John Murray, 
1859], p. 129), Midgeley is right to stress that Darwin’s description of the relation of organisms is decidedly 
more bush- (or mesh-) like. 
74 Judith Halberstam, In a Queer Time and Space: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives (New York: New York 
University Press, 2005). See also Tom Boellstorff, ‘When Marriage Falls: Queer Coincidences in Straight Time’, 
GLQ, 13:2–3 (2007), 227–248. 
75 Judith Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011). 
76 Halberstam, The Queer Art of Failure, p. 2. 
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of being in the world.’77 Posing the question, ‘What kinds of reward can failure offer us?’, 
Halberstam suggests: 
Perhaps most obviously, failure allows us to escape the punishing norms that discipline 
behavior and manage human development with the goal of delivering us from unruly 
childhoods to orderly and predictable adulthoods. Failure preserves some of the wondrous 
anarchy of childhood and disturbs the supposedly clean boundaries between adults and 
children, winners and losers. And while failure certainly comes accompanied by a host of 
negative affects, such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair, it also provides the 
opportunity to use these negative affects to poke holes in the toxic positivity of 
contemporary life.78 
For Halberstam, success and progress are linked to heteronormative narratives and structures that 
are both restrictive and conservative. As an alternative, Halberstam suggests celebrating failure, as a 
way of escaping such norms and gesturing towards different non-normative futures and possibilities. 
I want to suggest that failure is a useful interruption to narratives of becoming that I have 
inherited from Haraway’s companion species approach to other-worlding. In the previous chapter I 
suggested that curiosity as a critical practice must be one that is inherently dangerous, drawing 
human and more-than-human agencies into networks of responsibility that threaten to undo the 
identity and position of any and all of the partners in relation. To this end, I suggested that 
Haraway’s demand that we know more at the end of the day than at the beginning be reframed to 
include the possibility of knowing less or nothing. This, I want to argue, is an essential interruption to 
Haraway’s companion species approach. I also want to expand this to argue that becoming should 
not be privileged at the expense of unbecoming, or of failing to become. An approach that does not 
take into account the possibilities and potentialities of failing to become is too dangerously close to 
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narratives of progress, development and success that, as outlined by Halberstam, are structured by 
heteronormativity and the reinforcing or unquestioning reproduction of the status quo. Becoming 
with companion species must not simply be becoming more, and becoming better. There must 
always be the dangerous possibility of knowing less and becoming less – of knowing nothing and 
failing to become. This is especially important in a queer engagement with evolutionary theory that 
is often used to disqualify any non-heterosexuality as either a failure to develop or as a danger to 
humanity’s future: as, in short, monstrous (something I will return to shortly). Instead of attempting 
to fit homosexuality into the logic of evolutionary progress and development and thus assigning it a 
measure of ‘success’, Halberstam’s celebration of queer failure can be appropriated and developed 
as a political position, suggesting the queer in evolution as a failure that offers other ways of thinking 
about development and inheritance, as well as temporalities and possible futures. 
 Halberstam’s notion of queer failure and unbecoming can also be developed for political 
purposes in terms of people living with HIV/AIDS. As I suggested earlier through Butler’s reading of 
Agamben, and in reference to US immigration policy, people living with HIV/AIDS become liminal 
figures, suspended between life and death in the category of bare life. Individuals become both less-
than-human and more-than-human simultaneously as they, to some extent, become the virus – a 
dangerous entity that it is the state’s responsibility to control and eradicate. Becoming-with the 
virus, therefore, is often a very clear example of unbecoming. While employing Halberstam’s failure 
and unbecoming in this respect, it is very important to remember the danger and ‘negative affects, 
such as disappointment, disillusionment, and despair’ that accompany unbecoming.79 It is also a 
dangerous theoretical negotiation, as people living with HIV/AIDS are often vilified (in the 
conservative press especially) as failures, with HIV/AIDS being interpreted as a punishment or 
consequence of a dangerous failed ‘lifestyle’. HIV/AIDS activists have also worked hard to move 
beyond characterisations of victimhood to become active in the production of biomedical 
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knowledge.80 However, mindful of these dangers, I maintain that the biopolitical unbecoming of 
people living with HIV/AIDS, and their relegation to the liminal category of bare life has allowed (or 
perhaps demanded) connections and communities to form, and for activist and patient advocacy 
groups to demand active involvement in the production of biomedical knowledge. This, I argue, is 
possible in part precisely because of the liminal status of the virus and the category of bare life 
within contemporary biopolitics. 
Queer Temporalities and Viral Interruptions 
The distinction between life and death, or the living and non-living, involves a certain 
temporal frame. This temporal frame suggests a linear ordering of past, present and future, as well 
as relying upon traditional notions of genealogy and vertical inheritance. This corresponds with 
Halberstam’s notion of ‘straight time’. In the work, In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, 
Subcultural Lives, Halberstam suggests that ‘part of what has made queerness compelling as a form 
of self-description in the past decade or so has to do with the way it has the potential to open up 
new life narratives and alternative relations to time and space’.81 Alternative relations to time are 
those that resist the normativities of ‘straight time’ – that is, temporality structured by reproductive 
sexuality and familial kinship. I also want to expand Halberstam’s argument to include linear tree-like 
models of evolution and over-investment in biology on sexual reproduction and vertical inheritance. 
In contrast, the virus seems to follow a very queer temporality. One of the arguments put forward by 
scientists who argue that viruses are non-living is that their polyphyletic character makes them 
impossible to incorporate into existing trees of vertical evolutionary inheritance. Viruses resist this 
linear ordering of temporality. Viruses also interrupt the linear ordering of life and death, drawing 
attention to the fact that non-life is both life’s frontier and its structural interior. The figure of the 
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virus prompts a rethinking of temporality in terms of non-linearity and outside of the frame of 
vertical inheritance and heterobiological reproduction.  
The living and the non-living are related temporally. The non-living is assumed to be 
oppositional to the living, both preceding and following it. However, as I have shown, viruses trouble 
this conception of the relationship between life and non-life, and draw attention to the situated 
character of the cuts that produce this apparent opposition. Viruses, through their integration into 
the genome and through the dynamics of transfer that they bring about, also queer any sense of 
straight time in evolutionary narratives. This has consequences for how we think of the future, and 
in particular how we begin to think a queer futurity. For José Esteban Muñoz, the idea of the future 
is always already queer, and queerness is always directed at a future to come. He describes 
queerness as a horizon, stating that ‘the future is queerness’s domain’.82 For Muñoz, queerness is 
always oriented towards possible alternative futures and is thus utopian. He argues that, 
Queerness as utopian formation is a formation based on an economy of desire and desiring. 
This desire is always directed at that thing that is not yet here, objects and moments that 
burn with anticipation and promise [...] Queerness is utopian and there is something queer 
about the utopian.83 
My project aligns closely with Muñoz’s formulation of queer futurity and ideas of utopia as a 
horizon. Specifically, the continual striving for alternative forms of life and ways of becoming-with 
others in the more-than-human world is always utopian, political, and queer.  
Narratives of evolutionary success, based on norms of heterobiological reproduction, are 
interrupted by viruses that challenge classification and threaten boundary making and normativity. 
Viruses are, as I argued earlier, interruptive. HIV is a retrovirus, and can be seen to quite literally and 
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materially interrupt the genomic processes of the cell that it infects to become integrated into the 
cell’s own DNA. In respect of forms of life, viruses also clearly interrupt the temporal life narratives 
of individuals, including the practices and communities that are possible for and available to 
individuals. Activist and patient advocacy groups have harnessed the liminality of the category of 
bare life that people living with HIV/AIDS are relegated to, along with the possibilities of queer 
horizontal community formation and the dynamics of transfer in order to interrupt the production of 
biomedical knowledge and the processes of biopower. Viruses thus function as biological-social 
interruptions in a number of ways. Muñoz argues that thinking in terms of a utopian futurity can 
‘interrupt the linear temporal ordering of past, present and future’.84 I agree with Muñoz’s approach 
but want to suggest that the virus perhaps draws more attention than the idea of horizon to the 
dangers that are also present in futurity and need to be thought through. The mortal consequences 
of infection and treatment have emphasised the necessity of activist work and the involvement of 
patient advocacy groups in the production of scientific and biomedical knowledge about bodies, 
diseases and treatments. While this project is utopian, it also necessarily emphasises the dangers 
present in possible future multispecies entanglements and attempts to account for these. As an 
interruptive agent, the virus is also linked to the final figure I will be discussing in this chapter, that of 
the monster. I will argue that the monster is useful to knot together queerness and the virus so as to 
question normativity while also suggesting the necessity of queer politics having an infinite 
hospitality to monstrous possible futures to come. 
Monsters 
 To fully explore the potential of viruses to queer temporality and futurity, I want to 
introduce a final figure, one that I will argue links queerness and the virus through the ideas of the 
subversion of the ‘natural’ order and functions to interrupt normativities and classificatory practices: 
the figure of the monster. The word ‘monster’ derives from the Latin, monstrum, from the root 
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monere, to warn. As philosopher and cultural historian Stephen T. Asma states: ‘To be a monster is 
to be an omen.’85 Monsters are not just physical or biological aberrations that do not fit traditional 
taxonomy, but also portents, or glimpses, of alternative or non-normative futures. Teratology, or the 
study of abnormal organisms had been practised since the 17th century, but monstrosity was a 
particularly important topic in the 19th century and was instrumental in Darwin’s formulation of the 
theory of evolution by natural selection. Asma explores the history of teratology and suggests that, 
before Darwin, the classifications of monsters as individual deviations from physical and 
morphological norms led to the question: ‘Did mutations in the individual lead to new branches on 
the phylogenetic tree?’86 Asma argues that before Darwin discovered and adapted Thomas 
Malthus’s population theory as discussed in Chapter One, he considered monstrosity to be part of 
the biological phenomenon of variation and a possible catalyst for evolution. However, once 
evolutionary descent was framed in terms of environmental pressures and minor mutations, 
monsters were discounted as creative forces; instead, monstrous individuals were considered as 
either vestigial remnants or cases of arrested development.87 Importantly, monsters not only 
threaten taxonomic classification or suggest that taxonomic boundaries are not impermeable, but 
also threaten the delineation of and distinction between the past, present and future. Monsters 
represent either an omen of a possible future or a reoccurrence of a no-longer-existing past.  
 I want to suggest that the figure of the monster links queerness and viruses in a number of 
ways. Viruses are monstrous in a colloquial sense, as dangerous, deadly and infectious material 
agents. The destruction of vast populations by the spread of tiny material agents such as HIV leaves 
no doubt as to their monstrous character in this sense. Viruses are also monstrous in the sense that 
they threaten systems of taxonomic classification. As liminal agents – neither non-living chemical 
compounds nor living organisms – viruses threaten the very distinction between the living and the 
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non-living. It is no coincidence that the mimivirus, discussed earlier, was described as ‘truly 
monstrous’ when it was discovered.88 Philosopher Noël Carroll describes the monster as ‘a being in 
violation of the natural order’, and viruses echo this definition as they threaten the biological 
classification of matter as either living or non-living.89 The debate among scientists about whether or 
not viruses should be considered living or non-living demonstrates that viruses are liminal material 
agents, and draws attention to the contingent and situated practice of biological classification. 
Rather than stating that viruses violate the natural order, it is clear that viruses violate and draw 
attention to the classificatory practices used to produce the idea of a natural order. The persistence 
of ancient viruses in the human genome also demonstrates the virus’s potential to violate the linear 
temporal ordering of past, present and future through vertical inheritance. 
 Queerness is linked to the virus through its monstrosity. Queer theory emerged as an 
attempt to deliberately violate the established binary configuration of homosexuality as 
oppositional, or marginal, to heterosexuality. Queer theory, given its monstrous birth in the early 
90s, represented a celebration of the non-normative. As David M. Halperin describes it, ‘Queer is by 
definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant.’90 Queerness is a 
celebration of the strange, the non-normative and the monstrous. More recent work in queer theory 
has also suggested that queerness can also subvert the traditional ordering of past, present, future, 
and prompt a rethinking of temporality and suggest new ways of conceptualising the future.91 As 
queer is at odds with normativities and draws attention to the relationalities that allow normativities 
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to function, then queer by definition is always already monstrous, and I propose that it is only 
through monstrosity that it can question, threaten and overcome normativities. Queerness as 
monstrosity is also important when trying to imagine and bring about alternative futures, for 
working towards queer horizons, and rethinking futurity outside of heteronormativity.  As I have 
suggested, this has polictical consequences. There is a social stigma attached to living and dying with 
particular diseases, illnesses and infections. I argued that this depends upon a conception of the 
body as pure and sterile, bounded against an infectious exterior world of dangerous and deadly 
microorganisms, and that this conception is always biopolitical as well as biological. Symbiogenesis 
and the reconception of the human body as a multispecies community could challenge this, and thus 
go some way to imagine and bring about more equitable futures for non-normative bodies, 
communities and practices. 
Monsters and the Future 
 I want, at this point, to link the idea of queerness and futurity to the figure of the monster 
more explicitly through the work of Jacques Derrida on monstrosity and the future. For Derrida, the 
future is necessarily monstrous. In On Grammatology Derrida states: ‘The future can only be 
anticipated in the form of an absolute danger. It is that which breaks absolutely with constituted 
normality and can only be proclaimed, presented, as a sort of monstrosity.’92 In this use of the 
monster figure, Derrida is drawing on the sense of the word already discussed; monsters are 
warnings or omens of futures to come.93 For Derrida, the future is radically unknowable and has the 
potential to break completely with normality and normativity. Derrida speaks of the future in terms 
of this radical unknowability and the potential for the subversion of normativity through the notion 
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of the monstrous arrivant, that which (or who) arrives. The monstrous arrivant is always to-come, 
and is not a person or event but rather hospitality itself to the future and the unknown.94 Derrida 
states in an interview that: 
the future is necessarily monstrous: the figure of the future, that is, that which can only be 
surprising, that for which we are not prepared, you see, is heralded by species of monsters. 
A future that would not be monstrous would not be a future; it would already be a 
predictable, calculable, and programmable tomorrow. All experience open to the future is 
prepared or prepares itself to welcome the monstrous arrivant.95 
A queer project must be open to the future, as it looks to find and create possibilities for alternative 
future positions, narratives, bodies of knowledge and ways of living well. These are potential futures 
– futures that break with normativity and are thus more equitable and just. Queer projects, then, 
must be prepared to welcome this monstrous arrivant and be oriented and open towards 
unknowable futures. 
 Derrida’s notion of the future to come and the hospitality to the monstrous arrivant informs 
Haraway’s companion species framework as well as her earlier work that is more explicitly 
concerned with notions of the monstrous. Haraway argues that entering into a companion species 
relationship is to open both partners in the relationship up to an unknowable future, a becoming-
with that is always a becoming worldly.96 Haraway’s becoming is both non-teleological and, I argue, 
also utopian in the sense of the term articulated by Muñoz. As Haraway argues, the demand of 
companion species is to try to ‘learn more about how to flourish together in difference without the 
telos of a final peace’.97 Becoming-with companion species, and becoming worldly, is to be open to 
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become radically other, which is a hospitality towards an unknowable future. This is one of the 
reasons that Haraway argues: ‘I am who I become with companion species, who and which make a 
mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind’.98 For the purposes of my argument, becoming-
with is always a becoming-monstrous; ‘who I become with companion species’ is always both 
unknowable in advance and, like the monster, challenges or ‘makes a mess out of’ normative 
categories and taxonomies. This becoming is also utopian, or as Haraway describes it, a project of 
autre-mondialisation, or other-worlding.99 Becoming-with companion species is both a becoming-
monstrous and a becoming-worldly that gestures toward a different worldliness, and other-
worldings. This approach is resonant with Muñoz’s understanding of queer utopia as world-making:  
I see world-making here as functioning and coming into play through the performance of 
queer utopian memory, that is, a utopia that understands its time as reaching beyond some 
nostalgic past that perhaps never was or some future whose arrival is continuously belated – 
a utopia in the present.100 
What Haraway elsewhere describes as the ‘promises of monsters’ is this ability of the figure of the 
monster to suggest potential other-worldings that break with normativities and normalisation. 
Becoming-monstrous is a queer world-making project of hospitality and openness to other and 
unknowable futures to come.  
Glimpsing Possible Futures: Living and Dying with the Virus 
 As I stated earlier, becoming-with must not be promoted at the expense of unbecoming. 
Narratives of becoming-with risk being incorporated into overly positive narratives of progress and 
success that do not take into account the power of failure and unbecoming. Becoming-with must be, 
as Haraway states, ‘as full of dying as living, as full of endings [...] as beginnings.’101 My symbiosocial 
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and queer ecological approach, that recognises the entangled nature of all living and non-living 
agency must recognise the dangers inherent in the radical openness of all agencies to unbecoming in 
their relations with others. This is biopolitical, as it emphasises the danger and threat of unbecoming 
as individuals living with viruses can experience unbecoming, both as a literal and mortal 
consequence of their illness, and also through relegation to a less than human, or less than alive, 
biopolitical position and status. Becoming-with the liminal virus can lead to relegation to this liminal 
category of not fully living citizenship and not quite dead: bare life. This liminality, however, can 
provide an opportunity for what Helmreich calls the dynamics of transfer. Although biopower can 
function to relegate individuals living with viruses to the category of bare life, the dynamics of 
transfer and the possibilities of horizontal community-formation available in this liminal position can 
allow for the possibility of alternative narratives, positions, and bodies of knowledge, as well as the 
formation of powerful communities such as activist and patient advocacy groups.  
 There is an urgent political need for individuals to use the dynamics of transfer to counter 
oppressive biopower and form communities of activism and patient advocacy, which is particularly 
obvious in the case of individuals living with HIV/AIDS. It is important to re-emphasise the integral 
status of death to life, not only in biology as a science, in biological material such as genes, but also 
in ways of living. Rosi Braidotti argues that biopower must be always understood, ‘not only in the 
sense of the government of the living but also with relation to practices of dying’.102 Just as life forms 
are not in a relation of binary opposition to inorganic matter, forms of life are not in a relation of 
binary opposition to death or practices of dying. In this sense, the boundary between living and 
dying is as historically and culturally contingent as is the boundary between the organic and the 
inorganic. Activist and patient advocacy groups have established themselves as ‘lay experts’ and 
demanded to be an active part of the production of biomedical knowledge about HIV/AIDS, both in 
                                                          
102 Rosi Braidotti, ‘The Politics of “Life Itself” and New Ways of Dying’, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, 
and Politics, ed. by Diana Coole and Samatha Frost (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), pp. 201–218 (p. 
201). 
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its cause and treatment.103 This is essential so that people living with HIV/AIDS are not considered as 
passive objects or resources for the production of biomedical knowledge. Instead, work done by 
activist groups and others has reconfigured the infected body as an active and productive site, rather 
than simply a passive resource to be experimented with and upon.104 My queer political account also 
reconfigures all bodies as infected, as full of multispecies agencies that include bacteria and viruses. 
If all bodies are seen as multiple and infected, this could go some way to counter the stigma 
attached to living and dying with particular infections or diseases. 
As well as the question of how to reduce the number of individuals that die as a long-term 
consequence of infection with the virus, the close relation of life forms and forms of life also raises 
the question of what forms of life have been lost, and how to properly mourn them. Douglas Crimp, 
writing in 1989, raised this question: 
Alongside the dismal toll of death, what many of us have lost is a culture of sexual 
possibility: back rooms, tea rooms, bookstores, movie houses, and baths; the trucks, the 
pier, the ramble, the dunes. Sex was everywhere for us, and everything we wanted to 
venture: golden showers and water sports, cocksucking and rimming, fucking and fist 
fucking. Now our untamed impulses are either proscribed once again or shielded from us by 
latex. Even Crisco, the lube we used because it was edible, is now forbidden because it 
breaks down the rubber. Sex toys are no longer added enhancements; they're safer 
substitutes.105 
                                                          
103 Epstein, pp. 8–14. 
104 Epstein, p. 21. 
105 Douglas Crimp, ‘Mourning and Militancy’, October, 51 (1989), 3–18 (p. 11). 
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It is clear that for Crimp, HIV/AIDS has claimed more than the life of individuals; ways of life have 
been lost.106 He identifies a conservative drive to promote certain forms of life at the expense of 
others; that is, he cites specific examples of gay men being encouraged to ‘clean up their act’ and 
present positive images of the gay community. As Crimp notes, this is again at the expense of certain 
forms of life: ‘This means purging our community of “‘fringe’ gay groups” – drag queens, radical 
fairies, pederasts, bull dykes, and other assorted scum.’107 This tension between the celebration of 
non-normativity and a more conservative assimilationist politics was intensified by the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, and is still a concern for contemporary queer politics.108 
 Although scientific and cultural work must be done to eradicate the virus in the future, I 
want to argue that an approach that has this as its only goal is too closely aligned with the 
conservative assimilationist programme that continues to relegate people currently living with 
HIV/AIDS to the category of bare life – themselves reconfigured as dangerous liminal individuals to 
be eradicated. Not only is this a dangerous approach for individuals, but the entanglement of life 
forms and forms of life ensures that certain forms of life will also be reconfigured as a dangerous 
threat to the health of the majority. Non-normative communities will necessarily lose out, as they 
must be purged from the community for the sake of overall health. I contend that to open up the 
most equitable possible futures – to imagine and bring about the sort of utopia Muñoz discusses – 
queer politics must have an infinite hospitality and openness to unknowable monstrous arrivants. 
Queer politics must be open to innumerable monstrous life forms and forms of life. This entails 
imagining and bringing about not just futures where we live without HIV/AIDS, but also those where 
                                                          
106 It is arguable that these ways of life have been completely lost, even though it is clear that practices and 
communities have had to change in the wake of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Tim Dean, for example, argues that 
nonmonogamous sex without condoms represents a kind of kinship that is only possible in the wake of the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Specifically, he argues that: ‘Bareback subculture reclaims gay sex as sexuality by 
relegating epidemiological concerns to secondary status.’ Not all non-normative forms of life have been lost, 
and some have been created or reconfigured. (Tim Dean, Unlimited Intimacy: Reflections on the Subculture of 
Barebacking [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009].) 
107 Crimp, ‘Mourning and Militancy’, p. 13. 
108 For work in queer studies that critiques conservatism or assimilationism in queer theory and LGBT activism, 
see Michael Warner, The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1999), and Muñoz, Cruising Utopia. 
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we live well with the virus. Viral biopolitics must recognise the ability of the state to transfigure 
people living with viruses into figural viruses themselves, so as to eradicate them from the body 
politic. Viral biopolitics, however, must also recognise the opportunity for resistance and community 
through the connections and dynamics of the liminal category that the virus occupies. Focusing on 
the eradication of the virus is essential, but eradication cannot be the sole focus as this leads to 
people currently living with the virus being refigured as the virus and individuals and forms of life 
being eradicated from social life. Queer politics must therefore be open to monstrous futures living 
with viruses as well as working to produce biomedical knowledge that reduces infection and 
improves treatment. What is at stake is not just living well, but practices of dying well in more-than-
human worlds. 
Conclusion 
The boundary between the living and the non-living is foundational to the theory and 
practice of biology as a science. In the first three chapters of my thesis I have left the supposed 
binary opposition of living/non-living uninterrogated and focused mainly on the oppositions 
between subject/object, active/passive, born/made, human/nonhuman and the biological/social. 
This final chapter has therefore functioned as an interruptive to the trajectory of the first three 
chapters. Also, throughout the first three chapters I have been considering the possibilities and 
opportunities presented when taking connection, entanglement and symbiosis with the more-than-
human world seriously. Again, the final chapter seeks to interrupt this narrative so as to prevent the 
over-emphasis on positive narratives of becoming at the expense of failure and unbecoming. 
Specifically I introduced the figure of the virus to suggest that Haraway’s companion species 
approach can be expanded or elaborated to include constitutive relations with all worldly living and 
non-living agencies.  
Viruses problematise the distinction between life and non-life. Scientists disagree as to 
whether they can be considered to be living organisms. Essential to this debate is the idea that 
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organisms must be able to self-sustain and replicate without other organisms. Of course, this 
obscures the fact that all living organisms are dependent upon other living organisms to survive. 
Also, the classification of viruses within trees of life, or phylogenies, is difficult if not impossible, due 
to their horizontal gene-shuffling and the rate of viral evolution. Viruses draw attention to the 
challenges and complexities of taxonomic classification practices. These challenges suggest that 
perhaps the tree of life is not always the best metaphor for understanding life. A queer ecological 
mesh could be a better way of thinking the interrelation and entanglement of all living and non-
living agencies. Viruses, within the mesh, are neither living nor dead; they are inert outside of host 
cells, but integral to the human genome and the evolution of life itself. The very idea of ‘life itself’ is 
also important for this chapter, read alongside Helmreich’s use of Agamben’s distinction between 
zoē and bios – particularly his useful elaboration of this distinction in terms of ‘life forms’ and ‘forms 
of life’. The definition of agencies as life forms or not is always intimately entangled with social 
considerations of forms of life, or ways of living. To illustrate this point I discussed the example of 
people living with HIV/AIDS. 
HIV/AIDS within the mesh knots together a number of biological and social issues. These 
include issues of sexuality, sex, gender, race and class, as well as issues of ecology, conservation, 
science, biomedicine, and local, national and international legal policies. I focused on US immigration 
policy that, until 2010, relegated people with HIV/AIDS to the category of bare life – denying them 
citizenship. At stake in this is not just the ability to live as a political citizen, but also the care and 
maintenance of those ‘failed’ and infected bodies that are relegated to the category of bare life, as 
well as the rights and practices of dying. Biopower is not, however, solely a matter of oppression 
from nation states. The dynamics of transfer, facilitated in part by the virus’s liminal status, allows 
for the formation of activist and patient advocacy groups that can successfully question the theories 
and practices of science and biomedicine that relate to infection and treatment. To some extent, 
people with HIV/AIDS were interpellated into the role of the liminal virus, and then appropriated this 
position into a position of knowledge and power. People living with HIV/AIDS demanded to be taken 
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seriously as subjects producing knowledge, rather than objects for scientific experimentation. People 
living with HIV/AIDS refused to be victims, and began to be ‘people living with HIV/AIDS’ rather than 
just ‘sufferers’ or ‘patients’. 
It is my argument that this activist and patient advocacy approach needs to be drawn 
together with critical theories of queer temporality. In the face of the continuing HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
with no cure or vaccine available, it is important to not just learn from activist and patient advocacy 
groups from the early days of the epidemic, but to imagine and bring about futures that deal with 
HIV/AIDS in the most equitable way possible. To think through possible ways of thinking a queer 
future both with and without the virus, I knotted queerness and the virus up with the figure of the 
monster. A monster is that which confounds classification and refuses normativity, as well as being 
an omen or portent of alternative futures. Viruses, in their monstrosity, may offer glimpses of 
possible futures that are both outside of heteronormative reproduction, and committed to forms of 
life that include living with and without the virus. This is not a compromise, or an admission of 
failure, but rather an approach that is utopian in attempting to imagine and bring about better 
futures, without being naive to the real mortal dangers and consequences that are part of 
multispecies becoming-with. The threatening, dangerous, and liminal status of the virus allows for 
the dynamics of transfer to be appropriated by individuals and communities for positive political 
aims. In one sense, living with HIV/AIDS is both a becoming and an unbecoming; it emphasises the 
possibilities and dangers involved in negotiating entanglements and connections in more-than-
human worlds. Queer politics must take the mesh seriously, as well as the responsibilities and 
dangers that this symbiosocial becoming-with the more-than-human world entails. From this 
perspective it is clear that there are different ways of doing science and different ways that biology 
and biomedicine get knotted up together. Queer ecologies and viral biopolitics raise the question of 
how scientific and biomedical projects are framed – in the case of HIV/AIDS in terms of complete 
eradication or in more complex terms where eradication of the virus is one goal among many that 
include living and dying well with the virus. These are urgent and ongoing political issues, as they are 
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about caring for those currently living and dying with the virus, as well as those who will come to live 
and die with the virus in the future. Past, present and future entanglements of the biological and 
social in multispecies becoming-with have real mortal consequences on individuals, practices, 
communities and worlds. Life forms, forms of life, and practices of dying are at stake, when 
attempting to live well in the more-than-human world. 
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Conclusion 
Living and Dying in a More-than-Human World 
 
‘Disease is a relationship’ 
Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf1 
 
In 2004, British artist Luke Jerram exhibited a collection of glass sculptures of microbiological 
entities, particularly disease microbes. The sculptures, ranging in size from 10cm to more than two 
metres tall, are both a visual and tactile prompt to consider the diseases’ effects on the world. 
Jerram is colour-blind, and the project is also a way of questioning the practice of artificially adding 
colour to medical images. Images of viruses, for example, are often artificially coloured even though 
they are smaller than the wavelength of light, so therefore have no colour. Jerram’s project seeks to 
question this practice and, in creating intricate glass models of viruses and other microbiological 
agents (including bacteria and parasitic protists such as Plasmodium that cause malaria), explore the 
tension between the beauty of the object and the often devastating effect on humans of the 
microbial entity being represented. In an interview, Jerram describes the link between the tactile 
nature of the objects and the worldwide effect of the disease that they represent: ‘Originally, I made 
a glass sculpture of HIV that people could hold in their hand and contemplate the global issues of 
what that virus is doing to the world.’2 The HIV sculptures are at once a comment on the practices 
that are involved in the production of scientific meaning (in this case the use of electron microscopy 
                                                          
1 Donna Haraway, How Like a Leaf: An Interview with Thyrza Nichols Goodeve (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 
75. 
2 Luke Jerram, ‘Interview with the Wellcome Collection, London 2009’, Luke Jerram: Glass Microbiology 
<http://www.lukejerram.com/glass/interviews> [accessed 10 December 2012] (para. 4 of 8). 
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and artificial colouring) as well as an attempt to represent both the material specificity of the 
microbiological, and the real and mortal effects of the biological upon the world.  
The project’s tension between the beauty of the object and the danger of the 
microbiological agents that are represented is also deeply personal. Published on Jerram’s website is 
the following letter: 
 I just saw a photo of your glass sculpture of HIV. 
I can’t stop looking at it. Knowing that millions of those guys are in me, and will be a part of 
me for the rest of my life. Your sculpture, even as a photo, has made HIV much more real for 
me than any photo or illustration I’ve ever seen. It’s a very odd feeling seeing my enemy, 
and the eventual likely cause of my death, and finding it so beautiful.3 
This letter illustrates the tensions at work in Jerram’s project, as well as those that run through this 
thesis, with its focus on queer ecological entanglements and multispecies becoming-with. In short, 
these tensions are always present in attempts to live well in the more-than-human world. The 
author of the letter is entangled in an obligatory relationship with the viruses inhabiting their cells 
and body. The lives of both the human and the virus (if a virus does indeed ‘live’) are, after infection, 
inextricably and unavoidably entangled. A person living with HIV/AIDS also depends upon the latest 
scientific and biomedical knowledge to be able to adapt their life so as to live better with the virus. 
In the letter, HIV/AIDS is presented as both companion and enemy; it is an unavoidable part of the 
author’s life, and the possible cause of their death. The virus, in Jerram’s project, is beautiful, while 
also devastatingly dangerous and deadly, on both a personal and global scale. 
 
                                                          
3 Luke Jerram, ‘HIV’, Luke Jerram: Glass Microbiology <http://www.lukejerram.com/glass/gallery/hiv> 
[accessed 10 December 2012] (para. 4 of 7). 
234 
 
Knowledges, Agencies 
 In Chapter One I argued that Edward O. Wilson’s Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (published 
in 1975) and the feminist responses to this publication are very significant as a negotiation between 
the biological and social. Specifically, Wilson’s theory of sociobiology represents a particular method 
of relating evolutionary biology with social structures and norms, for example traditional gendered 
norms and roles. Using feminist engagements with sociobiology as a lens through which to 
interrogate broader issues of science and society, I explored feminist epistemologies that analysed 
the relationship between patriarchal structures in society, and in the theory and practice of science. 
As an example of a feminist epistemology that engages with the construction of scientific knowledge 
I analysed Donna Haraway’s concept of situated knowledges. Situated knowledges build upon earlier 
work done in feminist standpoint and postmodern epistemologies and provide a way of thinking 
through the relationship of the biological and the social without relying on either radical social 
constructivism or biological determinism. This approach is useful for interrogating the theory and 
practice of science, as well as interrogating attempts to rewrite scientific theory for positive social 
purposes, such as Elaine Morgan’s exploration of the Aquatic Ape Hypothesis. In Chapter One I 
employed Haraway’s situated knowledges, and argued that Morgan’s narrative of evolutionary 
descent from the perspective of the female ape can be read as drawing attention to the ways in 
which patriarchy structures and is structured by scientific theory and practice. Not only this, but 
through the situated connections between contemporary female experience and embodiment and 
the pre-hominid ape, Morgan’s narrative also draws attention to the hierarchical oppositions that 
structure narratives of evolutionary descent. The female is opposite and hierarchically subordinate 
to male, and this opposition resonates with those of human/animal, active/passive, and 
agent/resource. I argued that Morgan’s narrative subverts these binary oppositions and allow the 
female ape (and consequently contemporary female experience and embodiment) an agency that is 
traditionally denied in evolutionary theory. In this chapter, I emphasised the potential to create 
235 
 
alternative scientific narratives for different political purposes, while being attentive to the 
constraints on this. 
In the second chapter I focused on the ways in which gender and sexuality studies 
developed in the 1990s alongside scientific developments in the field of genetics. Specifically, I 
explored feminist engagements with deconstruction, and the birth of queer theory. Feminist 
engagements with deconstruction built upon insights from earlier feminist epistemologies and the 
tensions present in these approaches, and responded to a number of questions that these 
approaches posed. In feminist standpoint epistemologies, for example, how was the category of 
woman defined, and what counted as female experience? Was there a single stable position from 
which to claim an identity or experience of the female, and what were the consequences of this for 
feminist politics? Feminist engagements with deconstruction suggested that there could be shared 
politics and solidarity without recourse to a single shared and grounded identity or experience. At 
the same time, queer theory was being developed as a similarly deconstructive approach to identity, 
experience and politics. Both of these theories sought to question determinism and explore the 
possibilities of partial and contingent connections and political solidarities. The 1990s, however, saw 
a proliferation of ‘gene talk’ and narratives of genetic determinism, due to the hubris that 
surrounded the Human Genome Project.4 I explored the genesis of the Human Genome Project, as it 
offers a perspective on specific pieces of research done in the 1990s to discover a biological or 
genetic basis for homosexuality. Using resources from deconstructive approaches to feminism and 
queer theory, this chapter developed an account of genes and sexuality that neither argues a genetic 
basis for sexuality nor attempts to dissociate sexuality from materiality and embodiment and 
suggest a social or cultural basis for sexuality. Instead, I argued for an approach that goes beyond the 
crude opposition of ‘born’ or ‘made’ in discussions of sexuality, to consider genes as active biological 
and social agents that are always already entangled up in and with biological-social bodies, 
                                                          
4 Evelyn Fox Keller, The Century of the Gene (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000) 
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experiences and identities. Once again, this chapter demonstrates that there is the possibility of 
radical and alternative narratives and positions when the biological and the social are put into 
conversation. 
 Chapter Two expanded upon the discussion of the agency of the female ape discussed in 
Chapter One, to consider the agency of human genes and genetic material. Continuing the roughly 
chronological trajectory that was followed in the first two chapters, Chapter Three developed the 
approaches and findings discussed in the first two chapters to more fully discuss nonhuman (or 
‘more-than-human’) agency, as well as the political possibility of kinship beyond the human. To 
interrogate the possibilities for more-than-human agency and kinship, this chapter focused on the 
obligate kinship entanglements between the human and the bacterial. In order to explore this fully, I 
used resources from evolutionary biology, specifically Lynn Margulis’s theory of symbiogenesis, and 
kinship theories developed in gender and sexuality studies in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These 
approaches to kinship suggest the possibility of thinking kinship beyond familial relations, as well as 
beyond heterobiological reproduction and vertical inheritance. I develop this suggestion to argue 
that queer kinship can be expanded to include the more-than-human. I draw from symbiogenesis an 
insistence that humans are ‘loose committees’ of trillions of more-than-human individuals and 
genomes, and put this into conversation with social theories about the kinds of human kinship made 
possible by developments in science and technology such as the Human Genome Project. 
Specifically, I attempted a merger of symbiogenesis and biosociality into a symbiosocial approach. I 
align symbiosociality with both the diffractive queer approaches outlined in earlier chapters and 
Haraway’s work on companion species. This symbiosocial approach to kinship suggests that humans 
are always already entangled in emergent multispecies relationships – relationships that are 
performative and co-constitutive. Once again, agency is not restricted to humans, but rather found 
in all of the multispecies biological-social relationships that make up the more-than-human world. 
Symbiosociality is also a political representation, and inherits from biosociality a Foucauldian 
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approach to biopower and biopolitics. As such, it is linked to the discussions of viral biopower in the 
fourth and final chapter. 
 In the fourth and final chapter I interrupted the trajectory of the thesis set out in the first 
three chapters. I argued, in fact, that interruption is a necessary and useful critical practice. To this 
end, I expanded my account of more-than-human agency and kinship to include viruses – liminal 
material agents that interrupt in a number of ways. Viruses interrupt at a cellular level (and I 
discussed the specific example of HIV, which interrupts and inserts its genetic material into the host 
cell upon infection) as well as in genomic and evolutionary narratives through the persistence of 
ancient viruses in the human genome and the impossibility of constructing unproblematic viral 
phylogenies. Viruses also interrupt at a personal level, in terms of an individual’s health and the 
ability to live well after infection. Furthermore, I explored the status of viruses as liminal, occupying 
a problematic position between living organism and non-living chemical – between life and death. 
Through this liminality they interrupt the seeming opposition of living/non-living that structures the 
theory and practice of the biological sciences. Chapter Four argued that the interruption of viruses 
draws attention to mortality, and to the dangerous and deadly in multispecies kinship. This, I argued, 
is itself a necessary political interruption to narratives of multispecies entanglements that focus on 
flourishing, becoming more and knowing more. These narratives must be as much about dying and 
mortality as they are about living and flourishing. To elucidate this point, I discussed the example of 
people living with HIV/AIDS, and drew out some of the tensions that I identified in Jerram’s glass 
microbiology work. For people living with the virus, they are caught up in an entanglement with viral 
agency that has effects on forms of life as well as practices of living and dying. Viruses are both 
companions and enemies, and I explored this in relation to viruses’ creative and productive effect 
within evolution and genomics alongside their destructive effects on individual bodies. Individuals 
living with HIV/AIDS are subjected to a bodily and often mortal unbecoming, but also to a biopolitical 
unbecoming whereby they are relegated to a liminal biopolitical category of ‘bare life’ – comparable 
to the liminal category occupied by the virus. Putting viral biopolitics into conversation with insights 
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from previous chapters and work on queer temporality, I suggested that this liminal status can be 
exploited for positive ends, and I discussed the example of HIV/AIDS activist groups who have 
reconfigured the infected body as an active site (rather than a passive resource) in the production of 
scientific and biomedical knowledge. I also argued that the symbiosocial approach reconfigures all 
bodies as infected, and that this is a political point that could work towards reducing the stigma that 
surrounds living and dying with particular diseases and infections. Not only are there alternative 
positions and narratives available in the entanglement of the biological and the social, but there are 
also alternatives for health practices and ways of living. 
Entanglements 
 Throughout the project, I attempted to develop an approach that recognises the need for 
faithful accounts of a ‘real’ material world, full of agencies that do things and bear upon each other 
with material consequences. Simultaneously I have attempted to recognise the historically 
constructed, situated and contingent character of any and all knowledge claims about this world. In 
doing so, I have argued that the seeming opposition of the real and the socially constructed does not 
hold, and is always already deconstructing itself. Paired terms such as material/semiotic, the 
biological/the social, born/made, matter/meaning, and nature/culture are not tenable as 
oppositions, and this thesis has tried to demonstrate this in a number of ways. This has been 
primarily through the exploration of agency, not as a property of individuals (whether human or 
more-than-human), but as an emergent, performative, and constitutive relationality. This 
relationality has been explored as ‘entanglement’ and the biological and social have been argued to 
be entangled all the way down. Important to my proposed focus on the entanglement of the 
biological and the social is the demand to take seriously both the material specificity of the biological 
and the socially and historically specific contexts within which knowledge claims are constructed and 
maintained. Pre-hominid apes, genes, bacteria and viruses are ‘real’ material entities that act upon 
each other and other agencies within complex ecological networks, webs or meshes. At the same 
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time, they are inseparable from the discourses that articulate knowledge claims about them. I 
argued in Chapter Two, for example, that ‘real’ material genes and the Human Genome Project and 
narratives of genetic determinism co-form and co-shape each other in a performative relationality. 
The biological gene and the social gene are inseparable and co-constitute each other through their 
entanglement. 
 Human bodies and experience are entangled in the more-than-human world of multispecies 
agency. I have developed this idea through existing theories of kinship, particularly those that 
emphasise the obligate, necessary, and non-voluntaristic nature of kinship relations. Not only this, 
but these unavoidable and constitutive kinship relations that the human is entangled in also draw 
attention to the classification practices that go into defining kin and kinds, while demonstrating the 
contingency of classification. Kinship relations across species boundaries draw attention to 
boundaries and boundary-making practice, while suggesting the radical possibility of subverting 
classification and breaking down and redrawing these boundaries. Human-bacterial kinship 
discussed in Chapter Three, for example, illustrates the practical and theoretical labour that goes 
into defining species. The difficulty in defining bacterial species draws attention to the fact that the 
traditional model of species classification, the Biological Species Concept, overemphasises vertical 
inheritance at the expense of horizontal gene transfer and sexual reproduction at the expense of 
other forms of biological reproduction. Importantly, the interdependence of the human and the 
bacterial (which I analyse in terms of digestion and in energy production in the cell) emphasises the 
classificatory practices that go into defining species boundaries. At the same time, however, this 
interdependence also suggests that in their material specificity both humans and bacteria are 
involved in obligate, necessary and cross-species kinship relationships that question the very 
possibility of isolating individual organisms or defining species. 
 As well as exploring transgressions of species boundaries, this project has sought to 
negotiate boundaries that may be thought of as equally, if not even more, rigid: boundaries between 
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academic disciplines. I have, throughout the thesis, attempted to put seemingly disparate disciplines 
into conversation with each other not just to interrogate the entanglement of the biological and 
social, but to attempt to demonstrate that disciplinary boundaries are less rigid than they might first 
appear. It is not a matter of one discipline opening up its borders to accept another, or being 
extended into other fields. This is the approach that Wilson outlines in Sociobiology. In this book he 
claims that ‘sociology and the other social sciences, as well as the humanities, are the last branches 
of biology waiting to be included in the Modern Synthesis’.5 A similar claim could be made from the 
opposite direction: that is, biology is solely social construction and discourse, and should be analysed 
as such. Despite my attempt to blur disciplinary boundaries, I have not followed this approach, 
instead suggesting a diffractive approach. This approach, outlined in detail in Chapter Two, suggests 
that borders between disciplines are, like borders between light and dark created by diffraction 
patterns, permeable and difficult to define: in diffraction, light spots appear in dark areas, and dark 
in light. It is not that biology is really social, or the social really biological. Rather, seemingly separate 
fields can be read diffractively through and against each other to produce interesting and often 
unpredictable patterns of interference and diffraction. Symbiogenesis and indigestion as discussed in 
Chapter Three offers another way of viewing the interdisciplinary framework I have tried to work 
within. Resources and insights from different fields of knowledge can be incorporated but not 
assimilated – ingested but not digested – by approaches from different fields. This involves 
maintaining rather than resolving the interdisciplinary tensions that result. 
Boundaries and Bodies 
With this in mind, I have used resources and insights from a number of different fields. 
These include (and this is not an exhaustive list): gender studies, feminist theory, feminist science 
studies, evolutionary biology, neo-Darwinism, quantum mechanics, genomics, lesbian and gay 
studies, queer theory, deconstruction, feminist technoscience studies, symbiogenesis, bacteriology, 
                                                          
5 Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 4. 
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kinship theories, animal studies, virology, biopolitics and biopower, ecological thinking, and 
biomedicine. I have tried to put these resources and approaches into productive conversation with 
each other, to read different insights with and through each other, which has also involved drawing 
on (and redrawing) several existing conversations. The thesis as a whole is therefore analogous to a 
diffraction pattern itself: the sometimes unexpected pattern that is formed when light waves 
interfere with each other through superposition. As I explained in Chapter Two, when light waves of 
different frequencies are passed through a diffraction grating (such as a bird’s feather), the 
superposition and interference of the light waves can produce colourful patterns (such as 
iridescence), unexpected areas of light where a dark shadow would be expected and dark in areas of 
light. Similarly, I have attempted to bring together disparate areas of study, to read their insights and 
approaches with, through, and against each other in the hopes of producing a pattern of (perhaps 
unexpected) findings, conclusions and insights.  
 One of the central arguments of my project has been that the body is queer: queer to itself 
and always already queering itself. This is often ignored or effaced in normative narratives of 
embodiment or bodily experience. In the introduction I analysed the supposed self-evidence of male 
and female bodily design. Bodies, in many evolutionary origin stories, are assumed to have been 
‘designed’ by evolution for heterosexual biological reproduction. Physiology, behaviour and pleasure 
are thus assumed to be adaptations with one sole purpose: the continuation of the species through 
vertical inheritance. From this follows the seeming self-evidence of the naturalness of 
heterosexuality and of normative sexual behaviour for the purposes of reproduction. Throughout 
the thesis I have explored the queerness of the body itself in a number of different ways, as well as 
building on important work in gender and sexuality studies that has sought to challenge 
heteronormative accounts of the body. In Chapter One, I analysed narratives of evolutionary descent 
in which the human body is always linked to its pre-human ancestors. In sociobiological accounts, 
contemporary bodily experience is explicitly nonhuman and pre-human, being explained through the 
logic of the adaptations of pre-hominid apes. In Chapter Two I developed upon this strangeness of 
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the body by exploring genes and genetic determinism. In narratives of genetic determinism, the 
body is simply a carrier for vertically inherited genes. However, exploring the complexities of 
genetics and reading genes as active and agential – as strange and queer – once again challenges the 
idea of an unproblematically human body. Chapter Three explored the more-than-human agencies 
that live symbiotically within the human gut, and within all plant and animal cells. Thinking of the 
human body as an ecosystem, a committee, or an assemblage, queers the very notion of a singular 
and human body; crucially, the human body is always already more-than-human. Chapter Four 
explored some of the mortal consequences of this way of conceptualising the body. The body is 
always porous and penetrable, and is always open to a radical more-than-human becoming. Not only 
this, but the body is always open to infection and the mortal dangers of unbecoming. This, as I have 
argued, is a political account, and one that could work to challenge the stigma attached to diseased, 
ill or infected bodies. 
The body is always already queer, and queering itself, as well as always being caught up in 
more-than-human entanglements. The human body is not singular, static, bounded and discrete, but 
is rather a multispecies becoming, emergent through relationships and entanglements with the 
more-than-human; as Anna Tsing argues: ‘Human nature is an interspecies relationship.’6 Haraway 
makes a similar point when she states: ‘You don’t become who you are without becoming with who 
you aren’t.’7 Multispecies entanglement is necessary and obligatory, and must be taken into account 
when exploring the relationship of the biological to the social and the role of the body in this 
relationship. The theory and practice of biology is entangled with discussions of what counts as 
living, which is entangled with the material specificity of viruses, themselves entangled with a range 
of biological and social issues including the troublesome biological-social task of taxonomic 
                                                          
6 Anna, Tsing, ‘Unruly Edges: Mushrooms as Companion Species’, Party Writing for Donna Haraway! (2010) 
<http://tsingmushrooms.blogspot.com/> [accessed 30 November 2011] 
7 Donna Haraway, ‘Cosmopolitical Critters: Companion Species, SF and Staying with the Trouble’, unpublished 
paper presented at Cosmopolitan Animals, John Coffin Memorial Lecture, Institute of English Studies, 26 
October 2012. A recording is available online at Youtube, 19 November 2012 
<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fMIm0SeRRY4> [accessed 17 February 2013]. 
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classification. Classificatory and boundary-making practices are themselves always already tangled 
up with questions of how to define the individual and the species, which is entangled with issues of 
biological kinship in phylogenies and social kinship in family trees, ecologies and beyond. In fact, the 
entanglements themselves get increasingly entangled and never resolve into easy distinctions or 
diagrammatic structures such as trees. These trees are concerned with vertical inheritance and 
heterobiological kinship. Crucially, though, inheritance is also always entangled up with horizontal 
transfer, communities, and kinship. Kinship and transfer entangles human genetics and genomics up 
with the genes and genomes of bacteria, viruses, and other microbiological agencies. These 
multispecies biological-social entanglements truly demonstrate entanglement all the way down. 
These more-than-human entanglements all the way down are complex and challenging, but they are 
also necessary, obligatory and they must be taken into account. Feminist and queer theories of the 
body offer useful tools or approaches to think through the idea of the human, of multispecies 
becomings, as well as scientific knowledge-making practices and related medical interventions. I 
have argued in this thesis, however, that the body itself is not just a passive resource for scientific or 
social theories; rather the body is always already strange and queer and interrupts both attempts at 
biological determinism and radical social constructivism. The body is not just strange and agential, 
but full of agential strangers and entangled with innumerable strange biological-social agencies. 
Futures 
 This project brings new perspectives to the entangled field of enquiry that I have described. 
The specific way in which I have brought the disparate fields into conversation with each other is an 
attempt to provide this new perspective for a number of reasons. These include interrogating the 
idea of the human, conceptualising more-than-human kinship and agency, and thinking through the 
mortal consequences of multispecies becoming for living well in terms of health and biopolitical 
citizenship. Foregrounding the queer ‘nature’ of the body and of ‘nature’ itself, the project has 
attempted to contribute to and provide resources for evolutionary theory and practice, non-
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deterministic theories and narratives of genetics and genomics, microbiology and kinship studies, as 
well as the related projects of virology, ecology and biomedical health practices. I would hope that 
the thesis could make a contribution to and be used as a resource for these and other areas, fields, 
and bodies of knowledge that are drawn into the entanglement of the biological and the social. 
 For example, the final chapter demonstrates a mode of thinking through the relationship 
between the material specificity of the more-than-human and the question of health, illness, and 
scientific and biomedical theories and practices. This, I would suggest, could be an avenue for fruitful 
future analysis – building upon some of the insights and approaches that I have developed in the 
thesis to explore other issues of health and illness that are related to more-than-human 
entanglement. In particular, viruses are not the only parasitic agencies that have effects on human 
health and which could be explored using the resources of this project. The word parasite comes 
from the Greek parasitos, meaning ‘person who eats at the table of another’, from para (beside) and 
sitos (food). This resonates with a companion species approach, echoing Haraway’s exploration of 
the etymological origin of ‘companion’ in the Latin cum panis, ‘with bread’. As she says, ‘Messmates 
at table are companions.’8 Etymologically speaking, the parasite is always already a companion, 
whether we like it or not. In many parts of the world, parasitic infections and infestations represent 
a serious health risk. In western urban centres, however, it has been suggested that the attempt to 
sever the knots of entanglement between the human and the parasite has led to the rise in 
autoimmune illnesses and disorders. Specifically, the Hygiene Hypothesis (or Old Friends Hypothesis) 
states that a lack of early childhood exposure to infectious agents, microorganisms and parasites 
increases susceptibility to allergic diseases and autoimmune disorders by suppressing the natural 
development of the immune system.9 
                                                          
8 Donna Haraway, When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), p. 17. 
9 The Hygiene Hypothesis was formalised by David P. Strachan in his article: ‘Hay Fever, Hygiene, and 
Household Size’, BMJ, 299 (1989), 1259–60. Medical microbiologist Graham Rook has suggested that because 
the focus of the hypothesis is not actually cleanliness, but more specifically co-evolution and interdependence, 
the hypothesis could be more suitably referred to as the ‘Old Friends Hypothesis’. See Graham A. W. Rook and 
Laura Rosa Brunet, ‘Old Friends for Breakfast’, Clinical and Experimental Allergy, 35:7 (2005), 841–2. 
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 This hypothesis has led to some individuals that suffer with chronic autoimmune disorders 
or severe allergies attempting to alleviate their symptoms with an experimental treatment: 
infestation with parasitic worms, or ‘helminths’. This process (evocatively called ‘rewilding’ the body 
by biologist Rob Dunn) involves introducing hookworm or whipworm into the gut where they take 
up residence and hopefully regulate the immune system.10 Scientific research on this subject is in the 
early stages, but some research shows promise.11 Anecdotally, some people report improvements to 
their conditions, while others do not.12 Self-infestation with parasitic worms as a health practice, as 
well as the biomedical research being done into the role of these worms in regulating the immune 
system, illustrates the evolutionary entanglement of the human in more-than-human relationships. 
Furthermore, it suggests that exploring these entanglements might lead not only to better 
understandings of the relationship between the human and the more-than-human, but might also 
provide resources for developing biomedical theories and practices that would hopefully alleviate 
the symptoms of individuals suffering with certain health problems. Similar to my queer political 
appropriation of symbiogenesis and biosociality in the fourth chapter, where I suggested that living 
well with the virus is important, the practice of deliberate self-infestation with parasitic worms 
suggests that although work must be done to reduce parasitic infections where they are a problem, 
it may be necessary to imagine and bring about futures where we live with parasites, not just 
without them (through eradication). 
                                                          
10 Rob Dunn, The Wild Life of Our Bodies: Predators, Parasites and the Partners that Shape who we are Today 
(New York: HarperCollins, 2011), especially pp. 30–58. 
11 One of the key researchers in this field is Joel Weinstock. For information about the animal and human 
research he has done on possible helminth control of autoimmune disorders, see Joel V. Weinstock and David 
E. Elliott, ‘Helminths and the IBD Hygiene Hypothesis’, Inflammatory Bowel Diseases, 15:1 (2009), 129–133. 
Examples of research that Weinstock has been a part of are: Robert R. Summers and others, ‘Trichuris suis 
Therapy for Active Ulcerative Colitis: A Randomized Controlled Trial’, Gastroenterology, 128:4 (2005), 825–832; 
and Kunihiko Kitagaki, ‘Intestinal Helminths Protect in a Murine Model of Asthma’, The Journal of Immunology, 
177:3 (2006), 1628–1635. 
12 A number of people suffering from chronic autoimmune disorders or severe allergies who experienced relief 
from symptoms are interviewed in the film, Parasites: A User’s Guide, dir. Sharon Shattuck (Sweet Fern 
Productions, 2010).  
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The approach outlined in this thesis does not necessarily need to be restricted to illnesses 
and health practices that are obviously related to the human body’s entanglement with multispecies 
agencies. The insights in the final chapter, where I suggest that queer temporalities might be 
explored alongside queer ecologies and the bodily and biopolitical reality of living with HIV/AIDS, 
could contribute to discourses and practices that surround living with any chronic or serious illness. 
Living with a chronic or serious illness could be interpreted as an unbecoming; the bringing of 
mortality, death and dying into the experience of life also suggests that illness is itself a liminal 
position, somewhere between living and dying. Living with a chronic or serious illness can also lead 
to alternative relations to temporality and the future. Treatments and health practices often 
restructure an individual’s relation to time, in terms of taking medication and making changes to 
lifestyle. Some theories of queer temporality suggest a radical break with the idea of the future and 
futurity. I argued in Chapter Four that imagining and bringing about futures, rather than rejecting 
them, is politically pressing and necessary for people currently living with HIV/AIDS in the present 
and those who will come to live with the virus in the future. Similarly, alternative futurities need to 
be imagined to bring about better and more equitable ways of living well and practices of dying for 
people currently suffering from chronic and serious health conditions and those who will come to 
suffer with illness in the future, as well as for all aging mortal bodies. 
 Like Jerram’s Glass Microbiology project, this thesis is committed to representing, as 
faithfully as possible, the material specificity of the biological organisms, agents and entities 
discussed. Simultaneously, the thesis has attempted to draw attention to the fact that any 
representation and knowledge claim about the biological is always produced within situated and 
contingent historical and social contexts. Just as Jerram attempts to faithfully represent the 
specificity of the parasites, viruses and bacteria that are represented in his glass sculptures, he also 
draws attention to the situated practices (such as electron microscopy and artificial colouring of 
scientific images) that work to produce the objects represented. This thesis has attempted to 
perform the same double movement to stress the entanglement of the biological and social. Similar 
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to Jerram’s project, the stakes of this thesis are also both personal and global. How the human is 
defined and the ways that more-than-human agency and kinship are conceptualised has implications 
and consequences that are both globally significant and intensely personal. Entangled in the mesh of 
more-than-human agency, scientific theory and practice, and health and illness, is the imperative of 
imagining and bringing about more equitable futures, with more possibilities for alternative 
narratives, positions and bodies of knowledge. A matter of life and death, the entanglement of the 
biological and the social has real mortal consequences for living well in the more-than-human world. 
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